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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., ) 
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN SUPREME COURT NO. 34485 
MCHUGH, BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE ) 
C. MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL ) 
MILLER, AND JOHN X COMBO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, ) 
, I 
PlaintiffIAppellant, 1 
vs. 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED ) 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH ) 
INC., 
1 
Defe~idantIRespondent, ) 
CLERK'S SUPPLEMENTAL RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls 
HONORABLE NATHAN HIGER 
District Judge 
Joseph Mallet Don Copple 
Deputy Attorney General Heather Cunningham 
P. 0. Box 7129 Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox 
Boise, ID 83707-1129 P. 0 .  Box 1583 
Boise, ID 83701 
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Date: 81. LO08 Fifth Judicial District Court - Twin Falls County 
Time: 04:15 PM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 16 Case: CV-2004-0006335 Current Judge: Nathan W. Higer 
State of Idaho, etal. vs. Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership, etal. 
Date Code 
NEWC 
COMP 
SMlS 
NOTC 
NOTC 
APER 
STlP 
HRSC 
NOAP 
HRHD 
CMlN 
HRSC 
HRSC 
ORDR 
NOSV 
ANSW 
NOSV 
NOSV 
NOSV 
STIP 
COMP 
NOSV 
NOSV 
NOSV 
NOSV 
User 
DAW 
DAW 
MCMULLEN 
MCMULLEN 
DAW 
DAW 
DAW 
DAW 
LlNDQ 
DENNIS 
MCMULLEN 
MCMULLEN 
DENNIS 
MCMULLEN 
MCMULLEN 
MCMULLEN 
MCMULLEN 
MCMULLEN 
MCMULLEN 
NlELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
RKLINE 
RKLINE 
RKLINE 
NlELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
User: COOPE 
Judge 
New Case Fiied John C. Hohnhorst 
Filing: U - Miscellaneous Fees Use Miscellaneous John C. Hohnhorst 
Schedule!!!!! Paid by: State of ldaho Receipt 
number: 4032517 Dated: 12/28/2004 Amount: 
$.00 (Cash) 
Complaint Filed John C. Hohnhorst 
Summons Issued John C. Hohnhorst 
Notice of Appearance John C. Hohnhorst 
Fiiing: I IA  - Civil Answer Or Appear. More Than John C. Hohnhorst 
$1000 No Prior Appearance Paid by: Davison, et 
a1 Receipt number: 5000763 Dated: 1/11/2005 
Amount: $47.00 (Check) 
Notice of Appearance John C. Hohnhorst 
Defendant: Canyon Vista Family Limited John C. Hohnhorst 
Partnership, Appearance E Don Copple 
Demand for Jury Trial John C. Hohnhorst 
Stipulation for Possession John C. Hohnhorst 
Hearing Scheduled (Status 06/13/2005 10:OO John C. Hohnhorst 
AM) 
Notice Of Hearing John C. Hohnhorst 
Notice Of Appearance John C. Hohnhorst 
Hearing result for Status held on 0611 312005 John C. Hohnhorst 
10:OO AM: Hearing Held 
Court Minutes John C. Hohnhorst 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference John C. Hohnhorst 
05/21/2007 09:OO AM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 06/05/2007 09:OO John C. Hohnhorst 
AM) 
Notice Of Hearing John C. Hohnhorst 
Scheduling Order & Notice of Trial Setting Order John C. Hohnhorst 
Notice Of Service John C. Hohnhorst 
Answer and Demand for Jury Trial John C. Hohnhorst 
Notice Of Service John C. Hohnhorst 
Notice Of Service John C. Hohnhorst 
Notice Of Service John C. Hohnhorst 
Stipulation to Amend Complaint John C. Hohnhorst 
First Amended Complaint John C. Hohnhorst 
Notice Of Service John C. Hohnhorst 
Notice Of Service John C. Hohnhorst 
Notice Of Service John C. Hohnhorst 
Notice Of Service John C. Hohnhorst, [; 6 
Date: , d2008 Fifth Judicial District Court -Twin Falls County 
Time: 04:15 PM ROA Report 
Page 2 of 16 Case: CV-2004-0006336 Current Judge: Nathan W. Higer 
State of Idaho, etal. vs. Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership, etal. 
Date Code User 
NOSV 
NOTC 
MOTN 
ORDR 
NOSV 
NOSV 
NOSV 
REQU 
MODQ 
ORDR 
ORAS 
CHJG 
HRSC 
CONT 
SCOR 
AFFD 
AFFD 
MEMO 
MOTN 
NOHG 
NOSV 
HRSC 
NOHG 
NOSV 
SUBR 
SUBR 
SUBR 
SUBR 
SUBR 
NIELSEN 
MCMULLEN 
MCMULLEN 
MCMULLEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
FERCH 
MCMULLEN 
TUBBS 
TUBBS 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NiELSEN 
COOPE 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
FERCH 
FERCH 
FERCH 
Notice Of Service John C. Hohnhorst 
Notice of Party Substitution John C. Hohnhorst 
Motion to amend Scheduling Order John C. Hohnhorst 
Order to Amend Scheduling Order John C. Hohnhorst 
Notice Of Service John C. Hohnhorst 
Notice Of Service John C. Hohnhorst 
Notice Of Service John C. Hohnhorst 
Request for Pre-Trial Conference John C. Hohnhorst 
Motion for Disqualification without cause John C. Hohnhorst 
Order to Disqualify Without Cause John C. Hohnhorst 
Order Of Assignment G. Richard Bevan 
Change Assigned Judge G. Richard Bevan 
Hearing Scheduled (StatusIADR 05/07/2007 G. Richard Bevan 
09:02 AM) 
Continued (Pretrial Conference 05/21/2007 G. Richard Bevan 
1030 AM) 
Amended Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial G. Richard Bevan 
Setting & lnitiai Pretrial Order 
Affidavit of Gary L. Young G. Richard Bevan 
fax 
Affidavit of Joseph D. Mallet in Support of Motion G. Richard Bevan 
to Consolidate 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Consolidate G. Richard Bevan 
Motion to Consolidate G. Richard Bevan 
Notice Of Hearing for Motion to Consolidate G. Richard Bevan 
Notice Of Service G. Richard Bevan 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/26/2007 09:OO G. Richard Bevan 
AM) to Consolidate 
Amended Notice of Hearing for Motion to G. Richard Bevan 
Consoiidate 
fax 
Notice Of Service G. Richard Bevan 
Subpoena Duces Tecum and Notice of G. Richard Bevan 
Deposition for Mark Butler 
Subpoena Duces Tecum and Notice of G. Richard Bevan 
Deposition for Greg Kelley 
Subpoena duces tecum and notice of deposition G. Richard Bevan 
for F Patrick Dobie Returned 
Subpoena duces tecum and notice of deposition G. Richard Bevan 
for Mark W Richey Returned 
Subpoena duces tecum and notice of deposition G. Richard Bevan 
for Roger L Dunlap Returned 0 "l 
Date. 8, !008 Fifth Judicial District Court - Twin Falls County 
Time: 04:15 PM ROA Report 
Page 3 of 16 Case: CV-2004-0006336 Current Judge: Nathan W. Higer 
State of Idaho, etal. vs. Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership, etal. 
User COOPE 
Date Code 
SUBR 
User 
FERCH 
. .. . m -  
Subpoena duces tecum and notice of deposition G. Richard Bevan 
for Christy Williams Returned 
Defendants' Objection To Motion To Consolidate G. Richard Bevan 
Brief In Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion To G. Richard Bevan 
Consolidate 
Affidavit Of Mark L. Butler In Opposition To G. Richard Bevan 
Plaintiff's Motion To Consolidate 
Affidavit Of E. Don Copple In OppositionTo G. Richard Bevan 
Plaintiff's Motion To Consolidate 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's First Motion G. Richard Bevan 
in Limine 
Plaintiff's First Motion in Limine G. Richard Bevan 
Second Affidavit of Joseph D. Mallet in Support of G. Richard Bevan 
Motion to Consolidate 
Brief in Support of Motion in Limine to Exclude All G. Richard Bevan 
Testimony and Evidence Regarding Cost of Cure 
Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Any G. Richard Bevan 
Evidence and Testimony Regarding the Cost to 
Cure Method 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Motion to G.  Richard Bevan 
Consolidate Hearing date: 3/26/2007 Time: 8:34 
am Court reporter: Virginia Bailey 
Hearing result for Motion held on 03/26/2007 G.  Richard Bevan 
09:OO AM: Hearing Held to Consolidate 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion in Limine G. Richard Bevan 
05/07/2007 09:OO AM) 
Hearing Scheduied (Hearing Scheduled G. Richard Bevan 
03/29/2007 09:OO AM) Ruling on motion to 
consolidate hearing by phone with Mr. Mallet to 
initiate to 7354372 
Notice Of Hearing G. Richard Bevan 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Hearing Scheduled G. Richard Bevan 
Hearing date: 3/29/2007 Time: 9:00 am Court 
reporter: Virginia Bailey 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on G. Richard Bevan 
03/29/2007 09:OO AM: Hearing Held Ruling on 
motion to consolidate hearing by phone with Mr. 
Mallet to initiate to 735-4372 
Notice Of Service G. Richard Bevan 
Notice Of Preparation Of Transcript & Filing G. Richard Bevan 
Motion in Limine to Exclude References to Taxes, G. Richard Bevan 
Taxpayers and Public Funds 
Motion in Limine to Exclude Appraisal Reports G. Richard Bevan 
Disclaimer of Interest from Lazy J Ranch, Inc. G. Richard Bevan 
, , .  98 
Notice Of Service (fax) G. Richard Bevan 
OBJC 
MOTN 
QUAM 
QUAM 
AFFD QUAM 
AFFD QUAM 
MEMO NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
MOTN NIELSEN 
CMlN COOPE 
HRHD 
HRSC 
HRSC 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE CMlN 
HRHD COOPE 
NOSV 
NOTR 
MOTN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
MOTN NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
MCMULLEN 
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State of Idaho, etal. vs. Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership, etal. 
Date Code User 
41912007 HRSC COOPE 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
AFFD NIELSEN 
SUBR NIELSEN 
AFFD NIELSEN 
SUER NiELSEN 
NiELSEN 
MOTN NIELSEN 
CONT COOPE 
AFFD NIELSEN 
MOTN 
NOSV 
411 012007 NOHG 
NOHG 
NOSV 
ORAS 
CHJG 
411 212007 BREF 
411 312007 NOSV 
411 612007 NOTR 
NOSV 
NIELSEN 
NlELSEN 
NiELSEN 
NIELSEN 
QUAM 
QUAM 
TUBBS 
TUBBS 
COOPE 
WALLS 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 0412312007 09:OO G. Richard Bevan 
AM) to enlarge to time 
Trial Brief - Part I (Condemnation Law issues G. Richard Bevan 
Brief in Support of Motion in Limine to Exclude AII G. Richard Bevan 
Testimony and Evidence Regarding Special 
Benefits 
Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude ail G. Richard Bevan 
Evidence and Testimony Regarding Secial 
Benefits 
Affidavit of Heather Cummingham in Support of G. Richard Bevan 
Motion in Limine to Exclude all Testimony and 
Evidence Regarding Special Benifits 
Subpoena Returned Duces Tecum and Notice of G. Richard Bevan 
Deposition for Linda Wills 
Affidavit of E Don Copple in Support of Motion in G. Richard Bevan 
Limine to Allow Deposition Testimony of Clarence 
Pomroy at Trial 
Amended Subpoena Duces Tecum and Notice of G. Richard Bevan 
Deposition for F. Patrick Dobie 
Brief in Support of Motion in Limine to Aliow into G. Richard Bevan 
Evidence the Deposition Testimony of Clarence 
Pomroy 
Defendants' Motion in Limine to Allow Deposition G. Richard Bevan 
Testimony of Clarence Pomroy at Trial 
Continued (Motion in Limine 0512112007 09:OO G. Richard Bevan 
AM) defendant. 
Affidavit of Heather A. Cunningham in Support of G. Richard Bevan 
Motion to Extend Time Set for Trial 
fax 
Motion to Extend Time Set for Trial G. Richard Bevan 
fax 
Notice Of Service G. Richard Bevan 
fax 
Notice Of Hearing G. Richard Bevan 
Notice Of Hearing G. Richard Bevan 
Notice Of Service G. Richard Bevan 
04/06/07 
Trial Brief-Part II G. Richard Bevan 
(Taking Of Access) 
Order Of ReAssignment Nathan W. Higer 
Change Assigned Judge Nathan W. Higer 
Trial Brief - Part li (Taking of Access) Nathan W. Higer 
Notice Of Service Nathan W. Higer 
0411 3107 
. . 
Notice Of Preparation Of Transcript & Filing Nathan W. Higer e 9 
Notice Of Service Nathan W. Higer 
Date: , ,/ZOO8 Fifth Judicial District Court -Twin Falls County 
Time: 04:15 PM ROA Report 
Page 5 of 16 Case: CV-2004-0006336 Current Judge: Nathan W. Higer 
State of Idaho, etai. vs. Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership, etal. 
Date Code User 
User: COOPE , 
Judae 
411 812007 HRSC COOPE 
HRVC 
HCAN 
ORDR 
411 912007 NOSV 
NOHG 
MOTN 
AFFD 
412012007 NOSV 
412312007 NOSV 
NOHG 
AFFD 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
AFFD NIELSEN 
AFFD NIELSEN 
MOTN NIELSEN 
NOHG NiELSEN 
NIELSEN 
AFFD NIELSEN 
Hearing Scheduied (Motion in Limine G. Richard Bevan 
05/07/2007 09:OO AM) both plaintiff and 
defendant 
Hearing result for Motion held on 04/23/2007 G. Richard Bevan 
09:OO AM: Hearing Vacated to enlarge to time 
Hearing Cancellation Notice Nathan W. Higer 
Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Consolidate Nathan W. Higer 
Notice Of Service G. Richard Bevan 
Notice Of Hearing Nathan W. Higer 
Defendants' Motion to Compel Nathan W .  Higer 
Affidavit of Heather A. Cunningham in Support of Nathan W. Higer 
Defendats' Motion to Compel 
Notice Of Service Nathan W. Higer 
Notice Of Service Nathan W. Higer 
Notice Of Hearing Nathan W. Higer 
Affidavit of E Don Copple in Support of Motion in Nathan W. Higer 
Limine to Exclude Ail Testimony and Evidence 
Regarding Special Benefits 
Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion in Limine Nathan W. Higer 
to Exclude all Evidence, Testimony and Argument 
Regarding the Development of Subject Property 
with Adjacent Properties 
a 
Affidavit of Mark L. Butier in Support of Nathan W. Higer 
Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude all 
Evidence, Testimony and Argument Regarding 
the Development of the Subject Property with 
Adjacent Properties 
Affidavit of E Don Copple in Support of Motion in Nathan W. Higer 
Limine to Exciude all Evidence, Testimony and 
Argument Regarding the Development of Subject 
Property with Adjacent Properties 
Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude ail Nathan W. Higer 
Evidence, Testimony and Argument Regarding 
the Development of Subject Property with 
Adjacent Properties 
Notice Of Hearing Nathan W. Higer 
Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion in Lirnine Nathan W. Higer 
to Exclude ail Evidence and Testimony Regarding 
Defendants' Knowledge of the State's Project 
Affidavit of Christy Williams in Support of Motion Nathan W. Higer 
in Limine to Exclude all Evidence, Testimony and 
Argument Regarding Defendants' Knowledge of 
the State =S Project 
Date: 812 008 Fifth Judicial District Court -Twin Falls County 
Time: 04:15 PM ROA Report 
Page 6 of 16 Case: CV-2004-0006336 Current Judge: Nathan W. Higer 
State of idaho, etai. vs. Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership, etai. 
User COOPE 
Date 
4/23/2007 
Code User 
AFFD 
MOTN 
NOSV 
NOHG 
NOTR 
NOTR 
NOTC 
AFFD 
AFFD 
CONT 
CONT 
CONT 
NlELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NiELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NlELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NiELSEN 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
Judge 
Affidavit of E Don Copple in Support of Motion in Nathan W. Higer 
Limine to Exclude all Evidence, Testimony and 
Argument Regarding Defendats' Knowledge of 
the State's Project 
Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude all Nathan W. Higer 
Evidence, Testimony and Argument Regarding 
Defendants' Knowledge of the State's Project 
Notice Of Service Nathan W. Higer 
Amended Nathan W. Higer 
Notice Of Hearing 
Notice Of Preparation Of Transcript & Filing Nathan W. Higer 
Notice Of Preparation Of Transcript & Filing Nathan W. Higer 
Supplemental Affidavit of E Don Copple in Nathan W. Higer 
Support of Motion in Limine to Exciude ail 
Evidence, Testimony and Argument Regarding 
the Development of Subject Property with 
Adjacent Properties 
Supplemental Affidavit of E Don Coppie in Nathan W. Higer 
Support of Motion in Limine to Exciude ail 
Evidence, Testimony and Argument Regarding 
Defendants' Knowledge of the State's Project 
Notice of Non-Opposition to Defendants' Motion Nathan W. Higer 
to Extend Time Set for Trial 
fax 
Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Nathan W. Higer 
Compel 
fax 
Brief In Opposition to Defendants' Motion in Nathan W. Higer 
Limine to Allow Into Evidence the Deposition 
Testimony of Clarence Pomroy 
fax 
Affidavit of John R. Diilman Nathan W. Higer 
fax 
Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Nathan W. Higer 
Exclude all Evidence and Testimony Regarding 
Speciai Benefits 
Third Affidavit of Joseph D. Mallet Nathan W. Higer 
Continued (Motion in Limine 05/18/2007 10:30 G. Richard Bevan 
AM) both plaintiff and defendant ail motions to be 
heard on May 7,2007 and May 21,2007 to be 
heard today 
Continued (StatusIADR 05/18/2007 10:30 AM) G. Richard Bevan 
Continued (Motion in Limine 05/18/2007 10:30 G.  Richard Bevan 
AM) defendant 
Date: 815 1008 Fifth Judicial District Court -Twin Falls County 
Time: 04:15 PM ROA Report 
Page 7 of 16 Case: CV-2004-0006336 Current Judge: Nathan W. Higer 
State of Idaho, etal. vs. Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership, etal. 
Date Code User 
User: COOPE 
Judge 
51312007 BREF NIELSEN 
5/4/2007 
51712007 NOHG 
NOHG 
AFFD 
NOSV 
MOTN 
NOSV 
AFFD 
COOPE 
NiELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NiELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NiELSEN 
NlELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NOHG NIELSEN 
MEMO NiELSEN 
MOTN NIELSEN 
MOTN COOPE 
NOHG COOPE 
51912007 NOSV NIELSEN 
511 012007 MOTN NIELSEN 
NOHG NIELSEN 
MOTN NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NOHG NIELSEN 
Brief Nathan W. Higer 
in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Exciude Ail 
Evidence, Testimony and Argument Regarding 
the Development of Subject Property with 
Adjacent Properties 
Notice Of Hearing Nathan W. Higer 
Notice Of Hearing Nathan W. Higer 
Notice Of Hearing Nathan W. Higer 
Fourth Affidavit of Joseph D. Mallet Nathan W. Higer 
Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Motion in Limine to Nathan W. Higer 
Exclude the Testimony of Roger Dunlap 
Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Second Motion in Nathan W. Higer 
Limine 
Notice Of Service Nathan W. Higer 
Plaintiff's Motion in Limine to Exclude the Nathan W. Higer 
Testimony of Roger Dunlap 
Notice Of Service Nathan W. Higer 
Affidavit of E Don Copple in Support of Motion in Nsthan W. Higer 
Limine for an Order that a Partial Settlement in a 
Adjacent Property on the State's Project Cannot 
be Testified to by one of the State's Appraisers, 
John Dillman 
Notice Of Hearing Nathan W. Higer 
Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine for Nathan W, Higer 
an Order that a Partial Settlement in to an 
Adjacent Property on the State's Project Cannot 
be Testified to by one of the State's Appraisers, 
John Dillman 
Defendants' Motion in Limine for an Order That a Nathan W. Higer 
Partial Settlement in a Adjacent Property on the 
State's Project Cannot be Testified to by One of 
the State's Appraisers, John Dillman 
Plaintiff's Second Motion in Limine Nathan W. Higer 
Notice Of Hearing Nathan W. Higer 
Notice Of Service Nathan W. Higer 
Motion to Shorten Time Nathan W. Higer 
fax 
Notice Of Hearing Nathan W. Higer 
fax 
Plaintiff's Motion to Bifurcate Nathan W. Higer 
Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Bifurcate Nathan W. Higer 
Notice Of Hearing Nathan W. Higer 
Date: . J12008 Fifth Judicial District Court -Twin Falls County 
Time: 04:15 PM ROA Report 
Page 8 of 16 Case: CV-2004-0006336 Current Judge: Nathan W. Higer 
State of Idaho, etal, vs. Canyon Vista Famiiy Limited Partnership, etal. 
Date Code User 
511 112007 NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NlELSEN 
AFFD NiELSEN 
511 412007 NOTR NlELSEN 
AFFD NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NOHG NIELSEN 
REQU NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
MEMO NIELSEN 
MEMO NlELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NiELSEN 
AFFD NiELSEN 
User: COOPE 
Judae 
Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion in Nathan W. Higer 
Limine to Exciude all Evidence, Testimony and 
Argument Regarding 
Defendants' Knowledge of the State's Project 
fax 
Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion in Nathan W. Higer 
Limine to Exclude References to Taxes, 
Taxpayers and Public Funds 
fax 
Brief in Oppsition to Defendants' Motion in Limine Nathan W. Higer 
to Exciude Appraisal Reports 
fax 
Affidavit of Joseph D. Maliet in Support of Nathan W. Higer 
Plaintiff's Motion to Bifurcate 
Notice Of Preparation Of Transcript & Filing Nathan W. Higer 
Amended Fourth Affidavit of Joseph D. Maiiet Nathan W. Higer 
Defendants' Brief In Support of Motion to Compel Nathan W. Higer 
-John Diliman 
Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion in Limine Nathan W. Higer 
to Allow Evidence and Testimony Regarding a 
Collateral Issue 
Notice Of Hearing Nathan W. Higer 
Request to Take Judicial Notice of This Courts Nathan W. Higer 
Flies Records in State V. KLS&M 
L.P., Et AL., State V Lazy J. Ranch, Inc. and State 
V. BCMW Limited Partnership Pursuant to idaho 
Rules of Evidence, Ruie 201 
Brief in Opposition to Piaintiff's Second Motion in Nathan W. Higer 
Limine 0 Order of Condemnation 
Memorandum on Estoppei and Res Judicata in Nathan W. Higer 
Support of Motions in Limine to Exciude Aii 
Evidence, Testimony and Argument Regarding 
the Deveiopment of Subject Property with 
Adjacent Properties and Cost to Cure Method 
Suppiementai Memorandum on Estoppei and Res Nathan W. Higer 
Judicata in Support of Motions in Limine to 
Exclude ail Evidence, Testimony and Argument 
Regarding the Deveiopment of Subject Property 
with Adjacent Properties and Cost to Cure 
Method 
Defendants Pre-Trial Statement Nathan W. Higer 
Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Exciude Nathan W. Higer 
the Testimony of Roger Dunlap 
Affidavit of Roger Duniap in Opposition to Nathan W. Higer 
Piaintiff's Motion in Limine to Exciude the 
Testimony of Roger Dunlap 
Date: 8. LO08 
~ .' 
Time: 04:15 PM 
Page9of 16 
Fifth Judicial District Court -Twin Falls County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2004-0006336 Current Judge: Nathan W. Higer 
State of Idaho, etal. vs. Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership, etal. 
Date Code User Judae 
511 412007 NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
AFFD NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
511 612007 NOSV NlELSEN 
SUBR NIELSEN 
SUBR NIELSEN 
AFFD NIELSEN 
MEMO NlELSEN 
OBJC NIELSEN 
NOSV NiELSEN 
NOSV NiELSEN 
NIELSEN 
LETT COOPE 
Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion in Nathan W. Higer 
Limine to Exclude any Evidence and Testimony 
Regarding the Cost to Cure 
Method 
fax 
Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion in Nathan W. Higer 
Limine for an Order that a Partial Settlement in a 
Adjacent Property on the State's Project Cannot 
be Testified to by One of the State's Appraisers, 
John Dillman 
fax 
Affidavit of Joseph D. Mallet in Opposition to Nathan W .  Higer 
Defendants' Motion in Limine for an Order that a 
Partial Settlement in an Adjacent Property on the 
State's Project Cannot be Testified to by One of 
the State's Appraisers, John Diliman 
fax 
Plaintiff's Pre-Trial Memorandum Nathan W. Higer 
fax 
Brief in Response to State's Memorandum in Nathan W. Higer 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion in Limine to 
Exclude ail Evidence Testimony and Argument 
Regarding Defendants' Knowledge of the State's 
Project 
Notice Of Service Nathan W. Higer 
fax 
Subpoena Duces Tecum and Notice of Nathan W. Higer 
Deposition for James Macdonaid 
Subpoena Returned Duces Tecum and Notice of Nathan W. Higer 
Deposition for Michaei Bingham 
fax 
Affidavit of Biily Ray Strite in Opposition to Nathan W. Higer 
Defendants' Motion to Exclude All Evidence, 
Testimony and Argument 
Regarding the Development of Subject Property 
with Adjacent Properties 
fax 
Defendants' Memorandum inopposition to Nathan W. Higer 
Plaintiff's Motion to Bifurcate 
Defendants' Objection to Plaintiff's Motion to Nathan W. Higei 
Bifurcate 
Notice Of Service 
fax 
Notice Of Service 
fax 
Brief on Cumulative Evidence 
fax 
Letter from Don Coppie 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W. Higet 
Nathan W. Higer 4 1. i i  
Nathan W. Higer 
Date: 8/- 1008 Fifth Judicial District Court -Twin Falls County 
Time: 04:15 PM ROA Report 
Page 10 of 16 Case: CV-2004-0006336 Current Judge: Nathan W. Higer 
State of Idaho, etal. vs. Canyon Vista Famiiy Limited Partnership, etal. 
Date Code User 
511 712007 ORDR COOPE 
511 812007 CONT COOPE 
CONT COOPE 
CMIN COOPE 
HRHD COOPE 
HRHD COOPE 
HRVC COOPE 
HRHD COOPE 
HRSC COOPE 
5/21/2007 NOSV NIELSEN 
NOSV NIELSEN 
5/23/2007 ' ' ORDR COOPE 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NiELSEN 
STIP NIELSEN 
5/25/2007 JUIN COOPE 
W ITN NiELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NiELSEN 
WiTN NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
User. COOPE 
Judge 
Order Nathan W. Higer 
Continued (Pretriai Conference 05/18/2007 Nathan W. Hlger 
10:30 AM) 
Continued (Jury Trial 06/04/2007 09:OO AM) Nathan W. Higer 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Motions, Pretrial Nathan W. Higer 
Conference Hearing date: 511 812007 Time: 10:48 
am 
Hearing result for Pretriai Conference held on Nathan W. Higer 
05/18/2007 10:30 AM: Hearing Held 
Hearing result for Motion in Limine held on Nathan W. Higer 
05/18/2007 10:30 AM: Hearing Held defendant 
Hearing result for StatusIADR held on 05/18/2007 Nathan W. Higer 
10:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing result for Motion in Lirnine heid on Nathan W. Higer 
05/18/2007 10:30 AM: Hearing Held both 
plaintiff and defendant ail motions to be heard on 
May 7,2007 and May 21,2007 to be heard today 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Nathan W. Higer 
06/01/2007 09:OO AM) Jury selection 
Notice Of Service Nathan W. Higer 
Notice Of Service Nathan W. Higer 
Order Regarding Both Plaintiffs' and Defendants' Nathan W. Higer 
Motions in Limine and Motions to Exclude 
Amended Subpoena Duces Tecum and Notice of Nathan W. Higer 
Deposition for Richard Evans 
fax 
Amended Subpoena Duces Tecum and Notice of Nathan W. Higer 
Deposition for Gale Pooley 
fax 
Subpoena Duces Tecum and Notice of Nathan W. Higer 
Deposition for Michael Mongelli 
fax 
Stipulation to Amend the Exchange of Exhibits Nathan W. Higer 
fax 
Defendant Canyon Vista's Proposed Jury Nathan W. Higer 
Instructions Filed (CD also) 
Defendants' Witness List Nathan W. Higer 
fax 
Defendants' Proposed Exhibit List Nathan W. Higer 
fax 
Piaintifi's Trial Brief Nathan W. Higer 
fax 
Plaintiff's Witness Lis Nathan W. Higer 
fax 
Plaintifi's Exhibit iist 
, . j.5 
Nathan W. Higer 
Date: t ,12008 Fifth Judicial District Court -Twin Falls County 
Time: 04:15 PM ROA Report 
Page 11 of 16 Case: CV-2004-0006336 Current Judge: Nathan W. Higer 
State of Idaho, etal. vs. Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership, etal. 
Date Code User 
User. COOPE 
Judge 
5/29/2007 MlSC 
WiTN 
NOSV 
NOSV 
JUlN 
513012007 SUBR 
5/31/2007 CMiN 
6/1/2007 CMlN 
BREF 
MiSC 
MlSC 
HRHD 
6/4/2007 CMiN 
MlSC 
MlSC 
JTST 
6/5/2007 CMlN 
AFFD 
MOTN 
MEMO 
AFFD 
COOPE 
COOPE 
NiELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NiELSEN 
COOPE 
COOPE 
NIELSEN 
NiELSEN 
HALSTEAD 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
Piaintiff's Exhibit List 
Piaintiff's Witness List 
Plaintiff's Preliminary Jury Instructions and Jury 
Verdict Form 
Notice Of Service 
fax 
Defendant's Amended Exhibit List 
fax 
Notice Of Service 
Amended Piaintiff's Proposed Jury lnstructions 
Fiied 
Amended Subpoena Returned and Notice of 
Deposition for James Macdonaid 
fax 
Plaintiff's Amended Exhibit List 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Selection 
Hearing date: 5/31/2007 Time: 10:OO am 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Selection 
Hearing date: 6/1/2007 Time: 9:16 am Court 
reporter: Maureen Newton 
Bench Brief RE: Evidence of Bias to Impeach 
Credibiiity 
Jury Panel 
Peremptory Chaiienges 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduied held on 
06/01/2007 09:OO AM: Hearing Held Jury 
seiection 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury trial day 1 
Hearing date: 6/4/2007 Time: 9:13 am Court 
reporter: Maureen Newton13 PM Sue Woif 
Final Jury Panel 
Preliminary Jury instructions 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 06/04/2007 
09:OO AM: Jury Triai Started 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Trial Day 2 
Hearing date: 6/5/2007 Time: 9:04 am Court 
reporter: Sue Woif 
Affidavit in Support of Motion to Exclude 
Testimony of District Engineer, Devon Rigby 
Defendant's Motion to Exclude the Testimony of 
District Engineer, Devon Rigby 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Exclude 
Evidence and Testimony 
Affidavit of Pat Dobie in Support of Motion to 
Exclude Evidence and Testimony 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W.  Higer 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W. Higei 
Date: 812 j08 Fifth Judicial District Court -Twin Falls County 
Time: 04: 15 PM ROA Report 
Page 12 of 16 Case: CV-2004-0006336 Current Judge: Nathan W. Higer 
State of Idaho, etal. vs. Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership, etal. 
User: COOPE I 
Date 
6/5/2007 
Code User Judge 
NIELSEN Affidavit of Karl D. Vogt Nathan W. Higer AFFD 
AFFD NIELSEN 
COOPE 
COOPE 
Affidavit of Karl D. Vogt For in Camera Review of Nathan W. Higel- 
Documents 
Defendant's Supplemental Proposed Jury Nathan W. Higer 
lnstructions Filed 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Trial Day 3 Nathan W. Higer 
Hearing date: 6/6/2007 Time: 9:02 am Court 
reporter: Sue Wolf 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Trial Day 4 Nathan W. Higer 
Hearing date: 6/7/2007 Time: 9:02 am Court 
reporter: Sue Wolf 
Brief RE: Zones of Value Nathan W. Higer 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Trial Day 5 Nathan W. Higer 
Hearing date: 6/8/2007 Time: 9:09 am Court 
reporter: Sue Wolf 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Trial Day 6 Nathan W. Higer 
Hearing date: 611 112007 Time: 9:05 am Court 
reporter: Sue Woif 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Trial Day 7 Nathan W. Higer 
Hearing date: 6/12/2007 Time: 9:05 am Court 
reporter: Sue Wolf 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Trial Day 8 Nathan W. Higer 
Hearing date: 6/13/2007 Time: 9:07 am Court 
reporter: Sue Wolf 
Plaintiff's Supplemental Proposed Jury instruction Nathan W. Higer 
- Larger Parcel 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Jury Trial Day 9 Nathan W. Higer 
Hearing date: 6/14/2007 Time: 9:02 am Court 
reporter: Sue Woif 
Notice Of Preparation Of Transcript & Filing Nathan W. Higer 
Notice Of Preparation Of Transcript & Filing Nathan W. Higer 
Final Jury Instructions Nathan W. Higer 
Special Verdict Form Nathan W. Higer 
Roll Call Nathan W. Higer 
Statement of Interest Due on Jury Verdict Nathan W. Higer 
Through June 20,2007 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Attorney fees and Nathan W. Higer 
Costs 0712412007 01:30 PM) 
Notice Of Hearing Nathan W. Higer 
Affidavit of Fredric V. Shoemaker in Support of Nathan W. Higer 
Defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs 
Affidavit of E Don Coppie in Support of Nathan W. Higer 
Defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs 
Defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs Nathan W. Higer 
, . 
Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for Nathan W. Higer 
Attorney Fees and Costs 
CMlN 
CMIN COOPE 
BREF 
CMlN 
COOPE 
COOPE 
CMIN COOPE 
CMIN COOPE 
CMIN COOPE 
NIELSEN 
COOPE CMlN 
NOTR 
NOTR 
MlSC 
VERD 
MlSC 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
NlELSEN 
HRSC COOPE 
NOHG 
AFFD 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
AFFD NIELSEN 
MOTN NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
Date: 81. :b08 Fifth Judicial District Court - Twin Falls County 
Time: 04: 15 PM ROA Report 
Page 13 of 16 Case: CV-2004-0006336 Current Judge: Nathan W. Higer 
State of Idaho, etal. vs. Canyon Vista Famiiy Limited Partnership, etal. 
Date Code User 
User COOPE 
Judae 
612912007 AFFD NIELSEN 
MEMO NIELSEN 
71212007 HATCH 
HATCH 
NAAR HATCH 
71312007 JDMT COOPE 
CDlS COOPE 
71612007 CONT 
MOTN 
NOHG 
AFFD 
NOHG 
MOTN 
71912007 CONT 
BREF 
OBJC 
OBJC 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
NIELSEN 
711 112007 NOHG NIELSEN 
NOHG NiELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NiELSEN 
Affidavit of Attorney Fees (Heather A. Nathan W. Higer 
Cunningham) 
Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements Nathan W. Higer 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Nathan W. Higer 
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: 
Cindy Rowland Receipt number: 7016230 Dated: 
71212007 Amount: $10.00 (Cash) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Copy Cd Paid by: Cindy Nathan W. Higer 
Rowland Receipt number: 7016230 Dated: 
7/2/2007 Amount: $12.00 (Cash) 
Notice and Agreement RE: Purchase of audio Nathan W. Higer 
recordings of district and magistrate court 
proceedings. 
Judgment on Verdict Nathan W.  Higer 
Civil Disposition/Judgment entered: entered for: Nathan W. Higer 
Canyon Vista Famiiy Limited Partnership,, 
Defendant; State of Idaho, Plaintiff. 
order date: 71312007 
Continued (Motion for Attorney fees and Costs Nathan W. Higer 
0711712007 01 :30 PM) 
Motion to Shorten Time Nathan W. Higer 
Notice Of Hearing Nathan W. Higer 
Affidavit of Joseph Mallet in Support of Motion to Nathan W. Higer 
Vacate Hearing and Motion to Shorten Time 
Notice Of Hearing Nathan W. Higer 
Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Nathan W. Higer 
Continued (Motion for Attorney fees and Costs Nathan W. Higer 
0711912007 09:OO AM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Brief in Support of Motion to Vacate Hearing 
Objection to Judgment on Verdict and Amended 
Judgment on Verdict 
Objection to Judgment on Verdict and Amended 
Judgment on Verdict 
fax 
Amended Notice Of Hearing 
Amended 
Notice Of Hearing 
fax 
Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Disaliow 
Certain Requested Attorney Fees and Costs 
Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Attorneys Fees and Costs 
fax 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W. Higer 
Nathan W. Higer 
Date:' h12008 Fifth Judicial District Court -Twin Falls County 
Time: 04:15 PM ROA Report 
Page 140f 16 Case: CV-2004-0006336 Current Judge: Nathan W. Higer 
State of Idaho, etal. vs. Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership, etai. 
User: COOPE 
Date Code User 
NIELSEN 
Judge 
Plaintiff's Motion to Disallow Certain Requested Nathan W. Higer 
Attorneys Fees and Costs 
fax 
Affidavit of Joseph D. Mallet in Support of Motion Nathan W. Higer 
to Disaiiow Certain Requested Attorneys Fees 
and Costs 
fax 
Affidavit of Heather A. Cunningham in Opposition Nathan W. Higer 
to Plaintiff3 Motion to Vacate Hearing and 
Response to Objection to Judgment on Verdict 
Supplemental Affidavit of Attorney Fees (Heather Nathan W. Higer 
A. Cunningham). 
Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing Nathan W. Higer 
Notice Of Hearing Nathan W. Higer 
Motion for Protective Order and Motion to Quash Nathan W. Higer 
Subpoena of Heather A. Cunningham 
Affidavit of Heather A. Cunningham in Support of Nathan W. Higer 
Motion for Protective Order and Motion to Quash 
Subpoena of Heather A. Cunningham 
Affidavit of John T. Lezamiz Nathan W. Higer 
Subpoena Returned Nathan W. Higer 
and Notice of Deposition for Heather A. 
Cunningham 
Notice Of Service Nathan W. Higer 
Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Disaliow Nathan W. Higer 
Attorney Fees and Costs 
Affidavit of Pat Dobie in Opposition to Disaliow Nathan W. Higer 
Certain Requested Attorneys Fees and Costs 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Motion for Attorneys Nathan W. Higer 
Fees and Costs Hearing date: 711 912007 Time: 
9:12 am Court reporter: Candy Chiiders Audio 
tape number: Ct rm 2 
Hearing result for Motion for Attorney fees and Nathan W. Higer 
Costs heid on 0711912007 09:OO AM: Hearing 
Heid 
Memorandum Decision and Order Nathan W. Higer 
Order on Defendant's Motion for Protective Order Nathan W. Higer 
and Defendant's Motion to Quash Subpeona of 
Heather A. Cunningham 
Satisfaction Of Judgment on Verdict Pursuant to Nathan W. Higer 
I.C. 7-71 7 
MOTN 
AFFD NIELSEN 
AFFD NIELSEN 
NiELSEN 
MOTN 
NOHG 
MOTN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
AFFD NIELSEN 
AFFD 
SUBR 
NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
NOSV NIELSEN 
NIELSEN 
AFFD 
CMlN 
NIELSEN 
COOPE 
HRHD COOPE 
OPlN 
ORDR 
COOPE 
COOPE 
STJD 
SATJ 
COOPE 
NIELSEN 
SAVE 
Satisfaction Of Judgment Nathan W. Higer 
fax 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Nathan W. Higer 
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: 
Hepworth, Lezamiz and Janis Receipt number: . . & .  i 9 
7019500 Dated: 81712007 Amount: $2.00 (Cash) 
Date: d 1008 Fifth Judicial District Court -Twin Falls County 
Time: 04:15 PM ROA Report 
Page 15 of 16 Case: CV-2004-0006336 Current Judge: Nathan W. Higer 
State of idaho, etal. vs. Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership, eta1 
Date Code User 
User: COOPE 
Judae 
MOAM 
STlP 
ORDR 
JDMT 
NTO A 
APSC 
CCOA 
BONT 
BNDV 
SCDF 
SCDF 
SCDF 
SCDF 
LODG 
LODG 
REQU 
CCOA 
SCDF 
SCDF 
SCDF 
STlP 
ORDR 
SCDF 
SCDF 
LODG 
SCDF 
FERCH 
FERCH 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
NIELSEN 
COOPE 
COOPE 
NIELSEN 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
QUAM 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
COOPE 
Plaintiffs Motion To Amend memorandum Nathan W. Higer 
decision and order 
Stipulation To Amend memorandum decision and Nathan W. Higer 
order 
Order Nathan W. Higer 
Supplementai Judgment on Verdict Nathan W. Higer 
Notice Of Appeal Nathan W. Higer 
Appealed To The Supreme Court Nathan W. Higer 
Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal Nathan W. Higer 
Bond Posted for Transcript (Receipt 7020356 Nathan W. Higer 
Dated 811 512007 for 100.00) 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 7002610 Nathan W. Higer 
dated 811512007 amount 100.00) 
Satisfaction of Supplemental Judgment on Verdict Nathan W. Higer 
Pursuant to I.C. 7-717 
Supreme Court Document Filed- Filing of Clerk's Nathan W. Higer 
Certificate 
Supreme Court Document Filed- Notice of Appeal Nathan W. Higer 
(T) 
Satisfaction of Payment of Post Judgment Nathan W. Higer 
Interest 
Supreme Court Document Filed- Document Filed Nathan W. Higer 
- All Due Dates Suspended 
Supreme Court Document Filed- Clerk's Record Nathan W. Higer 
& Transcript Due Date Reset 
Lodged Transcript (Newton) Nathan W. Higer 
Lodged Transcript (Wolf) Nathan W. Higer 
Request For Additional Transcript And Record Nathan W. Higer 
Amended Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal Nathan W, Higer 
Supreme Court Document Filed- Document(s) Nathan W. Higer 
Supreme Court Document Filed- Amended Nathan W. Higer 
Clerk's Certificate 
Supreme Court Document Filed- Clerk's Nathan W. Higer 
RecordIReporter's Transcript -Suspended- 
Stipulation for Additional Transcript and Record Nathan W. Higar 
Order on Request for Additional Transcript and Nathan W. Higer 
Record 
Supreme Court Document Filed- Document(s) Nathan W. Higer 
Supreme Court Document Filed- Clerk's Record Nathan W. Higer 
&Transcript Due Date Reset 
Lodged Transcript Nathan W. Higer 
Supreme Court Document Filed- Notice of Nathan W. Higer , ,2 .g 
Transcript Lodged 
Date: 81 \008 Fifth Judicial District Court -Twin Falls County 
Time: 04:15 PM ROA Report 
Page 16 of 16 Case: CV-2004-0006336 Current Judge: Nathan W. Higer 
State of Idaho, etal. vs. Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership, etal. 
Date Code User .Judoe 
712 112008 SCDF COOPE Supreme Court Document Filed- Clerk's Record Nathan W. Higer 
&Transcript Due Date Reset 
811 112008 STIP NIELSEN Second Stipulation and Request for Additional Nathan W. Higer 
Clerk's Record 
ORDR COOPE Order on Second Request for Additional Clerk's Nathan W. Higer 
Record 
8/25/2008 SCDF COOPE Supreme Court Document Filed- Document(s) Nathan W .  Higer 
E DON COPPLE - ISB ki 1085 
"PC7 P ? . T ,  
HEATHER A. CUNNINGI-IAM - ISB # 5480 Lt,f:Ji ,,>.,/ -<') u,: .? . t  ,+:; g: c g  L. 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX R'/ 
Attorneys at Law ' _.__ " 2;. f:/<i,, 
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza 
199 North Capitol Boulevard a;.?c8r,. . I < , a  ,
Suite 600 
Post Office Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-3658 
Facsimile: (208) 386-9428 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership 
and Lazy J. Ranch, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., 1 CASE NO. CV 04-6336 
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN MCHUGH ) 
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C. 1 TRIAL BRIEF-PART I 
MCCLURE, GARY BUCK, NEIL 1 (CONDEMNATION LAW ISSUES) 
MILLER and JOHN X COMBO, 1 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, ) 
1 
Plaintiff, 1 
) 
VS. ) 
1 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED ) 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J. RANCH, ) 
INC. 1 
) 
Defendants. 1 
DEFENDAhTS' TRIAL BIUEF-PART I (CONDEMNATION LAW ISSUES) - 1 
I. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . .  
11. BACKGROUND FACTS. . 
111. LEGAL ISSUES 
A. Court Decides All Issues Except Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6 
Under Idaho case law, the Court decides all issues in an eminent domain 
proceeding except the amount ofjust compensation due. Therefore, all issues 
apart from valuation and just compensation, if any arise, will need to be 
determined by the trial court. 
B. RighttoO~enai~dClose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7 
Ordinary burden of proof issues are not at play in condemnation cases, but the 
Defendants as property owners bear the burden of persuasion. As the burdened 
party, the property owner should have the right to open and close. Idaho law 
recognizes that it is appropriate to allow the condemnee to open and close, and 
Defendants request that the court rule that the condemnee inay do so in this case. 
Oppositioil from the Plaintiff on this issue is not anticipated. 
C. Date of Taking As Valuation Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12 
Value is measured as of the date the summons is issued. 
D. JustConipensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12 
Idaho Code $7-71 1 defines just compensation. Although just compensation 
considers a number of items, including the value of the land taken and severance 
damages to the remainder, the actual amount of just compensation can be arrived 
at by taking the fair market value of the entire parcel as of the date of taking, and 
subtracting the fair market value of the remainder and adding any temporary 
easement value. This is the easiest method for the juiy to use in arriving at a just 
compensation figure, and objection from the State of Idaho as to this method is 
not anticipated. 
E. Hiehest and Best Use1 Reasonable Probabilitv of Rezone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13 
Property taken by condemnation is valued with consideration of the highest and best use 
for the property as of the time of taking. The highest and best use, as contrasted with the 
current use, is that which is: 1) legally permissible, 2) financially feasible, 3) maximally 
profitable and 4) physically possible. If a rezone of a property is reasonably probable, the 
rezone may be considered in valuation. 
F. Special v. General Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
Special benefits are benefits from the condemnation project which are unique and 
peculiar to the subject property and directly benefit the remaining property at issue. 
DEFENDANTS' TRIAL BRIEF-PART I (CONDEMNATION LAW ISSUES) - 2 
General benefits are benefits which accrue to the area or neighborhood in general, and 
cannot be offset against severance damages. 
G. Worst Case Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20 
In considering the value of the property after the taking, the "worst case scenario" is to be 
considered, because the property owner is paid for all damages, once and for all time. 
Therefore all damages, in a "worst case scenario," are to be considered. 
H. Comparable Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27  
When evidence of comparable sales is offered on direct examination of a value- 
witness, the fact that the similarity of the comparable sales to the subject property 
may be questioned by the State of Idaho does not bar their admissibility. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  I. Use of I-Iearsay by Expert Witnesses .28 
Experts in eminent domain cases frequently rely on hearsay evidence to support 
their opinions of value. This practice has been found acceptable by many courts. 
The expert witnesses in this case, on both sides, will offer hearsay evidence. 
Unlike a normal trial, this hearsay is not normally objectionable and is typically 
admitted. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  J. Burden of Proof. 2 9  
Defendants request that no burden of proof instruction be given, as the traditional 
burden of proof is not at play in eminent domain cases, as various courts have 
held. In the alternative, the Defendants request that an instruction be given which 
makes it clear that the Defendants have only the burden of persuading the trier of 
fact that the just compensation due is more than the amount advocated by the 
State of Idaho. 
K. Illustrative Exhibits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34 
Exhibits may be admitted for illustrative purposes, but still go to the jury room. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  L. Proiect Influence . 36  
"Project Influence" in eminent domain cases reflects the concept that, in the interests of 
fairness, valuation of a defendant landowner's property does not take into consideration 
any influence on value attributable to the project, whether such influence is good or bad. 
In determining proper just compensation, the land is valued before the taking as if the 
project never existed. The comparable sales which are utilized in valuing the subject 
property must also be unaffected, positively or negatively, by project influence. Evidence 
regarding comparable sales which reflect project influence should therefore be excluded 
by the trial court. 
M. Comparable Sales Sold after the Date of Taking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38 
Comparable sales which have occurred since the date of taking, December 28, 
2004, may still be used as comparables to the subject property. As long as they 
are comparable in character, close in time, and in a location which would be 
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probative of the value of the subject property, they should be allowed by the court. 
It is expected that experts from both sides will rely on sales after the date of 
taking. 
N. Severance Damages & Cost to Cure: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38  
The cost to "cure" or "fix" problems created by the State's project is not the 
proper measure of damages in a condemnation case. 
0. Value Testimony Does Not Reauire Compliance with USPAP Standards: . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46  
Expert opinion testimony on fair market value of appropriated property are not 
founded won methods orescribed bv the Uniform Standards of Professional 
Appraisal Practice, known as USPAP. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this Trial Brief is to set forth for the convenience of the Court the 
applicable law regarding the legal issues which Defendants anticipate may arise during the trial 
of this matter. Eminent Domain or condemnation cases are unique in the law and a number of 
special rules, not in at issue in other civil cases, have therefore evolved. 
Eminent domain cases arise when an authorized governmental entity, the condemning 
authority, takes private land for a public purpose. The right of eminent domain is grounded in 
the United States Constitution' and in the Idaho State Constit~tion.~ Hand in hand with this 
power of the government to acquire land is the obligation of the government to pay just 
compensation to the property owner for the taking. 
The date of the taking is the date the condemning authority (in this case, the State of 
Idaho) filed suit to acquire the private property and the summons was issued. (In this case, 
December 28,2004). In a partial taking case, the Government entity acquires a portion of the 
subject property (the part "taken") and the property owner is left with a portion (the 
U.S. Const., Art. V 
Idaho Const., Art. I,  $ 14 
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"re~nainder"). In partial taking cases the condemning authority must pay fair market value for the 
land taken plus any damages caused to the remainder property as a result of the taking and the 
construction of the project. Just compensation and damages are assessed horn the date of 
Summons pursuant to I.C. 5 7-712. 
In detennining just compensation, the property is first valued as of the date of summons 
assuming the State's project was never planned, designed or constructed. This value is typically 
referred to as the "before take value" or the "before value." The property is then valued as of the 
date of taking, assuming that the State's project has been planned, designed and constructed and 
is complete, having taken a portion of the owner's property. This is often referred to as the "after 
take value" or "after value." The difference between the before value and the after value should 
therefore take into account the value of the land acquired by the State and any severance damages 
to the remainder. 
In valuing the property both before and after the taking, the highest and best use of the 
property is considered, not its current use. The "highest and best use" means the use which is 
legally possible, physically possible, econo~nically feasible and maximally profitable. The 
highest and best use is utilized because in determining value, the property owner in a 
condemnation case is entitled to receive the highest price he could get in an open market, with a 
willing buyer and a willing seller. 
The amount of just compensation is assessed pursuant to LC. 5 7-71 1, and is the only 
issue to be determined by the jury when a jury trial is requested. 
11. BACKGROUND FACTS 
The Defendants in this case own the property located on the South side of Pole Line Road, 
approximately one-quarter mile east of Washington Street in Twin Falls, Idaho. The property 
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currently contains roughly 66 manufactured home spaces, or approximately half of the homes in the 
Lazy J Mobile Ranch. The property was zoned R-4, but the Comprehensive Plan designates the site 
for future commercial development, with southern part of property in a Collage of Southern Idaho 
plan. 
In the before condition, the property had four separate physical and historical points of 
access. If the property were to develop before the taking, the Defendant's witnesses believe that 
there would have been two or three direct access points allowed to Pole Line Road. In the after 
condition, it is uncontradicted that there is no direct access to Polc Line Road and there would be 
no access to the property until Cheny develops to the South. 
The States' appraiser, John Dillman, opined in 2003 that the amount of just compensation 
owing to the Defendants was $327,000. Mr. Dillman recently reduced his opinion of just 
compensation to $202,230. Mr. Paul Hyde is another appraiser retained by the State. He opines that 
just compensation is $264,000. Defendant's witness have determined that the amount of just 
compensation due is the following: 
1. Appraiser Mark Richey $2,155,000.00 
2. Appraiser Roger Dunlap $3,064,500.00 
3. Appraiser Greg Kelley $2,575,000.00 
111. ARGUMENT 
A. COURT DECIDES ALL ISSUES EXCEPT VALUE 
Eminent domain cases are unique in the law, and therefore unlike other civil actions in a 
number of respects. There is only one factual issue for the jury in an eminent domain proceeding, 
and that is the amount of just compensation to be awarded. All other issues are for the court to 
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decide. In Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203, 596 P.2d 75 (1978); rehrg denied, (1979), the Idaho 
Supreme Court explained: 
The eminent domain proceeding is founded in the constitution, and whether the proceeding 
is initiated by the party seeking to condemn, or by the property owner who claims his 
property or rights have been taken, it is not an ordinary civil proceeding. Hence in either 
case all issues, other than just compensation, are for resolution by the trial court. 
In holding that only the issue ofjust compensation is properly resolved by a jury, we are not 
to be understood as saving that a bifurcated trial of issues is always necessary. Conceivably, 
. - 
in the interests of economy, and depending on the particular circumstances of each case, as 
may be unfolded in pre-trial discovery, or at pre-trial conference, the trial court may 
determine to impanel a jury and have all issues presented at one time. In any event, however, 
the trial court will make the determination of the taking issue which will be reflected, as in 
California, in instructions which advise the jury that there has been a taking, and the nature 
of the property right taken where the court concludes that there is less than the fee. 
Additionally, and as it appears to be the practice in California, it is desirable that the trial 
court enter findings and concIusions pertinent to that issue, and pertinent to any issue other 
than that of just compensation. Id. at 222-23. 
Therefore, the trial court will need to decide any and all issues which may arise, other than valuation 
and just compensation. 
The Defendants do not anticipate any factual disputes other than just compensation. 
Determining just compensation also involves determining the highest and best use of the subject 
property, the validity of comparable sales, the weight to be given each witness' opinion of value, 
and the relevant characteristics of the subject property both before and after the taking, 
B. RIGHT TO OPEN AND CLOSE 
Condemnation cases are somewhat "backwards," in that the Defendants bear the burden of 
persuasion rather than the Plaintiff. As a result, the Defendants normally inquire of the jury panel 
first during voir dire, open first, present their case first, and then have closing argument first and a 
final rebuttal before the case is submitted to the jury. We are, in fact, not aware of any case in which 
the condemnee has not been allowed to "go first and last" as discussed above. It is therefore not 
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anticipated that this order of proof and argument will be contested by the State of Idaho. 
Nonetheless, the law on this issue is discussed below, in case there becomes an issue. 
In an eminent domain action in which the issue is the amount of just compensation, the 
property owner is entitled to open and close the evidence. Instate v. McGill, 79 Idaho 467,321 P.2d 
595 (1958), 73 A.L.R.2d 613 the Idaho Supreme Court discussed and recognized that the trial court 
had the authority to change the order of proof in certain cases, and that in condemnation cases, the 
court has the discretion and authority to change the order of argument: However, the problem 
presented here is not one of varying the order of proof, but rather varying the order of argument. It 
seems all too clear that although no Idaho case specifically requires the district judge to vary the 
order of argument, there is ample authority recognizing the discretion. Id, at 470. 
In McGill, the issue was whether the trial court, in refusing to change the order of argument 
to allow Defendants to open and close, committed reversible error. The Idaho Supreme Court held 
that under the specific facts of the case, the trial judge's ruling did not rise to the level of reversible 
error because the parties stipulated to allow the State to proceed first with its case. Id. at 470-71. 
However, the Court further stated and acknowledged that the better procedure in a condemnation 
action was to allow the property owner to open and close his case. The Court did not find error on 
the trial court because the parties stipulated to allow the State to proceed first with its case. 79 Idaho 
at 471. 
To come to grips with the ultimate problem, we must determine whether the trial 
court committed error by refusing to change the order of argument, under the facts 
of this case. Although the better procedure in a case such as this is to allow the 
defendant to open and close, we cannot say reversible error was committed by the 
trial court's refusal to follow such procedure, and especially so in view of the 
stipulation by the appellants that the respondents should proceed with the 
presentation of proof when no proof was required. Id. 
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The Court, quoting an Eminent Domain treatise, set forth that the general rule of law regarding the 
choice of argument is that the owner has the right to open and close: 
In 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Third Edition, sec. 18.5(2), pp. 205-207, the 
conflict of the decisions is summed up: 
The general rule is that the right to open and close goes to the one on 
whom the burden of proof lies in the first instance -- upon the party 
who would suffer defeat if no evidence should be given on either 
side. It consequently follows from what has been already stated that 
the owner should have the right to open and close, and this is 
generally the law. The failure of the trial court to follow this rule is 
not, however, necessarily ground for setting aside the verdict if it does 
not appear that the owner was hanned. In some jurisdictions it is held 
that the right to open and close rests in the discretion of the trial court, 
while in several other states the fact that the condemnor is petitioner 
or plaintiff on the record in the whole case has led the courts to give 
that party the right to open and close, even on the issue of damages. 
Id. 
Two Justices dissented from the majority opinion, including the Chief Justice, holding that 
the owner's right to open and close was so vital that denial of such was reversible error, and that the 
right to do so was not subject to the discretion of the trial court. "The right to open and close 
argument is a substantial, legal right," wrote Chief Justice Keeton, "the denial of which constitutes 
reversible error." Id. at 473 (Keeton, J., dissenting). 
The right to open and close is a legal tool afforded the party who carries the burden of 
persuasion and who is therefore subject to defeat should no evidence be given on either side. In a 
condemnation case, the landowner is constitutionally entitled to just compensation whether any 
evidence is presented or not. The issue in a condemnation trial is the amount of compensation 
owing, and the burden carried by the landowner is that of establishing the amount of just 
compensation where it asserted that the condemnor's proffered value is insufficient. Since this 
burden of persuasion lies with the landowner, the owner should be entitled to open and close. 
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McGill unequivocally recognizes this and allows the trial court to rule that the property owner has 
the right to open and close. 
In the majority of jurisdictions, the general rule is followed that in a condemnation 
proceeding where the only issue to be determined is damages or the value of the land damaged, the 
condemnee bears the burden ofproof as well as the right to open and close the evidence at trial. See 
United States v. Crary, 2 F.Supp 870 (Dist. Ct. Va 1932); Springjeld d: M.R. Co. v. Rhea, 44 Ark. 
258 (Ark. 1884); Colorado C.R. Co. v. Allen, 22 P. 605 (Colo 1889); Stuart v. Colorado Eastern R. 
Co., 156P. 152 (Colo. 1916);Kirlwoodv. SchoolDist. No. 7,101 P. 343 (Colo. 1909);Indianapolis 
& Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Wiles, 91 N.E. 161,729 (Ind. 1910); Burt v. Wigglesworth, 117 Mass 
302 (Mass. 1875); Minneapolis- St. Paul Sanitary Dist. v. Fitzpatrick, 277 N.W. 394 (Minn. 1937); 
Kansas City & G.R. Co. v. Haake, 53 S.W.2d 891 (Mo. 1932); Western Farmers Electric Co-op. v. 
Smith, 288 P.2d 729 (Okla. 1955); Phillips v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 559 S.W.2d 464 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1977). 
The following jurisdictions similarly follow the above described rule that a condemnee who 
bears the burden of proof has the right to open and close the evidence at trial: Rice v. City of Fort 
Lauderdale, 281 So. 2d 36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1973); Department of Public Work and 
Buildings v. Dixon, 229 N.E.2d 679 (1967); Village ofPenn Yarz Udan Renewal Agency v. Penn 
Yan Realty Corp., 294 N.Y.S.2d 66 (Ill. 1968); State By and Through State Highway Commission 
v. Nelson, 353 P.2d 616 (Or. 1960); Phillips v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 559 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1977); Wagonerv. City ofcirlington, 345 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961); Keifferv. King 
County, 572 P.2d 408 (Wash. 1977); Loeb v. Board ofRegents of University of Wis., 138 N.W.2d 
227 (Wis. 1965). 
The primary purpose for the majority rule of allocating the burden of proof on the landowner 
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or condemnee, and allowing the condemnee the right to open and close, is because the condemnee 
must prove his or her position regarding valuation when it is in conflict with the government. In 
Village ofPenn Yan Urban RenewalAgencyv. Penn Yan Realty Corp., 294 N.Y.S.2d 66 (N.Y. Dist. 
Ct. 1968), the court explained that when the taking agency is a governmental subdivision, it is 
presumed in the first instance that the agency has made a fair offer for the value of the condemned 
land. Id. If the condemnee does not accept the condemnor's valuation of the land, he must go 
forward with proof that "just compensation" requires a sum greater than the amount offered by the 
condemnor. Id. Explained another way, "[a] party seeking judicial process to advance his position 
carries the burden of proof. Loeb v. Board ofRegents of the Univ. Of Wis., 138 N.W.2d 227 (Wis. 
In some jurisdictions, denying a condenvlee the right to open and close the argument can be 
reversible error. See Phillips v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 559 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1977); Wagoner v. City ofArlington, 345 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961). The court in Phillips 
discussed the importance of the order of argument in a condemnation trial: 
The right to open is important. ~tenables the party to give direction to 
the case, very often to choose the ground on which the battle shall be 
fought. And the right to conclude is more important still. Even in fair 
and legitimate argument, the party concluding has the advantage of 
knowing precisely the line ofhis opponent, and thereforeofdirecting his 
attention to it, and arraying everything in the case, that fairly illustrates 
and sustains his view of it. (Citation omitted) The denial of the right to 
open and conclude the argument to the jury to the party entitled thereto 
is cause for a new trial. 
Id. 141 S.E.2d at 591. 
Some landowner or condemnees have argued that mandating that the condemnee open and 
close the evidence presents a clear, present and continuing disadvantage for the condemnee. See Penn 
Yan Realty Coup., 294 N.Y.S.2d at 67. However, when presented with this argument, courts have 
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consistently held that it is fundamental that in any adversarial approach, the person who claims 
damages has the burden of proving those damages. Id. at 68. 
Defendants therefore respectfully requests that they be allowed to conduct voir dire first, open, 
present their case in chief, close, and offer rebuttal to the Plaintiffs arguments, as is the normal 
procedure in condemnation cases. 
C. DATE OF TAKING AS VALUATION DATE 
The State of Idaho filed this action and issued the Summons on December 28,2004. 
A property owner's right to compensation is constitutionally vested and is to be measured as 
of the time of the taking, when the damage has accrued and fixed. Idaho Code 5 7-712 specifically 
provides as follows: 
7-712. Damages - Date of accrual. - For the purpose of assessing compensation and 
damages, the right thereto shall be deemed to have accrued at the date of the 
summons, and its actual value, at that date, sha1I be the measure of compensation for 
all property to be actually taken, and the basis of damages to property not actually 
taken, but injuriously affected, in all cases where such damages are allowed, as 
provided in the last section. No improvements put upon the property subsequent to 
the date of the service of summons shall be included in the assessment of 
compensation or damages. The compensation and damages awarded shall draw 
lawful interest from the date of the sunlmons. 
In State ex re1 Moore v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444, 546 P.2d. 399 (1976), our Supreme Court 
recognized that the damages that will accrue do so as of the date of the issuance of the summons: 
In Idaho, the value of the property actually taken in an eminent domain proceeding 
and the damages which will accrue to the remaining property by reason of the 
severance are computed as of the date of the issuance of the summons, not the date 
that the property is actually taken. Id. at 449 (citing I.C. 5 7-712). 
D. JUST COMPENSATION 
The only issue to be determined by the jury is the amount of just compensation to be paid to 
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Defendants. Idaho Code Section 7-711 establishes how the trier of fact is to determine just 
compensation: 
7-711. Assessment of damages. -- The court, jury or referee must hear such 
legal testimony as may be offered by any of the parties to the proceedings, and 
thereupoil must ascertain and assess: 
1. The value of the property sought to be condemned, and all 
improvements thereon pertaining to the realty, and of each and every separate estate 
or interest therein; if it consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel and each 
estate or interest therein shall be separately assessed. 
2. If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a 
larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be 
condemned, by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned, and 
the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff. 
3. Separately, how much the portion not sought to be condemned, and 
each estate or interest therein, will be specially and directly benefitted, if at all, by the 
construction of the improvement proposed by the plaintifc and if the benefit shall be 
equal to the damages assessed, under subdivision 2, the owner of the parcel shall be 
allowed no compensation except the value of the portion taken; but if the benefit shall 
be less than the damages so assessed, the former shall be deducted from the latter, and 
the remainder shall be the only damages allowed in addition to thevalue. This formula 
can be hard to follow, but the same result is obtained by computing the total value of 
the property before the taking, subtracting the total after the taking, and adding to 
value of temporary easements, if any. 
This fonnula can be hard to follow but the same result is obtained by computing the total 
value of the property before the taking, subtracting the total value after the taking, and adding the 
value of temporary easements, if any 
E. HIGHEST AND BEST USE 
Property in condemnation is valued assuming its highest and best use. Evidence regarding 
an opinion of value of the subject property not based upon its highest and best use, but rather an 
alternative, lesser use for which the property is adaptable, is inadmissible and contrary to the law in 
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Idaho. Idaho courts have consistently followed the general principle that compensation inust be paid 
based upon the property's highest and best use. 
In State ex rel. Symms v. City of Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 528, 493 P.2d 387 (1972), the 
Idaho Supreme Court expressly set forth the guidelines for the valuation of property in question: 
The compensation which must be paid for property taken by eminent domain does not 
necessarily depend upon the uses to which it is devoted at the time of the taking; 
rather, all the uses for which the property is suitable should be considered in 
determininginarket value. (citations omitted). The highest and best use for which the 
property is adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in the reasonably near future 
is to be considered, not necessarily as a measure of value, but to the'full extent that the 
prospect of demand for such use affects the market value of the property. (citations 
omitted). It inust be shown that the use for which the property is claimed to be 
adaptable is reasonably probable. (citation omitted). Furthermore, in order to 
establish adaptability, the owner must prove the economic feasibility of the suggested 
use. (citations omitted). If, as a matter of fact, the parcel taken is part of a larger tract 
held by the same owner, it is error to consider such parcel as if it constituted an entire 
tract separate and apart from other property in the possession of the same owner; the 
amount awarded for the land taken must reflect any enhanced value arising from its 
availability for use in conjunction with the land not taken. (citations omitted). Id. at 
530-31. 
Other Idaho cases that followed this same principle are City of Caldwell v. Roark, 92 Idaho 
99,437 P.2d 615 (1968), Ada County Highway District v. Magwire, 104 Idaho 656, 662 P.2d 237 
(1983), and Eagle Sewer District v. Hormaechea, 109 Idaho 418,707 P.2d 1057 (1985). 
Testimony regarding the value of the property based on a use other than the highest and best 
use for which the property can be devoted to is contrary to the constitutional requirement of 
ascertaining just compensation. This evidence undermines fundamental principles of the law of 
eminent domain and the State of Idaho. Allowing testimony of one's opinion of value not based on 
the highest and best use ofthe property would be prejudicial to Defendants' constitutional right to just 
compensation. Furthermore, evidence of an opinion of value based upon a use that is not a 
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consideration of the property's highest and best use is irrelevant in determining the co~npensation the 
property owner is entitled to. 
Highest and best use is that use of a property which is: 1) legally permissible, or there is a 
reasonable probability of getting the legal permission necessary, 2) physically possible, 3) 
economically feasible, and 4) maximally profitable. 
F. SPECIAL V. GENERAL BENEFITS 
In calculating severance damages to alandowner's remaining property, the amount of damage 
to the remaining property value may be offset by any special benefits to the property. LC. § 7-71 l(3); 
Orofino v. Swayne, 95 Idaho 125,128,504 P.2d 398 (1972). 
Special benefits are benefits from the condemnation project which are unique to the subject 
property and which directly benefit the remaining property at issue. See Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 
269, 280, 328 P.2d 60 (1958); Stale v. ex re]. Symms v. Collier, 93 Idaho 19, 24, 454 P.2d 56, 61 
(1969). 
Idaho Code Section 7-71 l(3) states that the jury must decide: 
... how much the portion not sought to be condemned, and each estate or interest 
therein, will be s~eciallv and directly benefitted [sic], if at all, by the construction of 
the improvement proposed by the plaintiff. .. (emphasis added). 
Condemnation law distinguishes such special benefits from general benefits. General benefits from 
the condemnation project are benefits which are general in nature and benefit the public generally 
rather than confer a discrete benefit directly upon the remaining property at issue. See Fonburg, 80 
Idaho at 280. 
The State of Idaho, if they, as condemnor assert a special benefit, has the burden of proof to 
show that the benefits are unique to the remaining property, and that those benefits directly flow to 
the remaining property as a result of the condemnation project before such benefits may offset 
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severance damages. State ex. rel. Dep 't of Highways v. Pinson, 207 P.2d 1105, 11 10 (Nev. 1949); 
See State of Louisiana Dep't, of Highways, 3 19 So.2d 808, 81 1 (La. Ct. App. 1975). 
It is logically necessary to analyze the benefits to both the subject property, as well as the 
neighborhood properties, to determine whether the benefit is unique and directly flows to the 
Defendants' remaining property or generally benefits the neighborhood. See I.C. $7-71 1 (3). 
If condemning authority's experts fail to analyze abutting neighborhood property, their 
determination of special benefits is incomplete, and such testimony must be barred and not admitted 
for the purposes of offsetting severance damage. Daniels v. State Road Dep 't, 170 So. 2d 846,854 
(Fla. 1964), Limmiatis v. Canal Auth., 253 So.2d 912, 914 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); City of 
Jaclnonville v. Yerkes, 282 So.2d 645, 646 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973). 
In Daniels, the Defendant argued that the State's evidence did not show the benefit described 
was special or peculiar to the remaining property or any different than the benefit received by the 
general public. 170 So. 2d at 854. The Supreme Court of Florida stated: 
Thus, insofar as "enhancement in value" is concerned, evidence thereof would not be 
admissible without proof that the increase in value resulted directly and peculiarly to 
the landowner's remaining land as a result of the improvement, over and above that 
enjoyed by neighboringproperty which might or might not be on the highway. "The 
question in each case is whether or not the special facilities afforded by the 
improvement have advanced themarket value ofthe property beyond the mere general 
appreciation of property in the neighborhood." Daniels, 170 S.2d at 854 (quoting 
Pittsburgh B&B Ry. Co. V. McCloskey, 1 A. 555,556) (emphasis added). 
In Limmiatis,theCourt of Appeals reversed a special benefit determination because the State's 
appraiser failed to contrast any specific benefit to the property at,issue to a general benefit to the 
neighborhood. 253 So.2d at 914. The Court stated: 
We do not feel that Smith's testimony regarding enhancement was based upon any 
specific benefit to appellant's property as contrasted to other property in the 
neighborhood. On the contrary, Smith's testimony indicates that if there was 
enhancement at all, the enhancement is general to the neighboring properties and not 
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special to the appellant's parcel. Where it appears that the testimony of the 
condemnor's appraiser is based upon an erroneous concept of law, it is error for the 
trial court not to strike such testimony. Limmiatis, 253 So.2d at 914. (citing Finkel 
v. State Road Dep't, 216 So.2d 463 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1968). 
In Yerkes, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to strike the State's 
evidence of special benefit: 
... before evidence of enhancement can be introduced it inustbe proven that the 
increase in value resulted directly and peculiarly to thelandowner's remaining 
land and not just to the neighborhood as a whole. No such evidence was 
proffered in the instant case. Therefore, it appears that the judge was 
eminently correct in striking the testimony as to enhancement. Yerkes, 282 
So.2d at 646 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
In no event can general benefits (such as road widening, sidewalks, sewer lines, landscaping 
or street lights) be offset against severance damages to reduce just compensation. 
Increased l'raftic, In~prg\.ed l ' ra?Pdi t ions  and Increased Business ?'r& 
-- 
are General Benefits \\'l~ich cam Be Offset from the 1)arnapes to Remainder. 
The distinction between general and special benefits has been carefhlly defined and delineated 
by the courts. However in practical application, distinguishing between the two types ofbenefits has 
been a daunting task for the courts and generally depends on the particular facts and circumstances 
of each case as noted by one court. 
There is probably more judicial discord as to what is or is not a special benefit than 
in any other area of the law of eminent domain. Where there is an actual physical 
improvement to the property, such as the draining of a swamp, it is easy to see a 
special benefit. It is equally easy to recognize, at the other end of the spectium, a 
general benefit such as an improved system of highways, since everybody in a 
community benefits from such an improvement. The difficulty lies in the amorphous 
grey area between these two extremes. 
Taylor v. State ex re. Herman, 467 P.2d 251,254 (Az.1970), 
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Notwithstanding, a review of case authority reveals that most jurisdictions recognize that an 
appreciation in the value of the remainder property caused by an increased traffic flow and conditions 
by the property is a general benefit which cannot be offset against severance damages. 
In State Highway Comrn'n v. Parlcer, 387 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. 1965), the Missouri Supreme 
Court held as follows: 
The fact that more traffic mav be 'knnelled' from the new limited access hirrhwav 
- 
onto the 'Belt' and past condemnees' property is not a special benefit accruing directly 
and oroximatelv thereto hvreason of the construction of the road. The increased flow 
of traffic would benefit the area generally and not specifically condemnees' property. 
(Citations omitted). 
Id. at 507. 
Relying on language from prior decisions, the Court quoted: "[tlhis court has held that 
increastd facilities for the travel and transportation of the general public are not such benefits as may 
be deducted from the compensation and damages." Id. (quoting State Highway Commission v. 
Vorhof-Duenke Co., 366 S.W.2d at 339). "Upon the more general subject, we have said that 'traffic, 
great or small, is merely an incident of streets and highways and cannot be considered & as an 
element of damages or benefits."Id (quoting State Highway Commission v. Turk, 366 S.W.2d at 
422) (emphasis added). 
In State Dept. Of Trans. v. Montgomery Ward Dev., 7 19 P.2d 507, 5 13 (0r.App. 1986), the 
Oregon Court of Appeals held, "[Elvidence of increased traffic volume is not evidence of a special 
benefit and should not have been admitted." 
InNew Jersey Turnpike Auth. v. Herrontown Woods, Inc., 367 A.2d 893,897 (1976), theNew 
Jersey Supreme Court held that "benefits arising from increased facilities of travel, such as the 
increase in value from increased population and trade which such facilities bring, are general 
benefits." (quoting Sullivan v. North Hudson R.R. Co., 18 A. 689 (1889)). 
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See Petkus v. State Highway Comm'n, 130 N.W.2d 253 (1964) (A benefit must be to the 
condemnee's land, not his business). 
A good test to determine whether a benefit is special is whether the alleged benefit results in 
a vested right. In Idaho, the law is clear that aproperty owner involved in a condemnation action does 
not have a claim for damages due to the installation of traffic control devices which divert the traffic 
flow or pattern. State v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444, 546 P.2d 399 (1976) (Courts have traditionally 
recognized that governmental acts primarily concerned with public safety and arbitration of social 
conflict are entitled to great weight in that scale). By the same token, this follows as an inescapable 
corollary that increased flow of traffic is not regarded as a special benefit. State by Mattson v. Colon, 
194 N.W2d 574 (Minn.1972). See also, State Highway Comm'n v. Parker, in&., State Dept. Of 
Trans. v. Montgomery Ward Dev., infra, New Jersey Turnpike Auth. v, Herrontown Woods, Inc., 
infra. 
Whether or not a condemnation action is commenced, governmental acts performed under the 
police power for the public health, safety and welfare, including but not limited to regulating traffic 
and installing traffic control devices, are legitimate functions of government which do not necessarily 
invoke its eminent domain power or trigger co~npensation to landowners whose property may be 
affected by the action. 
Acknowledging this well established legal proposition, which is recognized in most, if not a11 
the jurisdictions, courts have consistently held that the benefits that may accrue kom a particular 
improve~nent, i.e. a traffic control device (for example, a signalized intersectio~l) for which the land 
was taken results in a benefit to the whole comn~unity as opposed to a special and direct benefit to 
the remaining property involved. 
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As the old adage goes, "What's good for the goose, is good for the gander." Since property 
owners do not have a vested right nor are they entitled to damages arising from traffic conditions, 
governmental agencies cannot assert that its acts perfonned under its police power for the benefit of 
the public health, safety and welfare constitute a special benefit for which damages to the remainder 
may be offset. 
The reasoning and rationale in the constitutional sense to offset special benefits against the 
severance damage to the remaining property is best explained in Nichols: 
The rationale for this view is the coilstitutionai requirement for payment of just 
compensation which has generally been interpreted to mean fair and adequate 
monetary compensation for land actually taken regardless of any benefits to the 
remainder. To offset benefits against the part taken would discriminate unfairly 
against the condemnee because aneighboring owner whose land was not condemned 
would get the benefits of the public improvement while the condemnee would not 
only have some of his land taken, but would he forced to pay for his benefits by 
receiving a reduced sum or potentially no compensation for his property taken. 
Likewise, to charge the owner for general benefits to his remainder, which he and his 
neighbors equally enjoy, would unfairly discriininate against the condemnee on the 
sole basis that a portion of his land was taken while his neighbors was not. 
Themaiority of jurisdictions do not permit neneral benefits to set offdanaees because 
the citizen whose propertv is taken cannot be coinvelled to bear more of the cost of 
thevublic improvement and general benefits result in^ therefrom than is borne by other 
provertv owners whose provertv is not taken. Thus. special benefits have been 
narrowlv conceived in order to avoid unfairness of making one man pav in land 
for which another receives free. (Emphasis added). 
3 Nichols $ 8A.02[1], p. 8A-26. 
6. WORST CASE SCENARIO 
In this case, the State of Idaho has condemned Defendants' frontage on Pole Line Road. 
1. Idaho Cases Have Established the Rule that Damages to the Remainder Are to be 
Assessed Rased Uoon the Most Iniurious Use by the Government of the Land Taken Which is 
Reasonably Possible. 
Five Idaho case have so held. The first case to address this issue was decided in 191 1, in 
Idaho- Western Railway Co. I: Columbia Conference ofEvangelical Lutheran Augustana Synod, 20 
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Idaho 568, 119 P. 60 (191 1). In that case, a portion of property which was then being used for a 
college campus was condemned for a railroad line. There were many issues on appeal and the 
decisioil is lengthy. The Idaho Supreme Court, in addressing severance damages, quoted the statute 
relating to assessment ofjust compensation which was then in effect, Section 5220 of the Revised 
Codes. The language in that section relating to severance damages read as follows: 
If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the damages 
which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned, by reason of its severance froin 
the portion sought to be condemned, and the construction of the improvement in the manner 
proposed by the plaintiff. Id. at 580. 
That language has remained unchanged since 191 1 and is now codified in Idaho Code Section 7-71 1. 
The Court then discussed the statute as follows: 
Our statute therefore provides for the assessment of damages and benefits sustained and 
received by the remaining parcel of land after the severance, and which is caused 'by reason 
of its severance from the property sought to be condemned' and the 'construction of the 
improvement proposed' by the condemnor. Under this statute, it was proper for the land 
owner to introduce such evidence and proofs as were available, tending to show the 
depreciation in value which would result to the remaining portion of its land after the 
- - 
severance ofthis particular tract, and in doing so the statute specifically authorizes taking into 
consideration 'the construction of the improveme~~t in the manner proposed by the plaintiff.' 
- - 
This latter provision of the statute clearly authorizes the land owner to introducLevidence 
showing the damage and injury that the particular improvement or structure for which the 
condemnation is sought will cause to the remainder of his property. The statute requires the 
condemnor to disclose the purpose for which he is seeking to condemn the property and the 
general nature and character of the improvement or structure he expects to erect in order to 
bring hiinselfwithin the constitution and the statute. (Sec. 14, art. 1 ., Const.; sec. 5210, Rev. 
Codes), and entitle him to maintain his condemnation proceeding. Id. at 581-582. 
Elsewhere in the decision, the Court addressed the complaint by the colldemnor that the 
property owner introduced evidence regarding additional damages that could be caused if the railroad 
installed a double track rather than a single track or used the property acquired for a switching yard. 
The condemnor's plans included only a single tract. The Court set forth the issue and the applicable 
rule of law as follows: 
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The appellant also co~nplains of the action of the court in allowing witnesses on behalf 
of the appellant to testify as to the probable annoyance and damage that would be 
produced to the school and school property by the use of this land for railroad 
purposes in the event it should lay a double track or should use the ground for 
switching purposes. The objection made to this line of evidence was based on the 
grounds that it did not appear in the case that the railroad company intended to do 
anything more than build a single line of track over this ground. As weunderstand the 
rule in such cases, the company might have bound itself by its original pleadings and 
proceedings, or by stipulation, in the action to maintain only a single track and not to 
use the ground for switching purposes. It did not, however, see fit to do this. It was 
competent, therefore, for the land owner to prove the damage that it would probably 
sustain by reason of the most numerous and injurious use to which the condemning 
party might lawfully put the property under its condemnation for railroad purposes. 
Id. at 588-589 (citation omitted). 
The "most injurious use" issue next arose in Idaho in the 1925 case of Crane v. City of 
Harrison, 40 Idaho 229,232 P. 578 (1 925), in which an owner of property abutting a public street 
sued the City for damages caused by a change in grade of the sheet. The Court cited the Idaho- 
Western Railway case and, based in part thereon, determined that the owner was not entitled to 
damages: 
In the case ofIdaho etc. Ry. Co. v. Columbia etc. Synod, 20 Ida. 568,119 Pac. 60, which was 
an action brought under the eminent domain statutes for the purpose of determining the value 
of the property sought to be talcen and damage to the property not taken, in the course of that 
opinion it was held that damages should be assessed once and for all time and should be based 
upon the most injurious use to which the conde~nnor may lawfully put the property. If this 
is a correct statement of the rule, at the time the municipality acquired the right of way for 
street purposes, appellant or his predecessor was given damages once and for all time, based 
upon the most injurious use of the land reaso~iably possible to which the city might lawfully 
put it. Id. at 234. 
The Crane decision was cited at length and approvingly, including the portion quoted above, 
in the 1935 Idaho Supreme Court case Powell v. McKelvey, 56 Idaho 291,53 P.2d 626 (1935). The 
case was again considered in Foster's inc. v. Boise City, 63 Idaho 201, 118 P.2d 721 (1941). In 
Foster's, Inc., the City installed parking meters and the property owner complained in part that the 
meters amounting to taking the property of the abutting owner without due process of law. The 
Supreme Court disagreed saying: 
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The first proposition is hereinbefore answered, to the effect that: Dedication or 
condemnation of a street contemplates the most onerous and injurious mode of use to 
which it can be lawfully devoted. [citations omitted]. For illustration, we held in 
Crane v. City of Harrison, supra, that the lowering of a grade in front of Crane's 
residence, and thereby destroying his water and sewer pipes, was covered and 
contemplated by the original condemnation; and any resultant injuries were damnum 
absque injuria. 
In Powell v. McKelvey, supra, we held that the construction of an underpass below 
the street grade, in front of an abutting property owner, was covered by the original 
condemnation and not a cause of actionable damage to the abutting land owner. In the 
later case Mr. Justice Givens reviewed the Doyle and Crane cases and many opinions 
from other courts holding the same effect. 
If it be urged that the construction and erection of parking meters along the street in 
front of abutting property could not be foreseen or contemplated when the streets were 
laid out, we answer that, while they may be true, there is as muchreason for supposing 
they were contemplated as to suppose that traffic on the street would ever be 
conducted by motor cars; or that there would ever be occasion to park such 
mechanisms on the street. Such as always, however, within the range of possibility 
and, therefore, a possible use. Id. at 213. 
The Court then went to cite case decisions from other states involving parking meters. 
The issue did not arise in appellate decisions again until 1991, with the case of Reisenauer v. 
State, 120 Idaho 36, 8 13 P.2d 375 (1 991), a Court of Appeals case. The Reisenauer case involved 
the change of a State roadway. Additional lanes were added and the road moved closer to the 
Reisenauer's property, although none of their property was acquired or condemned and the State 
utilized only existing right of way. The Reisenauer Court quoted the Powell v. McKeh~ey decision, 
including the portions thereof which quoted the Idaho Western Railway decision from 191 1. The 
Court then followed the rule that just compensation was assessed once and for all, based upon the 
most injurious use of the property possible, finding that the Reisenauers were therefore not entitled 
to any compensation, as their predecessors in interest were compensated for the most injurious use 
the State could make of its right of way when the right of way was origiiially purchased several years 
earlier 
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The Reisenauer Court cited additional authority for the rule as follows: 
As additional support for this conclusion, we adopt the language from American 
Jurisprudence 2d which the district court cited in its opinion: 
Often, after land has been taken for a particular public use and devoted to that use in 
the customary manner for a number of years, an increase in the public requiremeilts 
makes an altered or increased use of the land desirable. In such a case, if the new use 
is of the same character as the use for which the land was taken, and merely amounts 
to the advancement of the original purpose, as when the wrought portion of a highway 
is widened so as to include the whole of the original location, or a second track is laid 
upon a railroad right of way, there is only an exercise of the easement which had been 
taken in the first place, and the owner of the fee has no ground for complaint, even if 
he is deprived of privileges in the land taken which he had previously enjoyed, or his 
remaining land suffers damages froin the increased use by the public from which it 
had previously been exempt. All these damages were paid for when the original 
taking was made, and the owner's good fortune in not suffering injury for several 
years for which he had been filly paid cannot be the basis of a property right protected 
by the Constitution, or entitle him to be paid both when the right to inflict the damage 
is acquired by the public and when the damage is actually inflicted. 
26 Am.Jur.2d Eminent Domain 5 206, at 889 (1966) (emphasis added). Because it is clear 
thattheReisenauers 'predecessors in interest were paid just compensation for the right-of-way 
acquiredby the state in 1937, the Reisenauers cannot obtain any additional compensation for 
alleged inverse condemnation. Id. at 40. 
Reisenauev was addressedinKillinger v. Twin Falls Highway District, 135 Idaho 322,17 P.3d 
266 (2000): 
In taking cases, as long as the basic character of the government's use does not 
change, an expanded use of the government's right of way in not compensable. See 
Reisenauer v. State Dept. of Highways, 120 Idaho 36, 40, 813 P.2d 375, 379 
(Ct.App. 1991) (concluding that "if the new use is of the sane character as the use for 
which the land was taken" the new use is only an advancement upon the original 
taking and is not grounds for additional compensation). Where the government's use 
does, however, constitute a fundamental change in the character of use from its 
original use, the government's conduct amounts to a taking requiring compensation. 
In Reisenauer, the Court of Appeals was faced with a situation where, in 1937, the 
state of Idaho purchased a right-of-way to a strip of property from a landowner to use 
in rea1igningU.S. Highway 95. The Reisenauers subsequently purchased the property 
adjacent to the strip in 1943. In 1978, the state added a passing lane to the highway, 
which moved the highway closer to the Reisenauev S property but was still within the 
right-of-way strip of property. The Reisenauers initiated an inverse condemnation 
action to recover compeilsation for several incidents where cars left the highway and 
ended up on the Reisenauers' lawn. The Court ofAppeals determined the Reisenauers 
DEFENDANTS' TRIAL BRIEF - 24 
were not entitled to cornpensation because the state had already provided just 
compensation to the previous owners and the subsequent addition of a passing land, 
while changing the degree of use, was not a substantial change in the type of use. 
See Reisenauer, 120 Idaho at 40-41, 813 P.2d 379-80 (finding the redesign of the 
highway was not a change in the basic character of the type of use even though the 
degree of use increased). 
In this case, however, the property was formerly used by the abutting landowners as 
an Access Road. The Killingers, in particular, used the Access Road for parking and 
maneuvering large vehicles in connection with their business. Transforming the 
property into a buffer zone without compensating the landowners for the loss of their 
use of the property as an Access Road is a taking. The Access Road is no longer 
usable for the same purposes as promised to the Killingers, but now is part of the state 
highway system. Such a change in the type of use from which the property had 
originally been set aside amounts to a taking requiring compensation. 
Therefore, we hold that creation of the buffer zone constitutes a change in character 
ofthe type ofuse and thus, a taking. Killinger, 135 Idaho at 270-217. 
2. The "most iniurious use" rule does not conflict with LC. 6 7-71 1(2), and the two have been 
intemreted consistently 
At first glance, it may appear as though LC. $7-71 1(2) conflicts with the most injurious use 
rule because the statute states that damages are to be assessed considering the constructionof the 
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff, and the most injurious use rule states that 
damages are to be assessed assuming a worst case scenario. An analysis of the two rules however, 
reveals that they are completely consistent. 
In Idaho-Western Railway, the Idaho Supreme Court specifically discussed both the exact 
language of what is today LC. 5 7-71 1 and the most injurious use rule. I11 that case, the condemning 
railroad had a plan to construct a single line of railroad track on the part taken. The Court therefore 
reasoned that it was wholly appropriate for the owner to consider damages sustained from the railroad 
use, such as noise, dust, etc. The Court interpreted the statute as requiring the condemning authority 
to set out the general nature and character for which the property was being condemned. According 
to the Court, the phrase "the construction of the improvement in themanner proposed by the plaintiff' 
DEFENDANTS' TRIAL BRIEF - 25 
did not refer to the particular plan of the plaintiff to construct one railroad track, but instead referred 
to the plaintiff's proposed improvement of the property taken for railroad purposes. The owners 
could therefore consider in assessing damages the problems associated with railroad uses, such as 
noise and dust disturbances. See Idaho- Western Railway Co. v. Columbia Conference ofEvangelical 
Lutheran Augustana Synod, 20 Idaho at 581-582. 
In that same case, the owners were also allowed to consider damages which would arise from 
use of the property taken for a double track railroad, or the use of the property as a railroad 
switchyard. Such considerations were appropriate, concluded the Court, because the condemnor had 
not limited or committed itself in the original pleadings and proceedings to only use the property 
taken for a single track. Once the condemnor acquired the property, even though the immediate plan 
might be to lay a single track, the railroad would be within its fee simple property rights to use the 
land for a second track or a switchyard, or other railroad purposes. Since damages are assessed only 
once and for all time, if an expansion of use for the same purposes is not considered in assessing just 
compensation, the owner will never receive compensation for those additional damages. 
The intentions of the condemning authority are not relevant in assessing damages; rather, 
damages are assessed based on what rights the condemnor acquires and not how he uses them. When 
property is acquired for railroad purposes, therefore, all possible railroad purposes may be considered. 
It is possible for the condemning authority to narrowly define the taking and set forth a particular use, 
i.e. one single track, but where this is not done, damages from the general type of use and the most 
injurious use are properly considered. See Idaho- Western Railway Co. v. Columbia Conference of 
Evangelical Lutheran Augustana Synod, 20 Idaho at 588-589. 
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Since the Idaho- Western Railway decision in 191 1, the Idaho Courts have not interpreted I.C. 
5 7-71 1 and the most injurious use rule together. The case is still good law, and therefore, the Court's 
interpretation and reasoning in that case is binding in this case. 
H. COMPARABLE SALES 
Value witnesses often arrive at their opinions based in part on an analysis of sales of property 
which they consider to be comparable to the subject property. One of the issues which may arise is 
whether a "comparable sale" truly does compare to the subject property so that it may be accurately 
deemed "comparable." The general rule is that evidence of allegedly con~parable sales should not be 
excluded when offered on direct examination. 
In State Ex. Rel. Symms v. Collier, 93 Idaho 19,454 P.2d 56 (1969); rehr'g denied, the Court 
considered an appeal by the State in an eminent domain proceeding where the State alleged that 
comparable sales used by the Defendant's experts werenot sufficiently similar to the subject property. 
In stating the issue the Court wrote: 
Appellant ... objected to admission into evidence of expert testimony considering so-called 
comparable sales of other property in the area. On appeal it is urged that the comparables, 
were developed to a greater extent, were smaller in acreage and, in one instance, were located 
in a different area, than the subject property. Most jurisdictions follow the rule cited in Hays 
v. State, 342 S.W.2d 167, at 170, 171 (Tex.Ct.Civ.App. 1960): 
'Evidence of sales of comparable properties may be offered under three conditions: 
(I) on direct examination of expert or lay witnesses as independent substantive 
evidence of the value of the property to which the comparison relates, or (11) on direct 
examination of the value-witness to give an account of the factual basis upon which 
he founds his opinion on the issue of value of the real estate in controversy, or (111) on 
cross-examination of the value-witness to test his knowledge, experience and 
investigation and thus affect the weight to be given to his opinions.' 
Accord, State v. 0.0673 Acres of Land, Etc., 224 A.2d 598 (Dela. 1966); State Highway 
Commission v. McNiSf, 395 P.2d 29 (Wyo. 1964); 5 Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain, 
5 21.3 [3] (1962). 
DEFENDANTS' TRIAL BRIEF - 27 
The Court found that in the case in question, the testimony regarding the comparable sales had been 
introducedlmder category two (11) above. The court held that the introduction ofthe comparable sales 
on direct was proper and the trial court had committed no abuse of discretion in allowing it to be 
admitted. Quoting another opinion, the Court explained the standards for admissibility of comparable 
sales as follows: 
'The criteria of sirnilarity varies in diminishing degree for each category. The strict 
foundation requirements, apply when evidence of comparable sales is offered as substantive 
proof of the value of property taken. A lesser foundation of comparability is required when 
evidence of other sales is offered in support of, and as background for, opinion testimony and 
not as independent substantive evidence of value. The reasons of relevancy, which require 
that a foundation of similarity be laid for direct examination, vanish when, evidence of other 
sales is elicited upon cross-examination to impeach an expert.' State v. 0.0673 Acres ofland, 
Etc., supra, 224 A.2d at 601. (citations omitted) [underlining added for emphasis]. 
Therefore, so long as evidence of comparable sales is offered on direct examination of a value- 
witness, the fact that the siinilarity of the comparable sales to the subject property may be questioned 
by the State of Idaho does not bar their admissibility 
I. HEARSAY EVIDENCE 
Unlike in most cases, hearsay is generally admitted (under limited circumstances) in eminent 
domain cases. An expert witness is permitted to rely upon hearsay in which he uses to make up his 
opinion. McElligott v. Freeland, 33 P.2d 430, 139 Cal.App. 143 (1934); United States v. 5139.5 
Acres of land,  200 F.2d 659 (1952); Covina Union High Sch. Dist. o f los  Angeles Co. v. Jobe, 345 
P.2d 78, 174 Cal.App.2d 340 (1959); 12 ALR3d 1064. Each of the defendant's experts, and to the 
same extent the Plaintiffs experts, have relied on hearsay in part to aid thein in arriving at their 
conclusions. This is common practice in the real estate and development business, and it is necessary 
in aniving at the expert's final opinion of value. 
Hearsay evidence should be allowed specifically with regards to comparable sales and prices 
paid for property. Two factors need to be considered in order to allow this type of testimony: it must 
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be shown that the witness is an expert and that the sales are comparable and recent. State Highway 
Commission v. Greenjeld, 399 P.2d 989,145 Mont. 164 (1965). Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 (Expert 
Witnesses) states that a witness may testify as an expert witness if they possess scientific, technical, 
or other specialized knowledge which will assist the trier of fact. Each of the Defendant's witnesses 
possess some sort of technical skill and specialized knowledge which will aid the trier of fact in 
determining just compensation. Furthermore, all of the comparable sales are recent in time. The 
witnesses, for the Defendants and for the State, should be allowed to testify to comparable sales that 
they each investigated. 
It is in the discretion of the trial court to allow an expert to render an opinion based upon 
hearsay. An expert may rely on hearsay as long as he testifies to the specific basis of his opinion and 
reaches an opinion through his own independent judgment. Duty v. Bishara, 123 Idaho 329,848 P.2d 
387 (1992). Each of the witnesses base some portion of their opinion on hearsay evidence, but the 
final opinion of each witness is based on their own independent judgment. The court should allow 
such testimony, as well as exploration into the basis for each experts opinion on cross-examination. 
Limited hearsay has been admitted by the Court in each case. Obviously, not all types of 
hearsay are admissible in condemnation cases, only that upon which the experts normally rely. 
J. BURDEN OF PROOF 
Normal burden of proof rules do not apply in condemnation cases. In State v. McGill, 79 
Idaho 467, 321 P.2d 595 (1958), the Idaho Supreme Court cited State v. Dunclick, 77 Idaho 45, 
286 P.2d 11 12 (1955), and stated the rule that the burden of proving the amount of damages 
sustained, i.e., the value of the land taken and resulting damage to the remainder, is to be borne by 
the conde~nnee. However, since that time a number of jurisdictions have ruled that the general 
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doctrine of burden of proof is inapplicable in a condemnation action, and Idaho would probably do 
the same if the issue were presented. 
In City of Wichita v. Jennings, 199 ICan. 621,433 P.2d 351 (1967), the Supreme Court of 
Kansas specifically held the general doctrine of burden of proof was inapplicable in a condemnation 
case. 
The appellants contend the trial court erred in instructing the jury that: 'The burden 
of proof is upon the landowners to establish the amount of compensation to be paid.' 
They suggest that K.S.A. 26-513 provides: 
'Private property shall not be taken or damages for public use without 
just compensation.' 
and the trial of a condemnation action violates the statute and constitutional 
prohibitions unless just compensation is awarded regardless of the burden of proof. 
There is much merit to appellants' suggestion. 
The instruction as given above is the same as that placed in the Pattern Instructions 
for Kansas. (P.I.K. 11.02.) However, the committee drafting such instructions 
expressed the belief "that because of the special nature of the land condemnation case 
a burden ofproof instruction is not practical or helpful." 
There is no uniformity among the authorities as to the necessity of giving such an 
instruction or the nature of the instruction that should be given. 
If the appraisers' award were disclosed to the jury, the burden of proof could well be 
placed on the landowner to prove a higher value and on the condemner to prove a 
lesser value. However, since the appraisers' award is not so disclosed and in view of 
the fact that in condemnation proceedings there is no formal joinder of issues, we 
conclude that the general doctrine of burden of proof is inapplicable. A general 
discussion of the question, with annotations, will be found in 5 Nichols on Eminent 
Domain, 3d Ed., 5 18.5 p. 300. It should be understood we do not find such an 
instruction standing along to be sufficiently prejudicial to justify a reversal. 
What has been said as to the burden of proof in no way reflects on the rule requiring 
the landowner to go forward with the evidence. Orderly and consistent procedure 
requires that one of the litigants be required to so proceed in all cases. 
The Jennings case was reaffirmed in City of Wichita v. May's Company Incovpouated, 5 10 P.2d 184 
(1973), where the Supreme Court of Kansas said: 
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The city argues some responsibility rests on the landowner to introduce evidence 
sufficient to submit to a jury. Since our decision in City of Wichita v. Jennings, 199 
Kan. 621, 433 P.2d 351, eliminated the burden of proof doctrine in condemnation 
proceedings, this argument fails. We hold there is an equal duty and responsibility on 
the parties to supply the evidence required by the statute. Justice requires that a new 
trial be ordered when each of the parties to a condemnation appeal fails to provide 
sufficient admissible evidence as a basis for a jury verdict. 
In State v. 45,621 Square Feet of Land, 475 P.2d 553 (Alaska 1970), the Supreme Court of 
Alaska specifically ruled that the landowner does not have the burden of proving by a preponderance 
of the evidence the just compensation to which he is entitled. 
In a condemnation proceeding such as the case at bar where the sole issue is 
determination ofjust compensation, procedural rules involving the concept of risk of 
failure to persuade are inapposite. Here the focal point of the trier of fact's inquiry is 
the ascertainment ofjust compensation. Thus, regardless of whether the condemning 
agency or the property owner meets a given burden of persuasion, Alaska's 
constitutional mandate requires that the owner be awarded just compensation for the 
property he has lost. In the usual condemnation case, the jury is confronted with 
conflicting opinions as to value. The jury is not faced with the necessity of finding a 
varticular value or no value at all. As to the issue of fair market value, both the 
condemning agency and the property owner may produce competent evidence of the 
fair market value of the condemned property. Absent the production of such evidence 
- -  - 
by either party, the triers of fact will determine fair market value solely from the other 
party's evidence. The burden of production facet of burden of proof, rather than the 
risk of non-persuasion aspect, is the more meaningful concept in the trial of a 
condemnation proceeding. 
Other courts have reached similar conclusions regarding the inappropriateness of burden of proof 
instructions, in the risk of non-persuasion sense for condemnation purposes. Since 1920 the courts 
of Ohio have held that the doctrine of burden of proof has no application to condemnation 
proceedings. Martin v. City of Columbus, 101 Ohio St. 1, 127 N.E. 411 (1920); Ellis v. Ohio 
Turnpike Commission, 70 Ohio Law Abst. 417, 124 N.E.2d 424, 432 (Ct.App. 1955); In re 
Appropriation by Director ofHighways, 120 Ohio App. 273,201 N.E.2d 889, 894 (Ct.App. 1963). 
In reaching this conclusion, the Ohio courts have placed emphasis on the absence of adversary 
pleadings, and the jury's paramount function of ascertainingjust compensation for the property taken. 
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The 45,621 Square Feet of Land case was reaffirmed in Ketchikan Cold Storage Company 
v. State, 491 P.2d 143 (Alaska 1971) as follows: 
In State v. 45,621 Square Feet of Land, 475 P.2d 553, 555 (Alaska 
1970), we held that 'instructions on burden of proof . . . are 
inappropriate in condemnation actions.' On retrial of the case at bar 
that decision will be controlling. We note here only that the 
instruction given below on burden of proof exacerbated the injury 
done appellant's case by the trial court's improper severance of the 
coilcept of highest and best use from the other indicia of property 
value. 
In State v. Amunsis, 61 Wash. 2d 160,377 P.2d 462 (1 963), the Supreme Court of Washington 
acknowledged that an instruction placing the burden of proof on the property owner should not be 
given: 
It is, however, as we have said, an inappropriate instruction in such a 
case, and we express the hope that the state will cease to ask for it and 
that trial judges will cease to give it. 
The following quotation from Martin v. City of Columbus (1 920), I01 Ohio 
St. 1, 127 N.E. 41 1 (see note 3), admirably expresses our own views: 
'The considerations touching the burden of proof between the parties 
to a condemnation case, upon the question of value, have all been 
based upon the assunlption that there is a burden of proof. If there is 
a burden of proof, the question properly arises as to whom shall meet 
it, who shall carry it, and if there be a shortage in that respect, as to 
whom shall fail. 
Very properly, however, the question that first is entitled to our 
consideration is this: Is there any 'burden of proof,' as that phrase is 
used and defined in the practice of the Iaw touching cases of this 
character? 
It may be helpful at this stage of the case to consider what is meant by 
the technical phrase 'burden of proof.'. . . . 
It then quotes fi-om 16 Cyc. 926, and 23 Cyc. 368, and continues: 
'From the foregoing texts it is quite apparent that there is no technical, 
formal, legal issue relating to the value of the property in question, to 
which the technical phrase 'burden of proof may intelligently and 
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reasonably be applied. There is no definite, concrete, particular issue 
of fact to be submitted to the jury, which is affirmed on one side and 
denied upon the other. The nature of the controversy between the 
parties is such that it does not permit or admit of any such simplicity 
of statement, of any such definiteness of controversy, of any formula 
of fact, which is claimed on one side and denied upon the other. 
In order to raise such form of technical issue, to which rules arising out 
of burden of proof would apply, it would be necessary for the one 
party to determine upon a definite, particular proposal as to value, 
which definite proposal would be affirmed by one party and denied by 
the other. Such unusual proposal would doubtless furnish the 
necessary technical issue to which the technical rules applicable to 
burden of proof would apply; but such would be most unusual in a 
condemnation case, where the witnesses for the condemnor, was well 
as for the property owner, will vary thousands of dollars as to what the 
fair market value of the property is at the time of the inquiry, so that 
the jury would have before it no definite issue to which it could 
logically and reasonably apply the doctrine known as 'burden of 
proof. ' 
* * * You might as well undertake to fit a hat to a headless man as to 
fit the doctrine of burden of proof to a proceeding of this character, 
which is absolutely wanting an issue to which such dochille can be 
applied. ' 
For the reasons indicated, there should hereafter be no suggestion that either the property 
owner or the condemner, in such a case, has to prove the fair market value at the time of trial 
of the property being condemned. After the condemner has met the burden of going forward 
with the evidence as to value, it is a question for the jury on the probative effect of all the 
evidence regardless of who offered it, and the jury should be so instructed. 
For additional authority, see Bellevue v. Stedman, 63 Ohio Ap. 150, 16 Ohio Op. 423,25 N.E.2d 695 
(1939); United States v. 4.105 Acres of Land, 68 F.Supp. 279 (1946); Patterson Redevelopment 
Agency v. Bienstoclc, 123 N.J. Super. 457,303 A,2d 598 (1973); and Morrisseui v. Commonwealth 
Department ofHighways, 424 Pa. 87,225 A.2d 895 (1967). 
Based on the foregoing, the property owner has only the burden of going forward with the 
evidence. Defendants request that no burden of proof instruction be given. In the alternative, the 
Defendants request that an instruction be given which makes it clear that the Defendants have only 
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the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the just compensation due is more than the amount 
advocated by the State of Idaho. 
K. ILLUSTRATIVE EXHIBITS 
Listed below are the relevant sections of the Idaho Rules of Evidence that address the 
admissibility of demonstrative and illustrative evidence: 
I.R.E. 402 - Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by these rules or by 
other rules applicable in the courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible. 
I.R.E. 403 -Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste 
of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading 
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation 
of cumulative evidence. 
I.R.E. 901 -Requirement of authentication or identification 
(1)  General provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as a 
condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a 
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. 
Listed below are the relevant sections of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure that address 
whether or not the jury may take demonstrative or illustrative evidence into the jury room. 
1.R.C.P 47(0) - Notes by jurors. 
Unless prohibited by order of the court, a juror may take or make written notes during 
a trial and take them with the juror when the jury retires for deliberation. The court 
shall give the jury appropriate admonishments at the beginning of the trial and at such 
other times as the court determines necessary to enforce this rule. 
I.R.C.P. 47@) -Taking documents and exhibits to jury room. 
Upon retiring for deliberation the jury shall, ifpractical, take with them all writtenjury 
instructions and exhibits which have been admitted as evidence in the trial, except 
depositions. 
1. Distinction between Demonstrative and Illustrative Evidence 
"Courts interchangeably use the terms 'demonstrative evidence' and 'illustrative 
evidence' to refer to evidence which is offered to assist the jury in understanding 
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the testimony of a witness or other evidence, such as the use of a diagram, map, 
model, photograph or chart to which a witness refers while testifying." D. Craig 
Lewis, Idaho Trial Handbook 258 (1995). 
2. Admissibility of Demonstrative Evidence 
'The admission of an exhibit for demonstrative purposes depends on whether the 
exhibit supplements the testimony of witnesses or assists the jury in obtaining a 
better understanding of facts in issue." Masters v. Dewey, 109 Idaho 579, 709 P.2d 
149 (1985). "Admission or exclusion of relevant demonstrative evidence is 
detennined by the trial court through balancing the probative value of the evidence 
against the dangers of unfair prejudice, distraction, confusion of issues and waste 
of time. I.R.E. 403." Id. 
"A diagram offered for il~ushative purposes needs only to be relevant to illustrate a 
witness's testimony; it does not have to be shown to be precisely accurate or 
consistent with the testimony of other witnesses." Idaho Trial Handbook at 259 
(citing State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 864 P.2d 596 (1993) in which diagram 
was properly admitted where not to scale and admittedly inconsistent with another 
witness's testimony) 
"An illustrative exhibit based on hearsay evidence may be admissible where the 
underlying evidence qualifies under a hearsay exception" Id. (citing Cosgrove v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, I17 Idaho 470, 788 P.2d 1293 (1989) in which an 
illustrative exhibit summarizing records was properly admitted where data on 
which exhibit was based qualified under business records, public records, and 
market report hearsay exceptions). 
3. Taking Documents and Exhibits to J u r ~  Room. 
The Idaho Courts have addressed taking documents and exhibits to the jury room. In 
Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122,937 P.2d 434(Ct. App. 1997), the court determined that the 
failure to submit three illustrative exhibits to the jury during deliberations was error. However, 
the court further determined that "the error in failing to submit the three exhibits was harmless in 
light of the fact that other exhibits adequately satisfy the illustrative purpose behind their 
admission." Id. at 127. 
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In Sears v. Lyndon, 5 Idaho 358,49 P. 122 (1897), the Idaho Supreme Court held that it 
was error to refuse to allow the jury to take with them a certified copy of a writ of attaclment 
under which a seizure was made. 
In short, the only foundation required for illustrative/demonstrative evidence is a showing 
that it will assist the witness in testifymg. Further, according to 1.R.C.P 47(p), if the exhibit has 
been admitted into evidence, it should go to the jury room during deliberations. Consequently, all 
exhibits admitted into evidence are to be taken to the jury room. 
L. PROJECT INFLUENCE 
Project Influence in eminent domain cases reflects the concept that, in the interests of 
fairness, valuation of a landowner's property in the "before take" conditioil does not take into 
consideration any influence on value attributable to the project, whether such influence is good or 
bad. In determining proper just compensation, the land is valued in the "before take" condition as 
if the project never existed. The rationale behind this principle is that neither the landowner nor 
the government should benefit from the project's influence on land values. If the value of the land 
is enhanced as a result of the project, the landowner should not be allowed to use the increased 
value in detennining the before value and just compensation. Likewise, if the value of the land is 
diminished as a result of the project, the government should not be allowed to use the lower value 
in determining before value and just compei~sation. 
There are no cases dealing with project influence in Idaho. However, the project influence 
principle is well recognized in eminent domain law. In City ofPhoenix v. Clauss, 177 Ariz. 566, 
869 P.2d 1219 (1994), the Arizona Court of Appeals stated: 
The "project influence doctrine" (also referred to as "project enhancement") holds that 
property may not be charged with a lesser or greater value at the time of taking, when the 
change in value is caused by the taking itself or by anticipation of appreciation or 
depreciation arising from the planned project. See State v. Hollis, 93 Ariz. 200,206,379 
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P.2d 750,753 (1963) ("property cannot be charged with a lesser value at the time of taking 
when the decrease in such value is occasioned by the taking itself,"); Uvodich v. Arizona 
Board ofRegents, 9 Ariz. App. 400,405,453 P.2d 229,234 (1 969). [further citations 
omitted]. Id. at 1221-22. 
The effects of project influence can extend to comparable sales as well. Using sales of 
land which are affected by project influence, beneficially or adversely, as comparables would be 
as inappropriate as taking such influence into consideration in the valuation of the Plaintiffs land, 
as the court went on to explain: 
The doctrine also excludes evidence of "comparable" sales that reflect an enhanced or 
reduced value due to the governmental plan or project that occasioned the taking of the 
property in question. Ruelas, 19 Ariz. App. at 532, 508 P.2d at 1176. Id. at 1221-22. 
The Arizona Court of Appeals also discussed the project influence doctrine when 
considering whether zoning changes were brought about by project influence in Town of Paradise 
Valley v. Young Financial Services, 177 Ariz. 388, 868 P.2d 971 (1 993); rev, denied, stating: 
An important limitation on the rezoning exception is the "project influence doctrine." This 
principle excludes all references to the probability of changes in value which occur 
because of a proposed project of the condemning authority. See State v. Hollis, 93 Ariz. 
200,206,379 P.2d 750,753 (1963); Uvodich v. Arizona Board of Regents, 9 Ariz. App. 
400,405-06,453 P.2d 229,234 (1969). In Kansas City Power &Light Co. v. Jenln'ns, 648 
S.W.2d 555,560 (Mo. App. 1983), the court stated: 
'Zoning generally falls within the project influence doctrine. "The probability of 
rezoning (or even an actual change in zoning) which results from the fact that the 
project which is the basis for the taking was impending, cannot be taken into 
account in valuing the property in the condemnation proceeding [emphasis 
deleted]." 4 Nichols, Eminent Domain at 12.322[1] at 12-655 (3rd ed. 1981).' 
The rule thus neutralizes the effect of the project for which the property was condemned. 
The condemnee neither gets the benefit of increased valuation nor is left with decreased 
valuation due to the condemnation project. Id. [referring to Nichols]. 
Although not referring to the "project influence doctrine" by that name, the Arizona 
Supreme Court approved the doctrine in Hollis, 93 Ariz. at 206,379 P.2d at 753, in which 
it stated: 
It is competent to show the value of property as it would have been if no such 
[project] had been contemplated. In other words, the property cannot be charged 
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with a lesser value at the time of taking when the decrease in such value is 
occasioned by reason of the taking itself. [Citations omitted.] See Uvodich, 9 Ariz. 
App. at 405-06, 453 P.2d at 234, citing Hollis, Id. at 974-975. 
Property, for eminent domain purposes, must be valued as if the government project which 
results in the taking was neither contemplated nor carried out. See City of Sparks v. Armstrong, 
748 P.2d 7, 103 Nev. 619, rehr'g denied. 
M. COMPARABLE SALES SOLD AFTER TEIE DATE OF THE TAKING 
Comparable sales which have taken place after the date of valuation (December 28,2004) 
should be admissible as the basis for the opinion of an expert witness regarding the value of the 
subject property. Courts have held that the use of cornparable sales occumng after the date of 
valuation are admissible at the discretion of the trial judge. State ex rel. State Highway Corn. v. 
Wertz, 478 SW2d 670, State, By Atty. Gen. v. Pioneer Co., Ltd., 637 P.2d 113 1 (1980), Mette v. 
Kemp, 69 P.2d 947 (1985), Davis v. Reed, 88 So 2d 857 (1956). 
Comparable sales occurring after the date of valuation must be suEciently comparable in 
character, close in time, and in a sufficiently similar location to be probative of the value of the 
subject property. State Dep't of Highways, Div. ofHighways v. Silerthorne, 707 P.2d 1017 
(Colo.App.), State v. Kunimoto, 617 P.2d 93 (1980). 
It is anticipated that both sides may offer evidence of comparable sales occurring after 
December 28,2004. 
W. SEVERANCE DAMAGES AND COSTS TO CURE 
Just compensation is to include payment for land taken and severance damages to the 
remainder, if any. 
I.C. § 7-71 1 determines the measure of damages in a condemnation case. Subsection 1 
provides that the value of the property sought to be condemned is to be assessed and Subsection 2 
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provides for severance damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by 
reason of its severance from the portion to be condemned and the construction of the project by 
the condemning authority. 
" 1. The value of the property sought to be condemned, and all improve- 
ments thereon pertaining to the realty, and of each and every separate estate or 
interest therein; if it consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel and each 
estate or interest therein shall be separately assessed. For purposes of ascertaining 
the value of the property, the assessed value for property tax purposes shall be used 
as the minimum amount for damages unless the court, jury or referee finds the 
property has been altered substantially. 
2. If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a 
larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be 
condemned, by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned, 
and the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff." 
There is no provision in LC. 5 7-71 1 for "cost to cure" damages as opposed to severance 
damages. Despite the recited statutory measure of just compensation, eminent domain case law 
has developed a concept which recognizes that fair market value adjusts to consider the possibility 
of restoring the damaged property to its before taking condition by expending the cost of curing 
the damages to the remaining property. A fbll description of the cost to cure and how it is applied 
is found in 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 6 18.1 8: 
Generally, the evidence of damage in the case of a partial taking of property is used 
to establish that a decrease in the market value of the land and improvements has 
occurred as a result of the taking and to show the use to which the condemnor 
intends to put the property. However, inasmuch as market value adjusts to 
consider the possibility of restoring the damaged property to the same relative 
position in which it stood before the taking, the courts have recognized the 
admissibility of evidence of the cost of curing damages to the remaining property. 
The criterion of damage adopted will be the one that produces the lesser damage 
figure. 
Several general rules of law have developed with regard to the concept of 
cost to cure: 
(1) Evidence of the cost of restoring the remaining property as far as 
possible to its original relative position is admissible only when the 
DEFENDANTS' TRIAL BRIEF - 39 
evidence of such cost is no greater in amount than the decrease in 
market value of the property if it is left uncurred. In other words, 
the cost to cure cannot exceed the damage to the remaining 
property. 
(2) It is incumbent upon the owner to offer evidence of the damages 
suffered by the remaining property prior to offering evidence of the 
cost of curing such damages. 
(3) Evidence offered to establish the prospect of restoring the remaining 
property to its original condition cannot be speculative. The ability 
to cure damages to the remaining prooerty must be reasonably 
certain. 
In keeping with the requirement of certainty and nonspeculation with regard 
to a proposed cure for the remaining property, it is well-established that any 
proposed restoration must be contained within the existing boundaries of the tract. 
The owner's right to compensation cannot be made to depend upon the speculative 
premise that adjacent land could be purchased, thereby curing the damage. 
It should be noted that the general rule is that the property owner is entitled to severance 
damages. There are two exceptions to this general rule: 
1. severance damages may be offset by special (as distinguished Erom general) benefits 
which flow to a property as a direct result of the taking and the project, so if special 
benefits equal or exceed severance damages, the property owner would not receive 
compensation for severance damage; or 
2. where it is possible to completely "cure" or "fix" the severance damages such that the 
property in the after condition is restored to the same relative condition it was in before the 
taking, the "cost to cure" may be awarded to the property owner in place of severance 
damages. This is only true, however, where: 
a) the cost to cure amount is less than the amount of severance damages; AND 
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b) the "cure" or "fix" can be accolnplished wholly within the boundaries of the 
remainder tract of property and cures, rather than mitigates, the damage. B & B 
Food Corp. v. State, 96 A.D.2d 893 (1983). 
In Sute v. Dunclick?, Inc., 77 Idaho 45,286 P.2d 11 12 (1955), a condemnation action, the 
State of Idaho advocated and offered testimony that other land adjacent or contiguous to the 
property to be condemned, which was not owned by the Defendant on the date of taking, could be 
acquired and substituted for the land taken. The Idaho Supreme Court held that this was not a 
proper measure of damage in a condemnation case: 
An examination of the transcript clearly indicates that it is respondent's 
theory that other land adjacent or contiguous to appellant's plant, not owned by it, 
could be acquired by appellant and substituted for the land taken. Further parts of 
the transcript and testimony admitted could be quoted indicating this theory. 
Respondent in its brief argues that such testimony of the availability and 
substitution of other land for that taken is a proper matter to be submitted to the 
jury. 
Under our constitution and statutes, Art. 1, 5 14, Idaho Constitution and 
sections 7-71 1 and 7-714 I.C., a defendant in a condemnation suit is entitled to be 
paid in money the value of the property so taken and the damages which will 
accrue to the part not taken because of its severance. Ryan v. Weiser Valley Land 
& Water Co., 20 Idaho 288, 118 P. 769; Jeffery v. Chicago & M. Electric R. Co., 
138 Wis. 1,119 N.W. 879; 29 C.J.S., Eminent Domain 5 191b, p. 1089. 
The condemnor cannot force an exchange of land, nor require the 
conde~nnee to purchase other lands in lieu of that taken, nor pay for the land taken 
and damages to the remainder in anything except cash. The law applicable to the 
damages which appellants will sustain due to the taking does not contemplate an 
exchange of property, nor can respondent require that appellants purchase or accept 
other land in lieu of that taken or move the plant, or any part of it, to a new 
location. The evidence proving damage which will besistained by appellants and 
testified to by respondent's appraisers was all based on the theory that there was 
other suitable available land: - 
In St. Patrick's Church v. State, 294 N.Y.S.2d 275 (1968), the church acquired land for the 
purpose of erecting a church, school, rectory and convent. Fourteen months after the taking, the 
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church bought some adjacent property for $25,000. The state then claimed that the house on the 
new property was worth $20,000 and that the church was therefore damaged only to the extent of 
$5,000. The New York court specifically rejected this form of a cost to cure theory: 
However, even if we were to assume the validity of the claimed values of 
this land and the residence, we are unable to adopt the "cost to cure" theory 
advanced by the State or to agree with its contention that the court erred in making 
the award, which appears to be within the range of the testimony. 
We are not here dealing with any mitigation of damages by something that 
occurred or could occur upon the property remaining after the appropriation as in 
Mayes Co. v. State of New York (18 N.Y.2d 549), where the "cost to cure" theory 
was allowed because the cure was to occur within the bounds of the claimant's 
lands. Sound reason requires that the theory cannot be used in cases of subsequent 
acquisitions of lands outside the bounds of the appropriated property; not should a 
condemnee's right to compensation be made to depend upon whether adjacent land 
could easily be purchased. These established principles are clearly recognized in 4 
Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d ed.) ($14.22, p. 525) where, in referring to the rule 
of cost of restoration, it is stated that "the restoration must be possible without 
going outside the remaining portion of the tract in controversy"; and again in 
Section 14.2472 (p.683), "It has recently been held that whether premises of a like 
description to those taken are readily available or whether it was owner's intention 
to seek siinilar property was not relevant to the question of the fair market value of 
condemned premises" (citing Jones v. Providence Redevelopment Agency, 92 R.I. 
285). That ihe adoption of the novel theory advanced by the State, illogical in its 
foundation, might well lead to confusion and havoc in the use of well-reasoned and 
judicially founded principles of providing just compensation for the taking of a 
citizen's lands, is all too evident. 
Our attention has been called Edgcomb Steel ofNew England v. State, (100 
N.R. 480), which is not aparallel to the case under consideration for there the 
additionally purchased land considered by the court had been contracted for prior 
to and pending the taking. In any event, that court reaffirmed the doctrine that 
damages for the taking are measured by the before and after values, measured at 
the time of taking. 
Additionally controlling upon the facts here presented is the well- 
established doctrine that claimant's right to compensation is constitutionally vested 
and should be measured as of the time of the taking when its damage had become 
acccrued and fixed. ( Wolfe v, State of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 292; Minesa Realty 
Co. v. State of New York, 26 A.D.2d 592). 
Id. at 277. 
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In Department ofHighways v. Intermountain Term. Co., 435 P.2d 391 (Colorado 1968), 
the property consisted of a highly specialized truck complex of improvements. The property 
owner believed that after the taking, the remainder was useless for truck terminal operations of a 
major motor carrier and ten days after the condemnation was filed, purchased 4.26 acres of land 
that was immediately adjacent. 
The Colorado Highway Department advocated that the other properties purchased by the 
property owner should be considered as a part of the tract which was damaged by the 
condemnation proceedings to decrease the amount payable by reason of diminution in the market 
value of the residue. The Colorado Supreme Court disagreed: 
The ipse dixit of the Highway Department is that the other property 
purchased by P.LE, should be considered as a part of the tract which was damaged 
by the condemnation proceedings, to decrease the amount payable by reason of 
diminution in the market value of the residue. 
[I] P.I.E. was not required by law to expend a large suin of money to 
avoid the consequences of the predicament in which the Department of Highways 
placed it through the expropriation proceedings. The business acumen of P.I.E. in 
the discovery of the opportunity to buy other property and the expenditure by it of 
$260,000 for acquiring such property with a subsequent sale of a part of it should 
not inure to the benefit of the Department o f  Highways. This 'other property' was 
not damaged by the condemnation proceedings and, therefore, was not residual 
property. Department ofHighways v. htermountain Term. Co., 435 P.2d at 393. 
In Utah Department of Transportation v. Rayco Corp., 599 P.2d 481,488-89 (Utah 1979), 
the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the cost of replacement ground was not a proper element 
and that restoration, cost to cure, must be possible without going outside the remainder - citing the 
Nichols Treatise: 
In 4A Nichols on Eminent Domain (3rd Ed.), 5 14.22 states: 
When the damage to the owner's remaining property can be avoided 
by grading or repairs, and the reasonable cost of such work is less than the 
decrease in the market value of the real estate, such cost forms the measure 
of damages. . . . 
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Also restoration must be possible without going outside the remaining 
portion of the tract. The owner's right to compensation cannot be made to 
depend upon the question of whether adjacent land could be easily bought. 
Moreover, at least one court has held that the fact that, after the vesting of 
titles, in a partial-taking case, the owner (whose remainder area is rendered 
unusable for its established use) acquires an adjoining tract to restore 
usability, this does not inure to the benefit of the condemnor so as to reduce 
the consequential damages to the original remainder area. 
The principal set forth in 5 14.22 of Nichols is illustrated in St. Patrick's 
Church, Whitney Point v. State ofNew Yorlc, wherein it is stated: 
We are not here dealing with any mitigation of damages by 
something that occurred or could occur upon the property remaining after 
the appropriation as in Mayes Co. v. State of New York, 18 N.Y.2d 549,277 
N.Y.S.2d 393,223 N.E.2d 881, where the "cost to cure" theory was allowed 
because the cure was to occur within the bounds of the claimant's lands. 
Sound reason requires that the theory cannot be used in cases of subsequent 
acquisitions of lands outside the bounds of the appropriated property; nor 
should a condemnee's right to compeilsation be made to depend upon 
whether adjacent land could be easily be purchased. . . 
The philosophy to support the foregoing principle is expressed in 
Department of Highways v. Intermountain Terminal Company (quotation omitted) 
In Mulkey v. State of Florida, 448 S.2d 1062 (Florida 1984), the court recognized the law 
that the cost to cure theory was limited to restoration on the remaining portion of the tract (note 
that Florida allows business damages): 
When the state, through the exercise of its power of eminent domain, takes 
private property for public use, the landowner must receive full comnpensation for 
his loss. Art. X, 5 6, Fla. Const. A landowner must also be compensated for 
damage to his property when less than an entire parcel is taken. 73.071 (3)(b), Fla. 
Stat.(1981); Kendry v. Division ofAdministration, Slate Department of 
Transportation, 366 S.2d 391, 393, Florida (1978); Lee County v, Exchange 
National Bank of Tampa, 417 S.2d 268,269, Florida 2d DCA (1982), review 
denied, 426 S.2d 25, Florida (1983). These damages, so-called severance damages, 
are generally measured by the reduction in value of the remaining property. 
Kendry, supra, at 393. However, the courts have recognized that this general 
measurement of damages may be replaced by a cost-to-cure approach in instances 
where such cost is less than the decreased value of the remainder. See generally 4A 
P. Nichols, The Law ofEminent Domain at 14.04, Rev. 3d ed (1981). 
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In Gluckman v. State o fNI< ,  325 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1971), the state project divided the land 
into two separate parcels. The state contended that one of the parcels was not landlocked because 
a service road could be extended to the parcel and the damages should be the cost of the service 
road---not the severance damages. The New York court held that this measure of damage was 
incorrect because the damages accrued at the time of filing and that the cost to cure theory could 
not be used because the cure must be accomplished without going outside the tract in controversy. 
Claimant's right to compensation for the property appropriated accrued at the time 
of the taking, and it is at that time that the amount of damages became fixed 
(Chester Litho V. Palisades Interstate Park Comm., 27 N.Y.2d 323; Wolfe v. State 
of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 292). At that time, claimant's land, insofar as industrial 
use was concerned, was landlocked. The easement by which access was available 
to the tap street was concededly restricted to residential traffic. No other access 
was present and claimant could not be required to construct an exterlsion of the 
service road to his land. The extension would have to be constructed over a public 
right of way and claimants neither had a permit from the town to complete the road 
nor even a permit or any document or other evidence that the Sate, as of the date of 
appropriation, had granted them a right to complete the road. The assertion that 
claimants need only apply to the State for a permit and it would be granted, since to 
deny such would be an abuse of discretion, is certainly not equivalent to a right of 
access to the parcel (see Windham v. State of New York, 34 A.D.2d 590, mot. for 
lv. to app. den. 27 N.Y.2d 481). In sum, claimants cannot be required by the State 
to create a public road over a public right of way to provide new access to the 
remainder of their property, when an appropriation of part of the property by the 
State has destroyed such access (see WoEfe v. State ofNew York, supra). We also 
note that the cost to cure theory, the method of computing consequential damages 
which the Sate seeks to use to require claimants to extend the service road to their 
property, may not be used here since the cure must be accomplished without going 
outside the tract in controversy. (St. Patrick's Chuvch v. State of New Yorl, 30 
A.D.2d 473; 4A Nichols, Eminent Domain [3d ed.], $ 14.22.) Judgment affirmed, 
with costs. 
Any modifications off of the Canyon Vista property in the after condition which could 
serve to mitigate or cure damage to the remainder property are therefore not relevant as a matter of 
law to the ascertainment of just compensation. Further, any proposed "cures" which don't actually 
cure damages should not be admitted or considered in assessing just compensation. 
Compensation is vested as of the time of taking and is to be measured in terms of severance 
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damage or the cost to cure, only if the cure can be completed and accomplished within the 
boundaries of Defendant's property. In addition, costs to cure may not replace or offset severance 
damages, as that is not how just compensation is to be computed. Any claims or evidence to the 
contrary offered by the State should therefore not be admitted. 
0 .  VALUE TESTIMONY DOES NOT REQUIRE COMPLIANCE WITH USPAP 
STANDARDS 
In condemnation cases, MA1 appraisers are typically retained to testify as to their opinions 
of the fair market value of the condemned property. MA1 appraisers' prepare appraisal reports in 
accordance with USPAP standards for compliance. However in assessing just compensation in a 
condemnation case, expert testimony of fair market value by non-appraisers is admissible and do 
not require that their opinions be founded upon the methods prescribed by the Uniform Standards 
of Professional Appraisal Practice, known as USPAP 
This proposition was succinctly stated by the Ohio Court of Appeals. In City ofNonvood 
v. Burton, 841 N.E.2d 393 (2005), reversed on other grounds, - N.E.2d - (2006), 2006 WL 
2585512, where the Court held: 
We have ureviouslv held that neither statutont nor case law restricts expert opinion 
testimonv on the fair market value of apuropriated property to those opinions 
founded w o n  the methods prescribed bv the USPAP. Rather, in determining the 
amount of compensation, or the market value of the property taken, each case must 
be considered in the light of its own facts, and every element that can fairly enter 
into the question of value, and which an ordinarily prudent business [person] 
would consider before forming [his] judgment in making a purchase, should be 
considered. (Emphasis added). 
841 N.E.2d at 399. See also, City ofCincinnati v. Banks, 757 N.E.2d 1205 (2001) and Sowers v. 
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Although no Idaho appellate court has addressed this specific issue, the Idaho Supreme 
Court's holding in Boel v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 137 Idaho 9,43 P.3d 768 (2002), clearly infers 
that expert testimony in litigation does not require compliance with USPAP standards. 
Stewart Title argues that the district court erred in allowing three real estate agents 
or brokers, who were not licensed real estate appraisers, to testify as to the value of 
the Boels' property. Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 702, 
[ilf scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise. 
The real estate agents wlxo testified were qualified to testify to things outside the 
common knowledge of the jury by virtue of their specialized lcnowledge and 
experience. However, Stewart Title argues that the Idaho Real Estate Appraisers 
Act (the Act), I.C. (ig 54-41 01-41 19, prohibits persons not licensed as real estate 
appraisers from giving an opinion as to the value of property. 
The Act was amended in 1999 in order to, among other things, make it unlawful 
for a person to perform an appraisal in this state if that person is not licensed or 
certified by the Real Estate Appraiser Board. . . 
Prior to the 1999 amendment, this Court approved the practice of allowing real 
estate agents or brokers to testify as to valuation. (Citations omitted). While the 
legislature amended the Act in 1999 to provide a general prohibition against giving 
an opinion as to value, it did not specifically address the court-approved practice of 
allowing expert testimony in litigation. In fact, nowhere does the Act mention the 
giving of expert testimony in litigation. . . Consequently, we hold that the 
legislature did not intend to alter or contradict the provisions of LR.E. 702 in 
enacting the Idaho Real Estate Appraisers Act. A real estate agent, if properly 
qualified under I.R.E. 702, may testify as to value of the property in the course of 
litigation. The district court's decision to allow the real estate agents to testify is 
affirmed. 
Id. at 14-15. 
Implicit in the Boel decision, the standard for testifying to an opinion of value is not based 
on USPAP, but instead, I.R.E. 702 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In some of the previous cases along Pole Line Road, notably, State ofIdaho vs. Billiar, 
Case No: CV -04-4348, ITD has completely ignored the fact that it is condemning the property 
owner's access rights along frontage on Pole Line Road. This issue was the subject of a Motion 
for Summary Judgment brought by the State in the Billiar case. Judge Hohnhorst denied the 
Motion when it was a g e d ,  but the case settled before his formal written opinion was issued. 
ITD, in that case, confused direct and inverse condemnation cases and rules of law and 
inappropriately attempted to apply cases that deal with police powers to a direct condemnation 
case. We anticipate, based on comments from witnesses in depositions and comments of 
counsel, that similar arguments will be made in this case. Because this issue of access will be 
critical in this case and the law on the subject is voluminous, Defendants provide this brief for 
the Court's reference. 
State v. lionburg, 80 Idaho 269,328 P.2d 60 (1958), is the Idaho case most directly on 
point. There is a line of cases which hold that when a conventional roadway is widened and 
converted into a limited access roadway, access rights of abutting owners must be acquired 
though condemnation and cannot be regulated away without compensation under the State's 
police powers. Idaho cases have cited approvingly to a Kansas case squarely on point, Smith v. 
State Highway Commission, 185 Kan. 445,346 P.2d 259 (1959), and to an Arizona case squarely 
on point, State ex rel. Morrison v. Thelberg, 87 Arizona 318,350 P.2d 988, (1960). There is a 
great weight of authority that access rights for limited access highways must be acquired and paid 
for, they cannot be regulated away under the State's police powers. 
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There is also an Idaho statute, I.C. $ 40-3 11, which provides that access rights shall be 
purchased, condemned or otherwise acauired by ITD for controlled access roadways. Access to 
and from Pole Line is a property right (an easement appurtenant to the land) of Canyon Vista 
which must be, and is being, condemned. The issue is now comnpensation. The State cannot 
avoid compensation by claiming the use of police powers and attempting to recast what is being 
taken from the property owner as a mere administrative regulation rather than a condemnation. 
Access cases are difficult to research and can be confusing because without an 
understanding of this area of the law, it would seem cases find both compensable takings and 
non-compensable uses of police power on very similar facts. It must be remembered that access 
cases can be either direct condemnation cases, in which a right is being acquired, or inverse 
condemnation cases, where the property owner is alleging their rights have been so impacted that 
there is a compensable taking. There is also the question of what rights are at issue in each case, 
an abutting owner's right to direct access to a pre-existing road, claimed access rights to a newly 
constructed road, or issues relating to traffic flows on the road, such as medians or stop signs. A 
thorough review of the case law reveals that there are four basic categories that access cases can 
be broken into which help to make sense of the morass, and determine which cases are on point 
in this particular case now before the Court. 
11. RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Taking of Canyon Vista's Access Rights 
The facts will be only very briefly summarized herein for the Court. We should clarify at 
the outset that no damages are being claimed by Canyon Vista due to the installation of center 
lane medians, multi-lane configuration, or intersection signalization. Those portions of the 
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project have not been identified by any defense witness as forming a basis of his opinion of 
severance damages. The Order of Condemnation and the Amended Complaint in this case 
condemn Canyon Vista's access rights to Pole Line Road. This taking of direct access rights 
results in severance damages to the remainder in the view of Defendants' experts. 
ITD may portray the Type IV access limitation on Pole Line Road in the after condition 
as a mere non-compensable regulation of traffic flow, ignoring the fact that access rights of 
abutting property owners must be acquired for the project. ITD's Order of Condemnation in this 
case, Paragraph 4, determines that Canyon Vistas' access rights are needed for public use for the 
U.S. 93 .Alternate Project. See Exhibit A, Order of Condemnation, attached hereto. 
The Amended Complaint in this matter is consistent with the Order of Condemnation and 
condemns Canyon Vistas' access rights to Pole Line Road except for one temporary 28' access 
point to serve the existing and interim use, providing access to a shop and a manufactured home. 
The Amended Complaint, paragraph VIII and Exhibit B to the Amended Complaint clearly show 
access rights are condemned. 
B. Specific Areas of Anticipated Factual Disputes Relevant to the Access Issue 
1. Canyon Vista Has Enjoyed A Half-Century of Access to Pole Line Road 
At trial the evidence will show that the property owners have, since the 195O8s, enjoyed 
free access along Pole Line Road to and from their property. There were four visable and 
improved physical accesses to and from the property and Pole Line Road before the taking. 
2. The State Interfered With Canyon Vista's Access Rights 
Witnesses on both sides agree that in recent years the highest and best use of the property 
has changed from agricultural to commercial. If the Canyon Vista properly were to develop 
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commercially, the property owner would have the right to direct access to and from Pole Line 
Road which conforms to the City of Twin Falls policy. 
Canyon Vista requested direct access points to Pole Line Road in the after condition from 
the State during right of way negotiations, but was turned down. The State made the 
determination that access would only be allowed at the half mile point and the quarter mile (not 
on the subject property) due to the U.S. 93 Alternate Project. The evidence will show that the 
State had asked the City of Twin Falls to impose access control along Pole Line Road for the 
impending project and allow only access consistent with the goals of the project, and the City had 
agreed to do so. ITD and the City were actively imposing access limitations on Pole Line Road 
as a direct result of the U.S. 93 Alternate Project, as of at least 1998. 
3. Commercial Access Absent Project Influence 
If the Canyon Vista property had been developed for commercial use as of December 28, 
2004, the date of taking, Pole Line Road would have been in the jurisdiction of the City of Twin 
Falls. In determining the highest and best use of the property absent the influence of the U.S. 93 
Alternate Project, it is necessary to consider what type of commercial development would have 
been reasonably probable for the site, including what access to and from Pole Line Road would 
have been reasonably probable. While experts on both sides agree that the property would have 
developed as a C-l commercial PUD, and that is the highest and best use as of the date of taking, 
there is a difference of opinion regarding the access which would have been permitted by the City 
in the before condition. 
Experts retained by ITD have opined that no access or public road intersections on Pole 
Line Road would have been permitted and approved to the Canyon Vista property as of the date 
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of taking, absent the project. Defendants witnesses have opinions that between one and two full 
movement driveways and one public road intersection (at the one-third mile, opposite the 
existing Canyon Crest) on Pole Line Road would have been approved as of the date of taking, 
absent the project. 
4. Access After the Taking Changes the Highest & Best Use 
Defendants witnesses will opine that as a result of the taking of all access rights to Pole 
Line from Canyon Vista, the development potential of the property is reduced, and the highest 
and best use is changed. The site can no longer accommodate a commercial development, and 
will likely need to remain a manufactured home park. 
No access to the remainder from Pole Line Road leaves the property land locked and is 
not reasonable to serve the property after the taking. This results, according to Defendants 
witnesses, in severance damages because the entire property, after the taking, is worth less in the 
after condition than in the before condition. ITD's witnesses have found no damages caused by 
the taking of access. 
111. ARGUMENT 
A. ITD is Taking Access Rights, For Which it Must Pay Just Compensation 
1. The Limited Access Highway 
The limited access highway came into being in the early 1950's. The National Highway 
System was evolving and there was increased dependence on the automobile. State legislatures 
around the county enacted legislative provisions authorizing their various state highway 
departments to construct or designate highways as access controlled facilities. In the 1950's and 
1960's there were numerous cases throughout the various states involving the condemnation of 
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property for limited access highways. 
The rules which evolved were that if an existing roadway was being coilverted into a 
limited access roadway, abutter's access rights were being destroyed and compensation must be 
paid therefore. However, where a new roadway was created where none had existed before, it 
could be designated as a limited access roadway and no abutter's access rights would come into 
being (and thus were not being taken). 
The limited access cases all address the problem of the taking of access rights for 
controlled access facilities. State highway departments in several states sought to avoid 
compensating property owners for taking their access rights, often claiming the rights were 
simply being regulated under the state's police powers. Many courts looked to state statutes 
relating to controlled access roadways and noted that the statutes generally require acquisition of 
access rights, therefore compensation is required. Other courts have reached the same conclusion 
(that compensation is warranted) applying traditional property law concepts. Uniformly the 
Courts have rejected government attempts to destroy access for limited access facilities and not 
pay for doing so. 
2. Idaho Case Law on Point, State v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269,328 P.2d 60 (1958) 
There is an Idaho case which considered whether or not the taking of access rights for 
construction of a limited access highway was permissible, State v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269,328 
P.2d 60 (1958). Of all Idaho access cases, this one is the closest factually to the present case. 
In Fonburg, the State was taking 12.76 acres of a farm. The owner had access to the 
existing highway 95 which was being taken; the property owner was not going to be allowed any 
access rights to the new four lane, limited access highway. The State was condemning access 
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rights to the existing roadway, as it had determined those rights were necessaty for its project. 
On a hearing had in the district court the trial judge held that the use to which the 
property sought to be condemned will be put is a public use and one authorized by law; 
that the necessity for the taking was established, and 'There is also condemned and taken 
herein all rights bf access to a& from all prope&ies abutting upon the above described 
parcel No. 24 [land of defendant, which the road crosses], and such rights of access, if 
any, existing heretofore are extinguished and the usage of any such access is hereby 
prohibited.' 
State ex rel. Rich v. Fonbuvg, 80 Idaho 269, 274-75,328 P.2d 60, 62 (1958). The property owner 
challenged the State's right to condemn access rights along with the property taken in fee. 
The Court looked to Idaho statutes then in effect to hold that the State was authorized to 
acquire the owner's access rights as part of a fee simple taking for the new access controlled 
highway 95, as follows: 
We shall first address our attention to the contention that the State has no 
authority to prohibit access to a public road by a landowner through whose land the road 
is constructed. 
By the provisions of subd. 9, Ch. 260, 1955 S.L., the Board of Highway Directors 
is empowered to purchase, condemn, or otherwise acquire real property in fee, including 
rights of direct access from property abutting highways with controlled-access, deemed 
necessary by the Board for present or fUture state highway purposes. 
This provision was amended by Ch. 227, p. 520, 1957 S.L., now codified as Sec. 
40-120 I.C. (Supp.), by the terms of which the Idaho Board of Highway Directors is given 
power to: 
'(9) Purchase, condemn or otherwise acquire (including exchange), * * * any real 
property, either in fee or in any lesser estate or interest, rights-of-way, easements 
and other rights * * * and rights of direct access from the property abutting 
highways with controlled-access, deemed necessary by the board for present or 
future state highway purposes. The order of the board that the land sought is 
necessary for such use shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.' 
The amendment was not in effect when this action was commenced, February 1, 1957, 
but was in effect when the action was tried. 
By the provisions of Sec. 7-701, I.C., among the uses that the right of eminent 
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domain may be exercised, specifically provided, among other things, for the construction 
o f  roads. 
It appears from a reading o f  these statutes that the State is authorized to do what it 
proposes to do in this proceeding, namely, to condemn land to be used for a limited 
access highway and acquire the fee title to privately owned property, limiting or curtailing 
entry o f  an adjoining landowner which would ordinarily be appurtenant to the land not 
taken. The statute quoted specifically provides for the taking o f  land for a controlled- 
access highway, deemed necessary by the Board o f  Highway Directors. 
State ex rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269,275-276, 328 P.2d 60,62 - 63 (1958). 
The Court then considered the owner's argument that he was not being provided access to 
the new highway, and should receive damages therefore. The Court found that the owner had no 
right to access a newly constructed road which was not previously in existence: 
There is no inherent right of  access to a newly relocated highway. The new 
highway not being in existence prior to the present construction, the landowner would 
suffer no coinpensable damages because his access to the new construction was denied 
him. The condemnee never having had access to the new highway there is no easement or 
access taken in this proceeding. There can only be compensable damages for an existing 
easement, and when one does not exist, there is none to take. 
State ex rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269,277-278,328 P.2d 60,64 (1958). However, with 
regard to the owner's right to compensation for the taking o f  his access rights to the existing 
roadway, the Court found that loss o f  access was to be considered by the jury in determining just 
compensation. Also, the reduction in accessibility to the nearby railroad caused by the taking 
was an appropriate consideration in assessing severance damages, though those rights were not 
taken in the condemnation action, because all inconveniences resulting to the remaining land are 
to be considered in valuation: 
Where a part ofthe owner's contiguous land is taken in a condemnation 
proceeding, all inconveniences resulting to the owner's remaining land, including an 
easement or access to a road or right o f  way formerly enjoyed, which decrease the value 
o f  the land retained by the owner, are elements o f  severance damage for which 
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compensation should be paid. 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain $ 105, p. 910; 29 C.J.S. 
Eminent Domain 5 163, p. 1033; State ex rel. Rich v. Dunclick, Inc., 77 Idaho 45,286 
P.2d 11 12; State v. S@ner, 58 Idaho 233,72 P.2d 699, and in Creasy v. Stevens 
(Marshell v. Stevens), D.C., 160 F.Supp. 404,405, the Court held: 
'The right of access to a public highway is a property right which cannot be taken 
or materially interfered with without just compensation.' 
However, the instructions given to the jury contained no outline of the elements of 
damages that the jury should consider. Throughout the instructions given, the trial judge 
instructed the jury that it should award defendant damages for the land taken, and 
severance damage to the remainder. The jury was nowhere in the instructions given 
advised as to the claimed severance damages because of destroyed or curtailed access to 
highway No. 95, as formerly enjoyed, nor was it advised that the improvements and 
access to the railroad right of way was an element to be by it considered. 
Accessibility to the railroad formerly enjoyed, which because of the taking of a 
part of defendant's land, is limited and restricted, thereby decreasing the value of the 
remainder, if it does, is an element of severance damage to be submitted to and 
considered by the jury. 
State ex rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 278-279,328 P.2d 60, 64 - 65 (1958). 
The Court held that a requested jury instruction regarding consideration of loss of access 
should have been given rather than refused, and finally, held that it was proper to allow the jury 
to consider all elements of damage, including loss of direct access and loss of accessibility. 
We think the jury should have been instructed as to the elements of damage 
claimed to have been suffered by defendant, and supported by any proof, because of the 
taking of the land and the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed. 
These elements of damage consist of the reasonable market value of the land taken, 
together with all improvements thereon located and taken in this proceeding, severance 
damage to the remainder, through which the road runs due to its severance from the 
whole, which severance damage would include, among other damage sustained, the 
curtailment and restriction of access to highway No. 95, as formerly enjoyed, and access 
to the railroad as enjoyed prior to the construction of the new road. 29 C.J.S. Eminent 
Domain $ 105, p. 910; Creasy v. Stevens (Marshell v. Stevens), D.C., 160 F.Supp. 404. 
The elements of damage which must be ascertained and assessed are provided for 
in Sec. 7-71 1. I.C. 
State ex: rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 280,328 P.2d 60,65-66 (1958). 
Clearly, in Fonburg, the Idaho Supreme Court found it was instructive to look at the 
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Order of Condemnation, the Complaint, and the statutes then in effect to determine whether the 
access rights were being properly taken. There was no argument in the appeal about police 
powers, because the State was expressly aclcnowledging the taking of access rights. However, 
although the words "police powers" do not appear in the case, it is clear that there were issues 
about what the jury could consider and what was compensable, so there must have been an 
argument about the compensability of loss of direct access as well as loss of accessibility. 
Fonburg has been cited in a number of other Idaho cases and remains good law. 
The language of the statute the Court considered in Fonburg is virtually identical to the 
current LC. § 40-3 11 (1 )  relating to the Idaho Transportation Board. The applicable provisions 
of LC. 6 7-71 1 remain the same as well. 
While in Fonburg the property owner was questioning the right to condemn access, it also 
appears clear the State Department of Highways was questioning having to pay damages as a 
result, though the argument was not framed as a police powers argument in the Court's decision 
However, the case is instructive in that it tells us how the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the 
issue and what they considered relevant to the inquiry. They followed the same basic approach 
that the Kansas Supreme Court did a year later in a case that is squarely on point; see below. 
3. Case Law Squarely on Point & Cited Approvingly by Idaho Cases 
a. Smith v. State Highway Commission, 185 Kan. 445,346 P.2d 259 (1959) 
Perhaps the most instructive case is one squarely and directly on point from Kansas, the 
reasoning of which was adopted and cited approvingly by the Idaho Supreme Court on three 
separate occasions, in Johnson v. Boise City, 87 Idaho 44, 52,390 P.2d 291,295 (1 964), State v. 
Bastian, 97 Idaho 444,447,546 P.2d 399,402 (1976), and Coeur d 'Alene Garbage Service v. 
TRIAL BRIEF- PART I1 (TAKING OF ACCESS) - I2 
0 2006. May bo freeiy used by Courts. Allother; must obtain permission fcom the author for use or copying ofany portion of [his material. 
City ofCoeur d'Alene, 114 Idaho 588,592,759 P.2d 879,883 (1988). The Kansas case is both 
factually and legally analogous to the present case, and remains good law. 
In Smith v. State Highway Commission, 185 Kan. 445,346 P.2d 259 (1959), the Kansas 
State Highway Commission argued that as part of an improvement project on U.S. Highway 36, 
the highway was going to have controlled access, and that the State need not pay any damages for 
access rights acquired because it was entitled to regulate access through the its police powers 
without being liable for compensation. The facts of the case were that the State was acquiring an 
easement and access rights to a portion of the Defendant's frontage on the highway. The 
property owner had the same number of entrances to their property after the condemnation as 
they did before the condemnation, but they were losing access rights along 1,410 feet of frontage 
except for a 40 foot wide existing entrance to their property, and three additional entrances on a 
portion of their property for which access rights were not being acquired due to construction of a 
frontage road. A drawing depicting the taking and the access rights being acquired appears in the 
opinion, see Smith v. State Highway Commission, 185 Kan. at 448, 346 P.2d at 264. 
The Kansas Supreme Court summarized the State's position in the case as follows: 
The State Highway Commission took the position throughout the trial of the case 
in the district court that it was not acquiring the landowners' rights of access by eminent 
domain, but that it had the right and authority in the interest of public safety to regulate 
access from the appellees' property to the highway by limiting access to the entrances then 
in existence under its 'Regulations Governing Entrances to Highway from Private 
Property.' Simply stated, the State Highway Commission contends it iscontrolling or 
limiting the access of the landowners by the exercise of the state'spolicepower. 
Apparently the Commission contends the right to regulate the entrances to an existing 
highway under the police power includes the right to whollyprohibit access without 
having topay damages, and by reason thereof, the Commission has the right to condemn 
and take all rights of access described in this proceeding without becoming liable to pay 
any darnages as a result thereof. (Emphasis in original). 
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Smith v. State Highway Commission, 185 Kan. at 450, 346 P.2d at 265-66. Both the jury and the 
Kansas Supreme Court rejected this argument from the State. 
The Kansas Court held that there are two distinct types of rights property owners have 
when adjacent to a highway: 
The owner of properly which abuts an existing street or highway has two distinct 
kinds of rights in a highway, a public right which he enjoys in common with all other 
citizens, and certain private rights which arise from his ownership of property contiguous 
to the street or highway, and which are not common to the public generally. These 
private rights include certain easements, or appurtenant easements, such as the rights of 
access, of view, of light and air, and others. These rights areproperty of which he may 
not be deprived without his consent, except on full compensation and by due process of 
law. 
It has consistently been held in this jurisdiction the right of access to and from an 
existing public street or highway is one of the incidents of ownership of land abutting 
thereon, sometimes called a common law right of access, which may not be taken from 
the owner by the public without just compensation. (Citations omitted). 
Smith v. State Highway Commission, 185 Kan. At 451,346 P.2d at 266. The Kansas Court 
recognized that an owner is not entitled to access his lands at all points and that the use of streets 
and highways could be regulated pursuant to police powers. Id. at 453; 267. The Court pointed 
out that the problem is the determination of how far the government may go under its police 
power before a taking, warranting just compensation, results: 
The basic problem in every case involving impairment of the right of access is to 
reconcile the conflicting interests--i. e., private v. public rights. The police power is the 
power of govement  to act in furtherance of the public good, either through legislation or 
by the exercise of any other legitimate means, in the promotion of the public health, 
safety, morals and general welfare, without incurring liability for the resulting injury to 
private individuals. (Citations omitted). Eminent domain, on the other hand, is the power 
of the sovereign to take or damage private property for a public purpose on payment of 
just compensation. (Citations omitted). (Emphasis in original). 
Smith v. State Highway Commission, 185 Kan. at 453-54, 346 P.2d at 267-68. Where access 
rights are concerned, there is no question that these rights may be condemned. The Court set 
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forth the following framework for discussion regarding compensation of access rights: 
Since there is no doubt that the right of access, like any other property can be 
taken for public purpose under eminent domain upon payment of just compensation, the 
interesting question is how far the public can proceed under the police power. 
Determination of whether damages are compensable under eminent domain or 
noncompensable under the police power depends on the relative importance of the 
interests affected. The court must weigh the relative interests of the public and that of the 
individual, so as to arrive at a just balance in order that government will not be unduly 
restricted in the proper exercise of its functions for the public good, while at the same 
time giving due effect to the policy in the eminent domain clause of insuring the 
individual against an unreasonable loss occasioned by the exercise of governmental 
power. 
Smith v. State Highway Commission, 185 Kan. at 454, 346 P.2d at 268. 
This exact language (beginning at "Determination ...) was quoted and adopted by the 
Idaho Supreme Court in Coeur d 'Alene Garbage Service v. City of Coeur d 'Alene, 1 14 Idaho 
The Kansas Court, after setting forth the framework for analyzing the issue, proceeded to 
decide the case and found that the State had in fact taken the access rights of the Defendant and 
was obligated to pay just compensation for those access rights. The Court considered the statutes 
relating to the State's authority and noted that the legislature had given the State the power to 
acquire access rights and establish controlled access highways. Id. at 456-57; 269-70. The Court 
found that this indicated a legislative intent that the access rights acquired were compensable: 
We think it clear that the legislature by enacting the controlled access facilities 
statute has spoken on the subject of controlled access highways. By the provisions of 68- 
1903, supra, it has prescribed the exclusive methods by which private or public property, 
including rights of access, may be acquired for the establishment of controlled access 
facilities--that is, 'by gift, devise, purchase or condemnation, in the same manner as now 
or hereafter authorized by law for acquiringproperty or property rights.' (Emphasis 
added.) The legislature intended by 68-1903, supra, that a landowner deprived of 
abutters' rights of access would be compensated for them. [All emphasis in original]. 
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Smith v. State Highway Commission, 185 Kan. at 457,346 P.2d at 270. The Kansas Court held 
that the State had filed an action to acquire the defendant's access rights, and on the date of 
taking, therefore had acquired those rights and was obligated to pay for them: 
The petition filed by the State Highway Commission in the eminent domain 
proceeding, presently before the court in the action pending, complied strictly with the 
legislative mandates of the controlled access facilities statute, and particularly 68-1903, 
supra, for the acquisition of abutters' rights of access on an existing highway. On the date 
of the taking the Commission fully acquired the abutters' rights of access described in the 
petition and was thereafter empowered to regulate, restrict or prohibit access to the 
highway as a controlled access facility pursuant to 68-1902, supra. By the same token, 
the Commission obligated itself to pay for the rights of access taken. (Emphasis in 
original). 
Smith v. State Ifighway Commission, 185 Kan. at 463,346 P.2d at 273. The Court also set forth 
the proper measure of damages for the taking of access: 
The amount which the state will have to pay in an eminent domain proceeding for 
the acquisition of rights of access is determined by considering the market value of the 
property before the access right is taken and after it is taken. The difference in value is 
the damage for the loss of access rights. 
Smith v. State Highway Commission, 185 Kan. at 460,346 P.2d at 272 
In addition, the Court noted that in the absence of an acquisition of access rights, a 
property owner adjacent to a controlled access highway desiring an additional entrance would 
need to apply for a permit from the State. If the permit were denied, the property owner could 
litigate to determine whether his right of access to the highway which is reasonably necessary for 
enjoyment of the land has been unreasonably curtailed or restricted. Id. at 459; 271. The State's 
argument that it need not pay for access rights being acquired because it can regulate them 
through its police power was then completely rejected by the Kansas Court on the following 
grounds: 
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The Commission argues under the police power it may limit access from the 
abutting property on the highway to the entrances then in existence. While the entrances 
in existence and used by an abutting property owner may be sufficient for thepresent and 
be all that are reasonable necessary for the enjoyment of the land, the Commission's 
argument fails to take into considerationfuture needs. With the advance in time land 
uses change, as well as other circumstances, which might affect the need for additional 
entrances to the land. And if in the future additional entrances are unreasonably denied 
by the Commission, the courts are still open to determine the question. 
But, if the Commission acquires the rights of access of an abutting property 
owner on an existing highway, pursuant to 68-1903, supra, the Commission has absolute 
control and may prohibit, at will, any further entrances to the portion of the land along 
which access rights have been acquired. 
Smith v. State Highway Commission, 185 ICan. at 459, 346 P.2d at 271 
The Court then expressly found that future access needs, not only present needs, must be 
considered as a material factor affecting the value of the land and directly effected by the taking 
of access rights: 
The need of an abutting property owner on an existing highway for additional 
entrances in the future is vitally material, since the question is interwoven with the 
present value of the land abutting the highway based upon a consideration of all of the 
capabilities of the property for its best and most advantageous uses as it is actually 
situated at the time of the taking. It is therefore obvious the taking of an abutting property 
owner's rights of access on an existing highway will affect the value of the land from 
which access rights are taken. The extent to which the value is affected will vary wit11 the 
facts and circumstances of each case. 
Smith v. State Highway Commission, 185 ICan. at 460, 346 P.2d at 271-272. 
In Smith, the Kansas Supreme Court set forth the framework for analyzing the police 
powers vs. compensable taking argument in the context of condemnation cases, and then 
proceeded to analyze the facts and apply the law, resulting in a holding that the State had taken 
access rights and had to pay for them. The Idaho Supreme Court adopted the framework in Smith 
but has not yet had occasion to decide a case on identical facts as Smith. However, there is no 
reason to believe they would not reach the same result the Kansas Court did, on the same facts, 
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especially given their approach in Fonburg. Idaho has statutes which acknowledge access rights 
are to be acquired for controlled access roadways, ITD has filed a Amended Complaint seeking 
to acquire access rights from Canyon Vista, and the taking of access rights materially alters the 
value of the remaining property because the property loses rights of access necessary for its 
highest and best use. 
In Johnston v. Boise City, 87 Idaho 44,51-52, 390 P.2d 291,294-295 (1964) the Idaho 
Supreme Court was presented with a situation where the City passed an ordinance closing some 
curb cuts to a property; there was no complete loss of access and no taking was alleged by either 
party. However, the property owner challenged the City's right to pass an ordinance closing his 
curb cuts. The Court looked to the reasoning in Smith, ultimately finding a proper exercise of 
police power. This shows our Court approaches these types of cases the same way the Kansas 
Court did in Smith. 
This case presents the problem of reconciling the conflicting interests of the 
public with that of the abutting owner. Under its exercise of the police power and 
authority over the streets and in furtherance of the public good, the common council for 
sufficient reason, can eliminate these curb cuts and the driveways without incurring 
liability to the abutting owner for the resulting injury. On the other hand, if the order of 
the comnon council be characterized as a taking of property for a public purpose, the 
authority to make the order arises from the power of eminent domain, under which the 
payment of just compensation is necessary. Smith v. State Highway Commission, 185 
Kan. 445,346 P.2d 259,267 (1959). 
b. State ex rel. Morrison v. Thelberg, 87 Arizona 318,350 P.2d 988 (1960) 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Lobdell v State ex rel. Board of Highway Directors, 89 
Idaho 559,564,407 P.2d 135, 137 (1965) has also cited approvingly to the Arizona case of State 
ex rel. Morrison v. Thelberg, 87 Arizona 318, 350 P.2d 988, (1960). In Thelberg, an existing 
conventional highway was converted to a limited access highway, which required a widening of 
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the road. The State argued that the property owner enjoyed the same access before and after the 
taking due to the construction of frontage roads, and that control of access to a controlled-access 
highway does not constitute a taking of property which would entitle the owners to 
compensation. 
The Arizona Supreme Court considered the issue of whether the State must pay for access 
rights when a conventional highway is converted into an access controlled highway to be of such 
importance that they granted a rehearing of the case and reviewed numerous amicus curiae briefs 
on point. After a review of the issues and authorities, the Arizona Court wholly rejected the 
State's arguments and found that conversions of existing roads to access controlled highways 
require compensation: 
When the controlled-access highway is constructed upon the right of way ofthe 
conventional highway and the owner's ingress and egress to abutting property has 
been destroyed or substantially impaired, he may recover damages therefor. The 
damages may be merely nominal or they may be severe. Other means of access 
such as frontage roads as in the instant case may be taken into consideration in 
determining the amount which would be just under the circumstances. [citations 
omitted]. 
State ex rel. Morrison v. Thelberg, 87 Arizona 318, 325,350 P.2d 988,992 (1960) 
The Court then went on to discuss the measure of damages in such cases. The Idaho 
Supreme cited Thelberg in support of the measure of damages rule set forth therein. (Compare 
the value of the property before taking to the value of the property after taking). 
4. I.C. 40-311(1) Contemplates that Rights of Access Must be Acquired 
Idaho has statutory language relating to the taking of access by the Idaho Transportation 
Department similar to the Kansas statutes cited in Smith. Idaho's Title 40, Highways and 
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Bridges, Chapter 3, Idaho Transportation Board, Section 40-3 11, Powers and Duties - Property 
provides: 
The board shall: 
(1) Purchase, exchange, condemn or otherwise acauire, any real property, either in fee or 
in any lesser estate or interest, rights-of-way, easements and other rights and rights of 
direct access from the propertv abutting highwavs with controlled access, deemed 
necessary bv the board for present or future state highway purposes. The order of the 
board that the land sought is necessary for such use shall be prima facie evidence of that 
fact. [Emphasis added]. 
-
This plain and unambiguous language of the statute is evidence that the legislature intended that 
ITD acquire access rights, through condemnation or another means of acquisition, not through 
non-compensable regulation via police powers. 
The latter part of the statute refers to the Order of Condemnation entered by the Board 
and declares that this is prima facia evidence that the rights sought to be acquired are necessary 
for public use. The Order of Condemnation entered in this case provides in paragraph 4: 
That all rights of access to, from, and between the right of way of the public way and all 
of the contiguous remaining real property of the record owner(s) shall be extinguished 
and prohibited except for access, if any, as provided and shown on the said project plans 
referred to in Paragraph 2 above. (See Exhibit A, Attached hereto). 
The Amended Complaint filed by ITD is consistent with the Order of Condemnation and 
expressly provides in Paragraph VIII, setting forth the rights acquired, "That access is to be 
limited to that shown on Exhibit 'B'." Exhibit B to the Amended Coinplaint depicts only one 
temoorary access to and &om Canyon Vista's property and Pole Line Road; the access will be 
removed if the use of the property changes. 
In ACHD v. Shavp, 135 Idaho 888,26 P.3d 1225 (2001), there was a conflict between the 
Order of Condemnation and the Complaint. The Complaint made no reference to access rights, 
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while the Order did. (In this case, the two are consistent). The Idaho Supreme Court held that 
the property to be acquired is to be set forth in the Complaint: 
Idaho Code (i 7-707, appearing in chapter 7 entitled "Eminent Domain," pertains 
to the condemnation complaint and sets forth what it "must contain," including "a 
description of each piece of land sought to be taken, and whether the same includes the 
whole, or only a part, of an entire parcel or tract." Idaho Code 5 40-1310(3), appearing in 
a chapter entitled "Highway Districts," provides that the director of a highway district: 
"shall have the right, subject to the order of the highway district commissioners, to begin 
action in the name of the highway district in the district court of the county in which the 
district is situated, to condemn the land necessary for the right-of-way for the highway, 
under the provisions of chapter 7, title 7, Idaho Code," whenever the director cannot agree 
with any person for the purchase of land. This section further provides: "An order of the 
highway district commissioners entered upon its minutes that the land sought to be 
condemned is necessary for a public highway and public use shall be prima facie 
evidence of the fact." Neither of these code sections purport to state whether it is the 
order of condemnation or the complaint initiating the eminent domain action that is 
detenninative in defining what land or what rights are sought to be condemned. It is this 
Court's opinion, however, that LC. (i 7-707 is more specific and, perforce, controlling. 
Idaho Code (i 7-707 requires that the land sought to be condemned be specifically 
described in the complaint, whereas I.C. (i 40-1310(3) only states that an order of 
condemnation entered upon the commissioners' minutes will be prima facie evidence of 
public use. While I.C. (i 40-1310(3) requires that such an order refer to the land sought to 
be condemned, it does not require a specific description of the land, as does LC. (i 7-707. 
Furthermore, I.C. 5 40-13 lO(3) only requires that this order be reproduced in the minutes 
of the commissioners, not published to the public generally or to the landowner 
specifically. Idaho Code (i 7-707, on the other hand, specifically anticipates that the 
complaint will be filed with a district court and thus published to and served upon the 
landowner. 
ACHD v. Sharp, 135 Idaho 888,889,26 P.3d 1225, 1226 (2001). 
The Complaint in this case, unlike in Sharp, expressly acquires access via condemnation, 
reserving only one temporary point of entry from Pole Line Road to Canyon Vista property to the 
owner. There is no requirement regarding the degree of specificity which must be pled in the 
Complaint; it is sufficient for ITD to plead (as it did) that access will be limited to that shown on 
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the exhibit attached to the Complaint and to provide legal descriptions for the property taken in 
fee and the easements taken. 
The project plans attached to the Amended Complaint clearly and unambiguously limit 
Canyon Vista's access to only one temporary 28' access which will serve only the existing land 
use. In the event of re-development of the property, it is undisputed rn access to Pole Line road 
will be allowed. 
In 2006, the Idaho Legislature passed an amendment to Idaho Code $7-707 requiring in 
paragraph 6 of that code section that Complaints in condemnation include: "An order of 
condemnation, or resolution, or other official and binding document entered by the plaintiff 
which sets forth and clearly identifies all property rights to be acquired including rights to and 
from the public way, and permanent and temporary easements." This reflects the Legislature's 
intent that the Order of Condemnation and Complaint be consistent, as they are in this case (Even 
though the Order is not attached). 
5. Cases Holding That Access Rights for Controlled Access Roads Are 
Cornpensable Takings, Not Exercises of Police Power 
A number of other States have highway departments which have made the argument the 
Kansas Highway Department inade in Smith. In these instances, the State was widening a 
roadway and converting it to a limited access highway as in the present case. In each instance, 
the State made the argument it should not have to pay for the access rights acquired because 
those rights could be regulated away without liability under the State's police powers. The 
Courts uniformly rejected that argument, in each case finding there was a coinpensable taking 
and not an exercise of police powers. These cases are all directly on point with analogous facts. 
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Perhaps the most concise statement of the law comes from the Nebraska Supreme Court: 
When the controlled-access highway is constructed upon the right of way of the 
conventional highway and the owner's ingress and egress to abutting property has been 
destroyed or substantially impaired, he may recover damages therefor. The damages may 
be merely nominal or they may be severe. Other means of access such as frontage roads 
as in the instant case may be taken into consideration in determining the amount which 
would be just under the circumstances. [citation omitted]. 
Balog v. State, Dept. ofRoads, 177 Neb. 826, 837, 131 N.W.2d 402,410 (Neb.1964). In Balog, 
the State argued that abutter's access rights were taken pursuant to police powers. The Court 
found this non-persuasive, and pointed out that in a way, all actions are police power actions; that 
does not make them non-compensable when there is a transfer of property rights. Further, the 
Court held that because there was a condemnation action filed, the State subjected itself to 
liability for the taking of access rights and could not rely on the police powers argument. 
The defendant argues that the plaintiffs cannot recover damages because their 
right of access to Cornhusker Highway was taken by an exercise of the police power. J& 
fact that the improvement of a bighwav is an exercise of the police wower does not 
determine whether the landowner or lessee is entitled to recover damages. This 
distinction was recognized in Philli~s Petroleum Co. v. City o f  Omaha, 171 Neb. 457, 
106 N.W.2d 727, 85 ' ;2 .~ .~ .2d  570,~where this court said: 'kp""e1lant substantially argues 
that the court in giving instructions Nos. 4, 5, and 7 failed to recognize the right of a 
municipality to exercise the police power delegated to it in reference to its streets. Section 
14-301, R.R.S.1943. The essence of the contention in this respect is that damages 
resulting from the exercise of the police power by appellant are not compensable. The 
fact that appellant had under the policepower the right to improve its streets and thereby 
control the traffic thereon does not mean that it had immunity from liability to respond in 
damages which resulted to private property abutting the improvement where a part of the 
propertv of appellee was taken bv condemnation. The exercise of police power may or 
may not involve the taking of private property and it may or may not involve mere 
noncompensable inconvenience to the owner thereof. The distinction is not whether it is a 
valid exercise of police power but whether or not the property itself is taken or damaged. 
In 18 Am.Jur., Eminent Domain, 5 11, p. 639, the author says: 'The rcal distinction, 
however (between eminent domain and the police power). lies in the fact that in eminent 
domain propertv or a right in property is taken from the owner and transferred to a public 
gency to be enioyed by it as its own. whereas under the police power, although it mav, 
and often does. take wropertv in the constitutional sense so that it must be paid for, this is 
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not accomplished by a transfer of ownershiv, but by destroving the property or impairing 
its value.' [emphasis added]. 
'This is a condemnation proceeding originated bv a petition of appellant which 
characterizes it as such. The petition asked the appointment of appraisers to determine the 
compensation appellant was required to pay in the manner and to the extent required by 
law, and of course there was not and could not have properly been any claim in the 
petition that the appellant was exempt from obligation to pay damages by reason that the 
municipality was exercising the police power. Thereby avoellant subiected itself to 
liability for all damages sustained by the taking which this court has repeatedlv held 
includes all elements and inconveniences which affect the market value such as "The 
creation of noise and dust, the invasion of privacy, the devrivation of light and means of 
access * * * and like matters * * *." Crawford v. Central Nebraska Public Power & I m  
-, 
Dist., 154 Neb. 832,49 N.W.2d 682,686. [Emphasis added]. 
Balog v. State, Dept. of Roads, 177 Neb. 826,832-834, 131 N.W.2d 402,407-08 (Neb.1964). 
The Indiana Supreme Court in State v. Marion Circuit Court, 238 Ind. 637, 153 N.E.2d 
327 (1 958) also rejected the notion that a controlled access roadway could destroy access rights 
without compensation, given that abutter's rights of access are property rights and are subject to 
condemnation: 
It is evident from the Limited Access Statute, [footnote omitted] supra, that it was 
contemplated the State Highway Commission could thereunder acquire property and 
property rights for the state, including rights of access [emphasis in original] by 
condemnation, gift, devise, and purchase, and that the rights of property owners who may 
claim damages may be enforced under present laws. And, if r i~h ts  of access are propertv 
or proverty rights which the state may acauire bv condemnation as specified in the 
Limited Access Statute. it is difficult to see how the acauisition of such rights of access 
could not constitute a taking of property but only a nebulous or intangible conseauential 
iniurv giving rise to no claim for damages, as contended bv petitioner. In fact, this court 
in the recent case of Huffv. Indiana State Highway Commission, Ind. 1958, 149 N.E.2d 
299, 303, reiterated the established rule that the owners' right of ingress and egress to a 
public highway is a property right which may not be taken from hiin without 
compensation, citing Ross v. Thompson, 1881, 78 Ind. 90, and Burton v. Sparh, 1941, 
109 1nd.App. 531,36 N.E.2d 962. [Underlined emphasis added]. 
State v. Marion Circuit Court, 238 Ind. 637,642-643, 153 N.E.2d 327, 329 (Ind.1958) 
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The Supreme Court clearly articulated the rule that limited access highways 
require a destruction of access rights, not merely a regulation of them, and therefore 
condemnation is applicable, not the police powers doctrine: 
There can now be little doubt that when an established land service road is 
converted into a limited access facility the abutting property owners are entitled to 
compensation for the destruction of their previously existing right of access. A limited 
access facility may be described generally as a broad super-highway with traffic lanes 
separated by a central median strip, and with ingress and egress to and from the highway 
only at designated interchanges or crossovers, oftentimes substantial distances apart. 
Under limited access facilities statutes almost identical to ours. the courts have uniformly 
held that an abutting property owner is entitled to compensation for the destruction of a 
pre-existing right of access to a land service road upon which the limited access hig11way 
is constructed. [Citations omitted]. 
The rule requiring compensation under such circumstances applies regardless of 
the specific requirements of a statute. [Citations omitted]. 
We are not here confronted by the exercise of the police power to regulate the 
flow of traffic or to control the operation of traffic or to prescribe reasonable limitations 
on the number of driveways or access facilities that might be allowed an abutting owner 
adjoining a land service highway. Admittedly, such regulations as prohibiting U tugs or 
left turns, or establishing oneway traffic or specifying the location of driveways in and out 
of abutting property are all the subject of police regulations which require no 
compensation to abutting owners. [Citations omitted]. 
As we pointed out in our prior decision, the right of access was destroyed not 
merelv remlated. We do not here deal with the relative convenience of one abutting 
property owner as compared to others similarly conditioned. If injury or inconvenience is 
the same in kind as that suffered by others similarly situated, but different only in degree, 
compensation is not recoverable. [Citations omitted]. Moreover, the Legislature has 
specifically required compensation for the destroyed right of access. Sec. 338.04, Florida 
Statutes, F.S.A. 
Anhoco Corp. v. Dude County, 144 So.2d 793,797 -798 (Fla. 1962). 
In the Court of Appeals of Marvland, the State Roads Commissioll argued that the closing 
of a driveway and the denial of access due a fee taking and the designation of the road as a 
controlled access arterial highway was a non-compensable exercise of police powers. The Court 
noted that this was entirely inconsistent with the fact that the State had actually filed an eminent 
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domain action, defining the issue as a taking and not an exercise of police power. The parties 
agreed to a stipulation withdrawing a portion of the eminent domain action in order to give the 
Court an opportunity to rule on the police powers question. The Court then described the State's 
position thus: 
The Coinmissioil contended, both in its brief and in its oral argument, that the 
closing of the driveway and the denial of access constitute a proper exercise of the police 
- 
power and 'therefore * [are] not * * * compensable item$] i f  damage.' It was unable, 
however, to reconcile this contention with the fact that the suit was brought pursuant to 
its powers of eminent domain and that it actually had paid damages into court. The 
amount, it is true, was nominal but it was the sum of money deemed by the Commission 
'to be the fair value of the land and improvements taken and damages done to the 
aforesaid property.' Several members of the Court commented, during argument, on the 
inconsistency of the Commission's position and in the ensuing colloquy there were 
indications that the propriety of the use of the police power in this and similar situations 
could not be resolved in this litigation. Recognizing the probability of an adverse holding, 
counsel for the Commission agreed to a suggestion by the Court that the case be reargued 
on the basis of an appropriate stipulation. The stipulation, to which counsel for appellees 
also agreed, is as follows: 
'1. That the petition for condemnation for the denial of access and the $1 .OO 
deposited therefor, shall be considered withdrawn from this case, prior to the 
hearing by the court below. 
'2. That this Honorable Court decide the issue of this case as if the same were filed 
as a Petition for a Declaratory Judgment, i. e., whether access under the facts of 
this case, can be denied under the Police Power, or must be acquired by 
condemnation under the principles of eminent domain.' 
The Commission says that to make conventional highways safer for the 
transportation of the public it is necessary to use the police power to limit or deny access 
to the abutting landowner and that this is a proper exercise of the police power. It goes a 
long step further and contends that it is 'obvious' that such a use of the police power 'is an 
inherent segment of the highway laws.' The Commission concedes that heretofore it has 
- - 
accomplished denial of access along existing highways only by paying compensation to 
the abutting landowner, the amount thereof having been resolved either by agreement or 
- 
by condemnation. It further concedes that this case reflects a proposed change in policy, 
which, if successful, will result in substantial economies in the area of right of way 
acquisition. 
State Roads Commission v. Jones, 241 Md. 246,248-249, 216 A.2d 563, 64 (1966). 
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The Maryland Court then went on to consider whether the access rights for the limited 
access arterial highway could be regulated under police powers or required compensation. The 
Court carefully considered applicable statutes, finding that police power emanates exclusively 
from the Legislature, and noting the importance of not allowing police powers to go too far, 
quoting the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. V. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 
It should be observed, as a prelude to the determination of the validity of the 
Commission's claim, that the police power inheres exclusively in the Legislature, and can 
be exercised by its creatures, such as the Commission, only to the extent it has bee12 
delegated. [Citations omitted]. We shall concern ourselves, therefore, with the single 
question whether there has been such a delegation. Any one undertaking this task would 
do well, by way of proper orientation, to keep in mind an observation made by Mr. 
Justice Holmes, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415-416,43 S.Ct. 
158, 160, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1 922): 
'The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that it is 
wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for such use without 
compensation. A similar assuinption is made in the decisions upon the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Hairston v. Danville & Western Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 605, 28 
Sup.Ct. 331,52 L.Ed. 637. When this seemingly absolute protection is found to be 
qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to extend 
the qualification more and more until at last private property disappears.' 
'We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public 
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the 
constitutional way of paying for the change.' 
State Roads Commission v. Jones, 241 Md. 246, 249-250,216 A.2d 563, 565 (MD.1966). 
After considering the Maryland co~ltrolled access highway statutes, the Court concluded 
that the Legislature intended access right be paid for, and thus held there was no exercise of the 
police power, but rather a compensable taking. 
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The following cases have all addressed improving existing roadways to controlled access 
highways and found that access rights are compensable takings in such instances, not proper 
exercises of police power: 
Alabama: Blount Co. v. McPherson, 268 Ala. 133,105 So.2d 117 (1958). The Court held 
"Certain it is that appellee was entitled to have compensation for his loss of access rights to this 
limited access highway when those rights were sought to be condemrled along with his land for 
the right of way of the highway." Id. 268 Ala. At 135, 105 So.2d at 11 9. In Arlcansas State 
Highway Comm'n v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 231 Ark. 307,330 S.W.2d 77 (1960), the 
Court held that police powers should not be exercised indisc~irninately or unnecessarily, and that 
statutes gave the state the power to purchase or condemn access rights, so there was an 
alternative to the use of police power which must be utilized: condemnation. 
Arizona: State ex rel. Morrison v. Thelberg, 87 Arizona 318,350 P.2d 988, (1960). 
Conversion of an existing highway to a limited access highway requires compensation for loss of 
access rights. Discussed, supra. 
Arkansas: Arkansas State Highway Comm h v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 231 Ark. 907, 
333 S.W.2d 904 (1960). The Court held that it did not need to reach the question of whether 
access rights could be taken via the police power without compensation, because controlled 
access highway statutes conternplated a taking of right of way in fee, and the court was 
"...convinced that in the case at bar the State is actually exerting its power of eminent domain. It 
thus becomes unnecessary for us to decide whether the same result might constitutionally be 
attained through the exercise of the police power alone, without payment to the landowner." Id. 
at 23 1 Ark. at 914,333 S.W.2d at 908-09. 
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u: Dept. of Public Works v. WOK 414 Ill. 386, 11 1 N.E.2d 322 (1953). The Court 
held that access rights of abutting owners could not be obtained through the State declaring a 
roadway controlled access (freeway), but rather, access rights are property rights which must be 
taken via condemnation, and paid for, in order to be extinguished. 
Massachussetts: Nichols v. Commonwealth, 331 Mass. 581, 121 N.E.2d 56 (1954). The 
State argued that because a property owner still had a legal right of access after construction of a 
limited access road, the owner should not be entitled to present evidence of damages. The State 
argued that the travel time or convenience of the route was immaterial as long as some legal 
access remained. The Court held that under the Massachusetts law relating to controlled access 
facilities it was clear compensation for toss of access rights was to be paid. In Wenton v. 
Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 78, 138 N.E.2d 609 (1956), the State tried the argument that since the 
property owner had no approved access permits, the owner essentially had no access to be taken 
via a controlled access highway. The Court rejected this argument on the grounds that there is a 
right of direct access to and from the public road belonging to adjacent property owners, whether 
or not they have obtained permits. Thus, the taking of access was compensable despite the lack 
of access permits pre-condemnation. 
Mississippi: Mississippi State Highway Conzm iz v. Ray, 215 So.2d 569 (1968). The loss 
of direct access due to converting an existing highway into a limited access highway was 
compensable and the trial court properly received evidence from three real estate appraisers who 
testified that there were severance damages caused by the loss of direct access and that the 
highest and best use of the property had changed due to the loss of access. See also Mississippi 
State Highway Comm'n v. Finch, 237 Miss. 314, 114 So.2d 673 (1959). The State claimed it 
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wasn't taking access rights and wasn't creating a controlled access highway because it's petition 
for condemnation did not refer to access rights as being taken and they had not declared the 
reconstructed roadway to be access controlled. The Court found that the plans for the project 
clearly showed it to be an access controlled highway after reconstruction, and that abutter's 
access rights had to be coinpensated because the statutes so contemplated. 
Ohio: Rothwell v. Linzell, 163 Ohio St. 517,526-527, 127 N.E.2d 524, 529 (1955). The 
statutes provided that the State could acquire access rights to a limited access highway by 
purchase, gift, agreement or condemnation. When the State files an action to condemn for a 
limited access highway, it exercises the power of eminent domain to acquire access rights. In 
most instances this will result in substantially reducing the value of the adjacent land, for which 
damages must be paid as part of just compensation. 
Orepon: Douglas Co. v. Briggs, 286 Or. 15 1,593 P.2d 1 1 15 (1979). The Court found 
that the statutes authorizing the County to establish access controlled throughways contemplated 
that compensation would be paid to acquire abutter's access rights. See also State v. Burk, 200 
Or. 21 1,265 P.2d 783 (1954). Converting a conventional highway to an access controlled 
highway requires compensation for access rights lost. 
Rhode Island: Aust v. Marcello, 112 R.I. 381, 385,310 A.2d 758, 760 (1973). The Court 
held that the general police powers rule does not apply in cases where abutter's access easements 
were talcen for limited access freeways because the statute allowed for purchase or condemnation 
of such access rights. 
Washington: McMoran v. State, 55 Wash.2d 37, 345 P.2d 598 (1959). The State 
constructed a concrete curb along a roadway to convert it to a limited access road. The State 
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claimed the property owner still had access to the right of way along a frontage road and 
therefore was not entitled to compensation. The Court found that the property owner had an 
appurtenant right of free and convenient access to the roadway where traffic was flowing, not just 
the right of way, and found a compensable taking. 
West Virginia: Ashworth v. State Road Comm'n, 147 W.Va. 430,436, 128 S.E.2d 471, 
475-76 (1 962). A property owners claim for loss of abutter's access rights when a roadway was 
designated as a limited access highway was upheld. 
6. Access Rights of Abutting Owners Are Cornpensable Property Interests 
Idaho has long recognized that access to a public right-of-way is one of the fundamental 
components and vested rights of ownership of land which an owner cannot be deprived of 
with.out just compensation. The principle was first elucidated in Village of Sandpoint v. Doyle, 
14 Idaho 749,757,95 P. 945,947 (1908) by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
While the public generally may have no special or particular interest in the right of 
ingress to any particular lot owner's property, the lot owner has a very material 
and special interest in having the public reach his property and place of business, 
and in his right to go and come and carry on business and invite the public to his 
place of business. It has been held by the courts that to cut off this right of ingress 
and egress would be to take the lot owner's property without due process of law. 
InFarris v. City of Twin Falls, 81 Idaho 583, 586, 347 P.2d 996, 998 (1959), the Idaho 
Supreme Court stated: 
Access to a public way is one of the incidents of ownership of land bounding 
thereon. Such right is appurtenant to the land and is a vested right of which the lot 
owner cannot be deprived without just compensation. (Citation omitted). 
The rule was similarly stated in Hadjeld v. State ex rel. Burns, 86 Idaho 561, 566, 388 P.2d 
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This court has long recognized that access to a public way is one of the incidents 
of ownership of land bounding thereon; that such right of access constitutes an interest in, 
and is appurtenant to, the land. It is a vested right of which the property owner cannot be 
deprived without just compensation. 
See also Continental Oil Co. v City of Twin Falls, 49 Idaho 89, 107,286 P. 353, 359 (1930); 
Lower Payette Ditch Co. v Smith, 73 Idaho 514,519,254 P.2d 417,420 (1953); Killinger v Twin 
Falls Highway Dist., 135 Idaho 322, 17 P.3d 266 (2000). 
The Idaho Supreme Court unequivocally held in Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286,295,328 
P.2d 397,402 (1958) that access rights must be compensated when taken, as they are a valuable 
property right. 
Our review of Idaho's Constitution, statutes and decisions, clearly shows that the 
power of eminent domain extends to every kind of property taken for public use, 
including the right of access to public streets, such being an estate or interest in and 
appurtenant to real property; and since such right of access constitutes an interest in, by 
virtue of being an easement appurtenant to, a larger parcel, the court, jury or referee must 
ascertain and assess the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be 
condemned by reason of the severance of the portion--the right of access--sought to be 
condemned, and the construction of the improvement. LC. sec. 7-71 1. 
Idaho law has carefully guarded and protected access rights as property interests. The 
Idaho Supreme Court summarized the state of the law as follows in Mabe v. State ex rel. Rich, 83 
Idaho 222,227,360 P.2d 799,801-802 (1961). 
Idaho is firmly committed to the rule that access to property from an existing 
highway is a prooertv right. Village of Sandpoint v. Doyle, 14 Idaho 749,95 P. 945, 17 
L.R.A.,N.S., 497; Continental Oil Co. v. City of Twin Falls, 49 Idaho 89,286 P. 353; 
Independent School Dist. No. I of Twin Falls County v. Continental Oil Co., 49 Idaho 
109,286 P. 360. That the curtailment of. or interference with access to real property is to 
be considered as an element of damages in an action for condemnation has been 
recorinized by this court in the following cases: State ex rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 
269, 328 P.2d 60; State ex rel. Rich v. Dunclick, lnc., 77 Idaho 45, 286 P.2d 11 12. This 
court has further held interference with access to be. in itself. a t ak in~  of a ~roperty right, 
com~ensable in damages awarded by way of 'inverse condemnation'. and not merely as an 
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item of severance damaizes in a condemnation suit. Farris v. City of Twin Falls, 81 Idaho 
583,347 P.2d 996; Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286, 328 P.2d 397,402. [emphasis added]. 
Per the Supreme Court, access rights of ahutting owners must be taken only with payment of just 
compensation: 
We have recognized that an ahutting property owner's right of reasonable access 
to a public highway is a property right, which may not be taken by the state without just 
compensation. Hadjeld v. State, 86 Idaho 561,388 P.2d 1018 (1963); Mabe v. State, 83 
Idaho 222,360 P.2d 799 (1961); Farris v. City of Twin Falls, 81 Idaho 583, 347 P.2d 996 
(1959); Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286,328 P.2d 397 (1958). When such property is taken 
without compensation the owner may recover, in an action in inverse condemnation, the 
damages to his property caused by the taking. Johnston v. Boise City, 87 Idaho 44, 390 
P.2d 291 (1964); Farris v. City of Twin Falls, supra. 
Bare v. Department ofHighways, 88 Idaho 467, 471,401 P.2d 552, 554 (I 965). 
There is a recognized distinction between the rights of direct access to and from the 
roadway and an abutting property and rights to flow of traffic; there is no recognized right to 
traffic flows. There is a recognized right of access. E.g. Brown v City of Twin Falls, 124 Idaho 
Therefore, any argument from the State that Canyon Vista had no access rights to Pole 
Line Road before the taking because they did not have any approved, permitted access points is 
fundamentally flawed. ITD would be ignoring that every abutting property owner has an 
easement appurtenant for direct access to and from the public roadways. The argument also 
ignores the property owner's historic use of their access rights to Pole Line Road. The cases 
have not held that absent a permit there is no right of access; rather they have recognized 
abutter's inherent rights of access. 
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7. Rights Vest at the Date of Taking; ITD Has Acquired Canyon Vista's Access 
Right 
LC. 5 7-712 provides that the property owner's right to just compensation vests as of the 
date of taking, which in this case is December 28,2004. The State toolc all access rights to Pole 
Line Road as of that date in its Amended Complaint, except for the temporary access which was 
reserved to the property owner for the current use. The State is bound by its Amended Complaint 
and must pay just compensation for the access rights it has acquired. 
The Nebraska Supreme Court held in Danish Vennerfovning and Old Peoples Home v. 
State ofNebraska, Dept. OfRoads, 191 Neb. 774,775,217 N.W.2d 819,822 (1974): 
A condemnor must take the rights he appropriates unconditionally by his petition 
of taking and he must pay full compensation to the condemnee for what he takes or is 
entitled to take by his petition of taking. [citation omitted]. 
Also, the Amended Complaint states no access will be allowed other than as shown in the 
plans. Facts admitted in pleadings are deemed admitted and need not be proved. 
Facts admitted by the pleadings need not be proved. Pendlebuvy v. Westevn 
Casualty and Surety Company, 89 Idaho 456,406 P.2d 129 (1965); Cloughley v. Orange 
Transportation Co., 80 Idaho 226,327 P.2d 369 (1958); Burleson v. Tucker; 78 Idaho 
262,300 P.2d 816 (1956). 
Whitt v. Jarnagin, 91 Idaho 181, 186,418 P.2d 278,282 (Idaho 1966). Thus, Canyon Vista 
should not have to prove access rights are being taken. The rule was also well stated in the early 
case ofICnowles v. New Sweden Irr. Dist., 16 Idaho 217, 101 P. 81, 82 (1909). 
Admissions made in pleadings on which the trial is had are solemn admissions in the case 
in which made, and are not required to be supported by evidence on the part of the 
adverse party. Such admissions are taken as true against the party making them, without 
further proof or controversy. 
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B. There is an Important Distinction Between Physical Access and Legal Access 
We anticipate that ITD will argue that: a) Canyon Vista did not have access points to and 
from Pole Line Road which they were utilizing, b) did not have any access permits to Pole Line 
Road, and c) did not request any. This reasoning is completely flawed, not only because 
abutter's access rights are recognized without permits, as discussed above, but for additional 
reasons as well. 
The fact that Canyon Vista did not have constructed physical access to and from Pole 
Line Road for their existing use of the property other than four historical accesses does not mean 
that they had no access rights to and from Pole Line Road. The current physical access that a 
property enjoys, the physical access being utilized, is not necessarily identical with the legal 
rights of access to and from a property. 
The reason this is important is that ITD is acquiring all the legal rights of access to Pole 
Line Road, but may ask the Court to focus on thephysicalaccess removed, i.e. only constructed, 
pre-existing physical entrances to and from Pole Line Road. Entrances are not the issue; rights 
are. 
The distinction between physical and legal access is perhaps best illustrated by title 
insurance cases that have addressed legal rights of access and contrasted rights of access with 
actual physical access. Title insurance policies insure "a legal right of access," assuming the risk 
of loss from the lack of a legally enforceable right of access to and from the insured property 
appearing from the public records. The specific language in policies typically insures against 
"Lack of a right of access to and from the land." In insurance cases, legal access is distinguished 
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from physical access, and title insurers have been held liable for lack of legal access but not lack 
of physical access, providing examples of the distinction which may be instructive here. 
In Title & Trust Co. v. Barrows, 381 So.2d 1088 (1979) the insured purchased a lot 
surrounded on three sides by land owned by others, all of which were a part of a beach 
subdivision. The fourth side of the lot bordered on a platted street, the right of way for which 
had been dedicated and accepted by the county. The insured later discovered that the right of 
way abutting their property was covered by high tide water during the spring and fall of each 
year, 
At the time the property was purchased Borrows purchased title insurance. The title 
policy covered any lack of a right of access to and from the land. The insured sued the title 
insurance company on the theory that there was no access because the road was impassable. The 
trial court held that there was a lack of access to the insureds' property, but the Florida Court of 
Appeals reversed, stating: 
Appellant and Florida Land Title Association, appearing as amicus curiae, argue that 
appellant cannot be held liable on grounds of "lack of right of access to and from the 
land" since there is no defect shown by the public record as to their right of access; that 
the public record shows a dedicated and accepted public right-of-way abutting the lot. 
They contend that title insurance does not insure against defects in the physical condition 
of the land or against infirmities in legal right of access not shown by the public record. 
See Pierson v. Bill, 138 Fla. 104, 189 So. 679 (1939). They arguethat defects in the 
physical condition of land such as are involved here are not covered by title insurance. 
We agree. Title insurance only insures against title defects. Title 6; Trust Co. v. 
Barrows, 381 So.2d at 1090. 
In Gates v. Chicago Title Insurance Company, 813 S.W.2d 10 (Miss. 1991), the insured 
purchased a 480 tract of land that ended up having as its access a goat path. The access was one 
negotiable only by foot or horseback and if attempted in a four wheel drive, it should not be after 
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rain or snow. The insured brought suit pursuant to his title insurance policy which provided for 
loss against darnages sustained or incurred by the insured as of the date of the policy by reason of 
a lack of right of access to and from the land. The court found the title insurance company was 
not responsible for investigating the physical condition of the access road, and therefore the 
insured was unable to recover under the terms of the policy. 
In Krause v. Title & Trust Co., 390 So.2d 805 (F1a.Dist.Ct.A~~. 1980), the court held that 
where plaintiffs had legal access to their property but it was not physically passable by ordinary 
vehicles without a substantial amount of fill, they were not allowed to recover under their title 
insurance policy. The court reasoned that the insurer is responsible for ascertaining the quality of 
title and legal access as shown by the public record, and could not be held responsible for 
insuring that physical access was possible. 
In Hocking v. Title Insurance & Trust Co., 37 Cal.2d 644,234 P.2d 625 (1951), plaintiff 
sued because the roads in the subdivision in which her lot was located had not been properly 
graded and paved prior to the filing and acceptance of the subdivision plat by the City, claiming 
that the condition of the roads impaired the value of her property and that she lacked access. The 
Court held that the insurer was not responsible, noting: 
It is defendants' position that plaintiff confuses title with physical condition of the 
property she purchased and of the adjacent streets, and that "One can hold perfect title to 
land which is valueless; one can have marketable title to land while the land itself is 
unmarketable. The truth of this proposition would appear to be elementary. It appears to 
be the condition of her land in respect to improvements related thereto (graded and paved 
streets), rather than the condition of her title to the land, which is different from what she 
expected to get. Hocking, 234 P.2d at 629. 
In MacRean v. St. Paul Title Insurance, 405 A.2d 405 (N.J. 1979), plaintiffs purchased a 
lot which was bounded on one side by an allegedly public street, Delaware Street, and on another 
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side by Warren Avenue, a public street. Plaintiffs accessed their home via Delaware Street. 
After a time, they were notified that Delaware Street was actually a privately owned lot, and a 
home was shortly thereafter constructed on that lot facing Warren Avenue, so that plaintiffs front 
door faced the side of the new neighbor's home. Although plaintiffs had access from Warren 
Avenue, they sued their title insurer, claiming that free access to the front of their home had been 
cut off by the fact that Delaware Street was not a dedicated public street. At issue in MacBean, 
according to the Court, was the reasonable expectation of a lay purchaser of title insurance. The 
court, after an examination of the policy and its exceptions, concluded that it was anlbiguous and 
left the issue of liability open for the trier of fact. 
The law relating to access claims is summarized by Joyce D. Palomar in Title Insurance 
Law'. 5 5.07, Lack of a Right of Access: 
Title insurers also assume, in both owner's and loan policies, the risk of loss from lack of 
a legally enforceable right of access to and from the insured land. It is important to 
understand that the title insurance policy insures only a legal "right of access," and not 
any particular physical route. 
These cases clearly demonstrate that the right of access is a distinct property right which 
may be separate and apart from actual physical access. Title insurers check the public records to 
determine if properties abut dedicated public roads. If they do, they are presumed to have legal 
rights of access unless there is something of record (perhaps a Condemnation Judgment taking 
access rights) which would indicate there are no legal rights of access. 
If Courts have found title insurance companies not liable for lack of access when the right 
of access exists, even is access is physically impossible, it makes logical sense that Courts have 
' Copies attached for the Court's convenience as Exhibit, "B" 
TRIAL BRIEF- PNiT 11 (TAKING OF ACCESS) - 38 
t3 2006. May be freely used by Courts. All o(hen must obtain permission from the author foruse or copying of any portion of this material. 
also held that when condemnors take or destroy rights of access, the fact that there may not have 
been physical entrances to the property is irrelevant. These rules are consistent. It would be 
inconsistent to treat legal access rights one way for title insurance purposes and differently for 
condemnation purposes, not requiring compensation by insurers when legal rights of access exist, 
but also not requiring compensation from condemnees when legal rights of access are lost. 
C. The Defendant's Claim for Severance Damages Due to Loss of Access Rights is Proper 
The remaining property owned by Canyon Vista has been damaged as a result of the 
taking. That damage is measured by comparing the value of the property as of December 28, 
2004 without the taking or the project, and the value of the property as of December 28,2004, 
considering the taking and the project. This is entirely appropriate and reflects the proper 
measure of damages in such cases. 
Generally, just compensation in a direct condemnation action is measured by the 
difference between the fair market value of the highest and best use of the property before the 
take and the fair market value of the highest and best use of the property after the take. The 
phrase "highest and best" use means the highest and most profitable use for which the property is 
adaptable or needed in the reasonably near future. Highest and best use does not necessarily 
depend upon the uses to which the property is devoted; rather, all uses for which the property is 
suitable should be considered. State ex rel, Symms v. Ciry of Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 528,493 
P.2d 387 (1972). The type and number of accesses provided to the affected property, both in the 
before and after condition, directly relates to the highest and best use for which the property may 
be suitable. 
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The Fonburg case, supra, allows for evidence of highest and best use to be considered in 
determining fair market value as an element of severance damages. 
When access rights are taken, the measure of damages is the value of the property before 
the taking less the value of the property after the taking, as was held in Lobdell v. State, 89 Idaho 
The authorities are almost universally in agreement that the measure of damages 
for the destruction or impairment of a right of access to a highway upon which the 
property of an owner abuts is the difference between the fair market value of the 
taking, and fair market value of the same property immediately after the 
destruction or impairment of the access. The basis of the damages awarded is not 
the value of the right of access to the highwav. but rather the difference in the 
value of the proverty before and after the destruction or impairment of the access, 
and this in turn is based upon the highest and best use to which the land involved 
is suitable before and after the talc in^. Mabe v. State, 83 Idaho 222,360 P.2d 799; 
State ex rel. Morrison v. Thelberg, 87 Arizona 318, 350 P.2d 988 (1960), 29 
ACJS Eminent Domain (i 141 p.597; 18 American Juris Prudence 919, Eminent 
Domain paragraph 280,4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 588, (i 14243 1; 
Condemnation and Appraisal Practice, p.201. (Emphasis added). 
Lobdell cited approvingly to State v. Thelbeug, 87 Arizona 318,325,350 P.2d 988,992 
(1960), in which the Arizona Supreme Court stated the rule as follows: 
The measure of damages for the destruction or impairment of access to the 
highway upon which the property of an owner abuts is the difference between the 
market value of the abutting property immediately before and immediately after 
the destruction or impairment thereof. The damages awarded the abutting 
landowner for destruction or impairment of access therefor is based, not upon the 
value of the right of access to the highway, but rather upon the difference in the 
value of the remaining property before and after the access thereto has been 
destroyed or impaired. This in turn is based upon the highest and best use to 
which the land involved is best suited before and after the right of access is 
molested. State. By and Through State Highway Commission v. Burke, supra; 
Boxberger v. State Highway Commission, 126 Colo. 526,251 P .2d 920. 
Let us apply the above rules of law to the facts in the instance case 
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bearing in mind that a portion of Thelberg's property was taken by the State for 
the purpose of constructing a frontage road along the north side of the controlled- 
access road on the old right of way." (Emphasis added.) 
See also Smith v. State Highway Commission, 185 Kan. At 460, 346 P.2d at 272 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that loss of access is a material consideration in 
assessing severance damages. 
Where a part of the owner's contiguous land is taken in a condemnation 
proceeding, all inconveniences resulting to the owner's remaining land, including an 
easement or access to a road or right of way formerly enjoyed, which decrease the value 
of the land retained by the owner, are elements of severance damage for which 
compensation should be paid. 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain 5 105, p. 910; 29 C.J.S. 
Eminent Domain § 163, p. 1033; State ex reL Rich v. Dunclick, Inc., 77 Idaho 45,286 
P.2d 11 12; State v. Sgner, 58 Idaho 233, 72 P.2d 699, and in Creasy v. Stevens (Marshell 
v. Stevens), D.C., 160 F.Supp. 404,405, the Court held: 
'The right of access to a public highway is a property right which cannot be taken 
or materially interfered with without just compensation.' 
State ex rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269,278, 328 P.2d 60,64-65 (1958). Therefore, the 
Defendants claim for severance damages is appropriate and the proper measure is being used. 
D. A Simple Framework for Making Sense of Aceess/TakingslPolice Powers Cases 
One can easily get overwhelmed by the confusing nature of the myriad of access cases. 
Because the cases tend to be both direct and inverse condemnation cases, and involve a variety of 
property rights and fact patterns, it is easy to find apparently contradicting cases. This has been a 
problem in jurisprudence for a long time; access is one of the thorniest issues one can research. 
As one Court stated: 
There is, of course, a veritable gallimaufiy of judicial opinion in respect of the 
right of access of abutting owners to highways. As long ago as 1907 the Supreme Court 
felt compelled to say: 
'The right of an owner of land abutting on public highways has been a fruitful 
source of litigation in the courts of all the states, and the decisions have been 
conflicting, and often in the same state irreconcilable in principle. The courts have 
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modified or overruled their own decisions, and each state has in the end fixed and 
limited, by legislation or judicial decision, the rights of abutting owners in 
accordance with its own view of the law and public policy.' Sauer v. City of New 
York, 206 U.S. 536,548,27 S.Ct. 686,689,690,51 L.Ed. 1176, 1182 (1907). 
We content ourselves by observing that the situation has not improved and we 
draw not a little comfort from the fact that it will not be necessary, in this case, to 
undertake either a discussion or a reconciliation of these seemingly myriad decisions, to 
say nothing of the output of the text writers and the legal periodicals. 
State Roads Commission v. Jones, 241 Md. 246,250-251,216 A.2d 563,565 (1966). The Court 
in that case was able to avoid the morass of cases because they found a direct taking of a 
compensable right, avoiding the balancing issues. 
How does one determine whether changes to access are a compensable taking or are 
merely the result of the exercise of police powers, which is generally non-compensable? The 
following is the analysis courts have used to answer this question. 
1. m, consider "Is the power of condemnation being exercised to take access?" 
a. m, there is a compensable taking; end of inquiry. 
If no, consider: "Is there a property right at issue?" 2. -
a. b, there is not a compensable taking, end of inqui~y. 
3. w, consider "Is the property right being eliminated or destroyed?" 
a. m, there is a compensable taking; end of inquiry. 
4. rfno, there is a balancing test to determine whether the police power has been 
utilized to such an extent that it has gone far enough to be a coinpensable taking. 
Factors to consider include: 
a. Interests of condemnor vs. interests the condemnee (present and future) 
b. Degree of interference with private property rights 
c. Reasonableness or unreasonableness of regulation 
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Access cases do not always articulate this framework for analysis, but review of the cases 
shows that it is primarily the approach courts have used, and as a result, access cases generally 
fall easily within one of these four basic "levels" of inquiry. 
There are many variations of fact patterns in access cases. Before delving further into the 
cases, it is worthwhile to briefly develop the above four steps another layer, with the most 
common fact patterns and a brief explanation. 
First, courts consider "Is the Dower of condemnation being exercised to take access?" 
Where the power of condemnation is being used to acquire access rights, courts have held that 
the condemnor cannot escape liability by claiming it is exercising its police powers. In fact, it is 
not, it is expressly using its power of condemnation, and cannot recast its actions as police 
actions in order to avoid liability. Courts have considered constitutional and statutory authority 
for the condemnation, the conde~nnor's orders and pleadings regarding the necessity of the 
taking, the rights being acquired, and the fact that rights vest at the time of taking and cannot be 
later recast. In cases where an existing road is being widened and converted to a limited access 
highway, as in this case, courts have held that acquisition of access rights is a compensable 
taking and not an exercise of the police power. Thus, if there is a direct condemnation, there is a 
compensable taking, though we must examine the rights being acquired. These are "Level One" 
cases, because they can be resolved at the first level of analysis; compensation is due. 
Where there is not a direct condemnation, there is often an inverse condemnation, with 
the property owner claiming something done without a condemnation action rises to the level of 
a taking. In these cases, the threshold question is "Is there a proverty r i ~ h t  at issue?" If not, there 
is not a taking. Courts have held that there is no right to a particular flow of traffic, therefore 
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regulations on traffic flows such as medians, U-turns, signals, etc. are non-compensable. 
Property owners also have no rights regarding regulations on the public way, so certain types or 
weights of vehicles may be prohibited, traffic can be limited in speed, parking inay be allowed or 
not in the public way, etcetera. There is also no right of adjacent property owners to access a 
newly constructed roadway, so when a road is built where none was before, denying adjacent 
owners access is not a compensable taking, as there is no pre-existing property right being 
affected. Where courts have found that no property right existed, they have obviously found no 
compensable taking. These are "Level Two" cases, because they can be resolved at the second 
level of analysis; compensation is not required. 
On the other hand, when a taking is asserted and a property right is at issue, there is 
clearly at least the possibility that property right is being so eroded that a taking results. Property 
owners which abut existing roads have an easement appurtenant to direct access to and from the 
road to access their property (though they do not necessarily have the right to access it at all 
points). In these cases, dealing with direct access, courts first consider "Is the property right 
being eliminated or destroved?" If yes, leaving the parcel landlocked with no vehicular access to 
and from the public way, the property right has been entirely destroyed and there is a 
compensable taking. These are "Level Three" cases, because they can be resolved at the third 
level of analysis; compensation required. 
In instances where there is a property right being impacted, but not entirely destroyed, 
more analysis is required. The court must balance the interests and equities to determine whether 
the police power has been utilized to such an extent that it has gone far enough to be a 
compensable taking. Factors to consider include the interests of condemnor vs. interests the 
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conde~nnee both now and in the future, the degree of interference with private property rights, 
and the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the regulation. If the property owner is merely 
inconvenienced, or has merely a more circuitous route to travel, but one which is still reasonable, 
there will be no taking found. However, if the restriction on access is so severe that the highest 
and best use of the property is changed, the development potential of the property is diminished, 
or the degree of impairment is unreasonable, compensation is warranted. These are "Level Four" 
cases, because they require going through all four levels of analysis; compensation may or may 
not be required, depending on the specific facts of each case. 
1. Brief History of Idaho Access Cases 
Idaho Appellate Courts have not considered the taking of access for limited access 
highways except in the Fonburg case, supra. However, access cases in Idaho have taken many 
forms, and will be discussed briefly, in chronological order, and categorized according to the 
above system. These cases deal with different levels of analysis, and include inverse cases or 
regulation of traffic flows rather than direct access rights. 
1. Village of Sandpoint v. Doyle, 14 Idaho 749,95 P. 945 (1908) 
Level 3. City sought to prevent landowner from obtaining access to an elevated bridge. 
Court ruled he had a unique right to access as an abutting owner. 
2. Crane v. City ofHarrison, 40 Idaho 229,232 P. 578 (1925). 
Level 2. Change in grade of road didn't result in compensable taking because it 
damaged, rather than took, property and at the time, damages were not recoverable. 
Overruled by Hughes v. State, infra. 
3. Continental Oil v. City o f  Twin Falls, 49 Idaho 89,286 P. 353 (1930). 
Level 3. City ordinance seeking to prevent abutting property owner from accessing 
sidewalk and roadway for service station use of his property was held unconstitutional 
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4. Powell v. McKelvey, 56 Idaho 291, 53 P.2d 626 (1935). 
Level 2. Construction of a subway in the center of a street, leaving lanes on either side, 
did not result in loss of access for abutting owners. Rather, the problem was diversion of 
traffic, held to be non-cornpensable. 
5. Fosters v. Boise City, 63 Idaho 201, 118 P.2d 721 (1941). 
Level 2. Installation of parking meters by the City in the right of way was challenged, but 
upheld as a non-cornpensable exercise of police power. 
6. Lower Payette Ditch Co. v Smith, 73 Idaho 514, 254 P.2d 417 (1953). 
Level 3. Not a compensation issue, but dealt with abutter's access rights to vacated road 
and recognized abutter's rights as property interest. 
7.  State ex vel. Rich v Dunclick, Inc., 77 Idaho 45,286 P.2d 11 12 (1955). 
Level 1. Convenience of lost access could be considered by the jury in a direct 
condemnation. 
8. State ex rel. Rich v Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 328 P.2d 60 (1958). 
Level 1. Taking of access rights for a limited access highway was proper under the 
statute, and cornpensable. (Discussed at length, supra). 
9. Hughes v State, 80 Idaho 286,328 P.2d 397 (1958). 
Level 4. Inverse case where one of two means of access to a corner colnmercial property 
was taken. The Court found this rendered the property unsuitable for its highest and best 
use and therefore there was a cornpensable taking. 
10. Farris v City of Twin Falls, 81 Idaho 583, 347 P.2d 996 (1959) 
Level 3. Access to a residence was impaired by installation of a curb and raising of the 
road by 8". The Court found a cause of action existed for impairment of access rights. 
11. Mabe v State ex vel. Rich, 83 Idaho 222, 360 P.2d 799 (1961). 
Level 4. Held that if the owner could establish damage from loss of direct access it 
would be compensable. However, in Mabe v. State, 86 Idaho 254, 385 P.2d 401 (1963) it 
was found that the owner failed to establish anything other than circuity. 
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12. Hadfield v State ex rel. Burns, 86 Idaho 561,388 P.2d 1018 (1963). 
Level 4. Court found it was unreasonable to dismiss a complaint seeking compensation 
for destruction of access during construction for three months to a Pocatello service 
station. If the temporary taking was unreasonable, it would be compensable. 
13. Johnston v Boise City, 87 Idaho 44,390 P.2d 291 (1964). 
Level 4. City was closing curb cuts which were not being utilized, under its police 
powers. The Court balanced the interests and found a non-compensable, reasonable use 
of the police power, and r&inaining access to the property reasonable. 
14. James v State By and Through Idaho Bd. of Highway Directors, 88 Idaho 172,397 P.2d 766 
(1964). 
Level 2. Lodge in Kootenai claimed it lost access to the highway, but the Court found 
that there was still access, it was just more circuitous and there was no compei~sable right 
to traffic flows. 
15. Bare v Department ofHighways, 88 Idaho 467,401 P.2d 552 (1965). 
Level 2. Property owner was using the right of way for his customers to obtain gas from 
his pumps. State closed off this use but did not change his access. He had no right to use 
public right of way for private purposes so be had no compensable claim. 
16. Lobdell v State ex rel. Board ofHighway Directors, 89 Idaho 559,407 P.2d 135 (1965). 
Level 1. Court found the State had stipulated their actions were a condemnation. State 
closed off all but a 40' access and a shared access with 3' on the subject property to serve 
a service station, restaurant, bar and taxi business. This reduction in access was a taking. 
17. Snyder v State, 92 Idahol75,438 P.2d 920 (1968). 
Level 2. Parking eliminated in right of way to allow for more through traffic. No 
physical taking. The owner had no rights in the right of way and there was no taking of 
access rights, thus a proper exercise of police power and no taking. 
18. Weaver v Village ofBancroft, 92 Idaho 189,439 P.2d 697 (1968). 
Level 3. Direct access to a residence was completely destroyed by construction of a wide 
ditch between the residence and the roadway, therefore there was a compensable taking 
requiring compensation. 
TRIAL BRIEF- PART I1 (TAKING OF ACCESS) - 47 
0 2006. May be freely used by Courts. All others must obtain permission fmin the author for use or copying of any portion of this material 
19. State ex rel. Moore v Bastian, 97 Idaho 444, 546 P.2d 399 (1976). 
Level 1 & 2. Direct condemnation was being used to acquire property from a corner site 
where an Albertson's was used. Owner tried to claim damages caused by median 
installation and increased circuity rather than damage caused by taking. Non- 
compensable. 
20. Merritt v State, 113 Idaho 142,742 P.2d 397 (1986). 
Level 4. Partial indirect taking of access. Owner filed an inverse claim. Court 
considered all facts and found remaining access to the property reasonable, thus no 
compensable taking. 
21. Brown v City ofTwin Falls, 124 Idaho 39,855 P.2d 876 (1993). 
Level 2. Inverse claim arising from median installation. Court found only minor 
inconvenience resulted; non-coinpensable. 
22. Killinger v Twin Falls Highway Dist., 135 Idaho 322, 17 P.3d 266 (2000). 
Level 3. Direct access to a public way was destroyed by the State's change in use of the 
right of way, resulting in a compensable taking. 
E. Even if Police Powers Were at issue, There is Still a Taking of Defendant's Access 
Rights 
It's difficult to imagine categorizing this case within the realm of police powers, given the 
Amended Complaint, LC. 5 40-31 1(1), Fonburg, Smith, and the majority of cases regarding 
limited access highway cases from other jurisdictions. However, even if we characterize the 
State's actions in this case as falling within the police powers doctrine, there is still a 
compensable taking under the balancing test because access to the remaining property is not 
reasonable, limits the highest and best use of the property, and decreases the development 
potential of the site. 
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1. One Access to Fifteen Acres for Commercial Use Found Unreasonable 
In a prior condemnation case with ITD, State v. Fuhvman, Judge D. Duff Mckee acted as 
the trier of fact and issued a decision, after hearing evidence at trial, that where the State was 
leaving the property owner with only one point of access the remaining access was unreasonable. 
The property was vacant but had a highest and best use of commercial, for a big box retailer. 
The site was roughly fifteen acres in size. The State was not expressly acquiring access rights as 
it is in this case. However, because the State project imposed a free running right onto new 
Highway 55, the remaining frontage on the road did not allow more than one full movement 
access to the property per Ada County Highway District standards. 
After considering all the evidence, Judge McKee found that one full movement access 
point was not reasonable access to serve a big box commercial development, which was the 
highest and best use of the property. A copy of his decision in the case is attached as Exhibit 
"C". 
If one full movement access was not held reasonable to serve 15 acres with a highest and 
best use of commercial big box type retail, it is hard to see how no access could be considered 
reasonable to serve almost 18 acres in the after condition, as in this case. 
2. If the Remaining Access Changes the Highest & Best Use, It's Unreasonable 
In evaluating what is reasonable access, one must consider "Reasonable for what 
purpose?" Access which is reasonable for a single family residence may be completely 
unreasonable for an office complex or a commercial development. Therefore, consideration of 
the highest and best use of property is an integral issue in a determination of whether or not 
reasonable access remains. If the remaining access changes the highest and best use of the 
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property, a compensable taking is generally found. 
In Douglas County v. Briggs, 578 P.2d 1261 (1978)), afmed by Oregon Supreme Court, 
Douglas County v. Briggs, 593 P.2d 11 15 (1079) reasonableness of the remaining access was 
held to be a fact question which must be determined in light of the highest and best use of the 
property. Briggs looked at the alternative access to see if it complied with the commercial use of 
that property, which necessitated a comparison between its past and current use. While the 
remaining access was suitable for residential and farming, it was not suitable for its highest use 
because no commercial access to the affected property remained. A talcing occurred as a result 
The New York case of Priestly v. State, 23 N.Y.2d 152,242 N.E.2d 827,295 N.Y.S.2d 
659 (1968) contains a good explanation of why highest and best use must be considered to 
determine unreasonableness or unsuitability: 
Claimants' appeal from that determination revolves upon the rather murky 
distinction between access which is merely 'circuitous' and, therefore, insufficient as a basis for 
consequential damages and that which is 'unsuitable' and, therefore, compensable. It is beyond 
dispute that mere circuity of access does not constitute a basis for an award of consequential 
damages [citations omitted]. But, this legal proposition is controlling in aparticular case only if, 
as a question of fact, the access involved is shown to be merely circuitous [citations omitted]. Lf 
the facts established at the trial of a claim show that the access involved is more than merely 
circuitous so that it can be characterized as 'unsuitable,' compensabilitv follows. The trial court in 
this case, by necessary implication from its award of consequential damages and by its reference 
to the damage caused by the loss of access to the bridge approach, found the access remaining to 
be unsuitable, while the Appellate Division disagreed and found it to be merely circuitous and 
not unsuitable and insufficient. In this posture, the issue then is whether the record as a whole 
supports the determination of the trial court or that of the Appellate Division [citations omitted]. 
Before attempting to evaluate the evidence as to the nature and character of the 
remaining access with a view toward the ultimate characterization of it either as merely 
circuitous or as unsuitable. it is first necessary that those concepts be given content and 
substance. Case law has indicated that mere inconvenience of access is insufficient to 
constitute unsuitability [citations omitted] and that 'Suitable access now is any access by 
which entrance may be had to a property without difficulty' [citations omitted] and, 
further, that the question of suitability is a factual one directly related to the highest and 
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best use of the property [citations omitted]. Such formulations, however, do not provide 
any definite or certain guides to the decision of particular cases. In light of this, the vew 
definition of the concewts involved can provide a basis upon which to approach such 
determinations. 'Circuitous,' in its commonly accepted understanding. indicates that 
which is roundabout and indirect but which nevertheless leads to the same destination. 
'Suitable,' in its commonlv accepted understanding describes that which is adeauate to 
the reauirements of or answers the needs of a particular object. The concepts are not 
mutuallv exclusive and. therefore, a finding that a means of access is indeed circuitous 
does not eliminate the possibility that that same means of access might also be unsuitable 
in that it is inadeauate to the access needs inherent in the highest and best use of the 
property involved. [Emphasis added]. 
Priestly v. State, 23 N.Y.2d 152, 155,242 N.E.2d 827, 829-830,295 N.Y.S.2d 659,662-63 (N.Y. 
1968). See also Baan v. State ofNew York, 75 A.D.2d 919,920 (1980). 
Changes in access can result in a change of highest and best use. In Cousin v. State oj 
New Youk, 42 A.D2d 1016 (1973), the city appropriated one of two curb cuts for an irregularly 
shaped property. The highest and best use before taking was as a gasoline service station. The 
appropriation reduced its highest and best use to light manufacturing or industrial. Since the 
taking changed the property's highest and best use, it did not matter if a more circuitous route 
existed because the change in use was unsuitable. (More weight is given to change of highest 
and best use than circuity). 
In Columbus Holding Corporation v. State ofNew Yorl, 36 A.D.2d 674,675 (1971) the 
State argued that highest and best use did not change as long as it was still "commercial." The 
Court disagreed, finding: 
This arwment is predicated upon the theorv that the highest and best use should have 
been determined to be commercial rather than a specific commercial use, to wit, a 
gasoline service station. This argument. however. ignores the fact that there are higher or 
lesser commercial uses to which a parcel of land mav be put: that some land is more 
suitable for one purpose than another: and that the suitabilitv of the land for a warticular 
purpose has a direct relationship on its value. The State's appraiser recognized this since 
he arrived at consequential damages of $27,500, obviously, since the land was no longer 
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suitable for a gasoline service station and was suitable only for some lesser commercial 
use. Under the circumstances, the court properly determined that the remaining access 
was unsuitable as distinguished from merely circuitous and awarded consequential 
damages. [Emphasis added]. 
3. Development Potential of the Property Has Been Diminished 
When there is no change in highest and best use, (i.e. commercial development is 
possible on the site both before and after the taking), it must be determined whether or not the 
remaining access has reduced the development potential of the property. (For example, if big 
box retail was possible before development, but only service-commercial after development, or if 
much less development can be accommodated on site). If the remaining access fails to support 
the degree of development potential that existed before the taking then damages may be 
awarded. 
In Split Roclc Partnership v. State ofNew York, 275 A.D.2d 450,451,713 N.Y.S.2d 64, 
65 (2000) the Court stated the rule as follows: 
In Priestly v State ofNew York (23 NY2d 152), the Court of Appeals held that if the 
State's appropriation of highway-abutting land or the physical construction of the 
improvement itself so impairs access to the remaining property that it can no longer 
sustain its previous highest and best use, then the State must pay consequential damages 
to the owner (see, La Briola v State of New York, 36 NY2d 328, 332). This Court has 
interpreted Priestly to include cases in which the remaining access would not support the 
degree of development potential that existed before the taking. Thus, consequential 
damages have been properly awarded when the highest and best use of the property was 
the same both before and after the taking, but the remaining access reduced the potential 
development of the property (see, Matter of Coung of Rockland [Kohl Indus. Park Co.], 
147 AD2d 478). 
Split Rock focused on the volume of traffic accessing the property, as well as the size of 
office buildings which could be constructed on the remainder. 
Where a change in access diminishes the degree or intensity of development, even though 
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the category of highest and best use remains the same, there are compensable damages, as held in 
Rockland v. Kohl Industrial Park Co., 147 A.D.2d 478,479, 537 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1989): 
Consequential damages have been properly awarded in many cases where the 
remaining access has reduced the potential development of property (see, e.g., Chemung 
Canal Trust Co. v State of New York, 90 AD2d 889 [drive-in bank facility]; Matter of 
Saratoga County Sewer Dist. # I  v Gordon, 101 AD2d 966 [less suitable for commercial 
purposes]; Banos v State of New Yorl, 54 AD2d 1077 [from unlimited to limited 
industrial development]; Laken Realty Corp. v State ofNew York, 29 AD2d 1027 
[industrial development]; Tauzel v State ofNew Yorlc, 82 AD2d 933 [farmland]). 
4. "Police Powers" Cannot Be Used as a Subterfuge for Taking Property Rights 
The State cannot recast or re-characterize a compensable taking as a police power 
regulation merely to attempt to avoid liability. In Coeur d'Alene Garbage Service v. City of 
Coeur d'Alene, 114 Idaho 588,592,759 P.2d 879,883 (1988), the Court considered an inverse 
condemnation claim for the taking of a property right when the City took a contract away from a 
garbage company by annexing property into the City and only allowing one garbage service 
provider to operate within City limits. The City claimed this was not a taking, and also attempted 
to categorize the case as a tort, which would make them immune from liability, much as ITD 
seeks to categorize its taking of access as a non-compensable exercise of police powers in this 
case. The Court was clearly able to see through the City's actions, noting that it had the power of 
eminent domain (as does ITD) but'was simply choosing to try and exercise that power without 
admitting it. 
Here, the City had the right of eminent domain under LC. 5 50- 1030(c) for the 
purpose of preserving the public health as provided for in I.C. § 50-304. Although the 
City did not exercise its right of condemnation in this case, it did take Garbage Service's 
property by excluding Garbage Service from servicing its existing customers in the 
annexed areas. 
The decision of this Court in Renninger v. State, 70 Idaho 170, 2 13 P.2d 9 1 1 
(1950), disposes of the City's contention that it is immune from liability to Garbage 
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Service by virtue of I.C. § 6-904(4). The City characterizes this suit as one for tortious 
conduct of the City. In Renninger this Court held that art. 1, 5 14 of the Idaho 
Constitution waives the immunity of the state in an inverse condemnation case. Id, at 178, 
21 3 P.2d at 91 6.  This case is correctly.characterized as one for inverse condemnation and 
not as one for tortious interference with contract. The City cannot avoid liability by 
attempting to recast what it has done. 
The Idaho Supreme Court pointed out in Foster's that the police power cannot be used as 
a method of imposing a tax. Likewise, it cannot be used to impose an uncompensated take. 
Effective exercise of the police power necessarily involves expenditures in many 
ways. The means and instrumentalities, by and through which the supervising 
powers of the policing authority are brought to bear on the subject to be regulated, 
involve costs and expenses. It is only reasonable and fair to require the business, 
traffic, act, or thing that necessitates policing, to pay this expense. To do so has 
uniformly been upheld by the courts. On the other hand, this power may not be 
resorted to as a shield or subterfuge, under which to enact and enforce a 
revenue-raising ordinance or statute. [citations omitted]. 
Foster's, Inc., vRoise City, 63 Idaho 201,218, 118 P.2d 721,728 (1941). 
F. Access is Related to Value and Is a Fact Question and a Jury Issue 
In the event the Court determines that: 1) there is not a direct taking of access rights in 
this condemnation case, 2) that there is a property right at issue due to abutter's having a right of 
direct access, and 3) that therefore a balancing of interests is required to determine whether or 
not the Defendant's remaining access is reasonable, that question should he submitted to the jury 
rather than decided in advance. Whether access is reasonable or not is intertwined with the 
highest and best use of the property and value, and cannot be separated therefrom. 
In Cady v. North Dalcota Dept. Of Transportation, 472 N.W.2d 467 (1991), a Level 4 
inverse condemnation case requiring a balancing test to determine whether or not a taking had 
occurred, the Court held that it was necessary for the fact finder to consider items non- 
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compensabie in themselves, such as circuity, in order to determine whether reasonable access 
existed or did not exist. 
In Filler, we said that loss of traffic, loss of business, and circuity of travel are not 
themselves compensable. 281 N.W.2d at 243. However, we do recognize that loss of 
traffic, loss of business, and circuity of travel are factors to be considered in determining 
the reasonableness of the remaining access to and from an abutting roadway. Id. 
Cady v. North Dakota Dept. of Transp,. 472 N.W.2d 467,470 (1991). 
The same was held in Simln'ns v. City ofDavenport, 232 N.W.2d 561,566 (Iowa 1975): 
'No hard and fast rule can be stated as to whether an abutting property owner has been 
denied access that is reasonable or, as we have said, 'free and convenient.' In most 
instances the question is one of fact, not of law, and its determination depends largely 
upon the evidence in the particular case. * * * (citing authorities).' Iowa State Highway 
Comm. v. Smith, 248 Iowa at 877, 82 N.W.2d at 760. See also Stom v. City ofcouncil 
Bluffs, 189 N.W.2d at 526. 
The rule was also stated in Douglas County v. Briggs, 34 0r.App. 409,414, 578 P.2d 1261, 
When restrictions on access are imposed, whether or not adequate access remains 
available is a question of fact which must be determined in light of the highest and best 
use of the affected property. 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain, s 5.72(1) at 5-165 (1976). 
Even in a direct condemnation case, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that circuity of 
access may be considered by the jury as an attribute of the remaining property, and considered in 
valuation of the property: 
There is no direct proof of any specific amount of damages that would be suffered 
because of curtailed access to the proposed highway. There is testimony that the new 
highway when constructed could, in the vicinity of appellant's plant, only be entered at 
certain points. Convenience of access to a highway, formerly enjoyed by appellant, and 
impaired by reason of the new construction, could be considered by the jury with the 
other testimony in fixing the amount of damage sustained. 29 C.J.S., Eminent Domain, 5 
163, p. 1033. 
State exrel. Rich v. Dunclick, Inc., 77 Idaho45, 53,286 P.2d 1112, 1116- 117 (1955). 
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The jury cannot fairly detennine value without consideration of all attributes of the 
property and its highest and best use before and afler taking. Access is a key component of that 
question. 
DATED this loth day of April, 2007. 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX 
Attorneys for ~efegdan)d/ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the loth day of April, 2007, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served upon the following by the method indicated below: 
/' 
Joseph Mallet L ~ . ~ .  MAIL 
Deputy Attorney General Hand Delivery 
Idaho Transportation Department Facsimile Transmission 
331 1 West State Street Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 7129 
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ORDE,R OF CONDEMNATION 
PROJECT NO. : F-2390 (104) E'ARCEL NO. : 4 1 
HIGEYWaY: U.S .  H i g h w a y  No. 93 EXY  NO^ : 5137 
LOCATION: T w i n  Falls PARCEL ID. NO: 00414831 
RECORDOWNER(S): CANYON V I S T A  FAMILY L I M I T E D  PARTNERSEIIP, an Idaho L i m i t e d  P a r t n e r s h i p  
T w i n  Falls, IDAHO 
COUNTY: Twin Falls 
The Board, having considered the report and recommenda~ions of the 
State Highway Administrator and having duly considered!thematter, 
finds : 
1. That the above designated project is for the purpose of 
constructing a, section of the State Highway System in the 
location as noted above. 
2 .  That the right of way necessary for the proposed project 
consists in part of certain real propekty located in the 
county as noted above, and which property has been designated 
and shown as the above parcel number on the plans of said 
project now on file in the office of the Idaho Transportation 
Department. 
3 .  That the parcel so designated and shown on said project plans 
is necessary to the construction of said project, and the 
construction of said project is impossible without the 
acquisition of said parcel. 
4 .  That all rights of access to, from, and between the right of 
way of the public way and all of the contiguous remaining 
real property of the record owner(s) shall be extinguished and 
prohibited except for access, if any, as provided and shown on 
the said project plans referred to in Paragraph 2 above. 
5 .  That the record owner(s), according to a Preliminary Title 
Report now on file in the office of the Idaho Transportation 
Department, of the parcel so designated and shown on said 
project plans are as listed above. Any encumbrances or liens 
of record pertinent to the parcel so designated are as set 
forth in said title report. Any other known claimants to the 
property as determined by investigations of representatives of 
this Department are as set forth above. 
6. That the Idaho Transportation Department has, by and through 
ORDER OF C0NDEMNATl:ON 
its representatives, sought in good faith to arrive at a 
settlement with the above-mentioned record owner(s), as to the 
value of land (including the improvements thereon) represented 
by the aforementioned parcel, together with any easements 
necessary for the construction and relocation of irrigation 
and drainage facilities, approaches, access roads, rounding of 
slopes, etc., in connection with the construction of the 
project, and the damages which will result to the property not 
taken and has been unable to make any reasonable bargain 
therefore, or settlement of such damages. 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the acquisition of the lands 
and property rights hereinabove described is necessary to the 
construction and maintenance of the said highway project. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Idaho Transportation Department shall 
acquire the hereinabove designated real property and property rights 
through the power of eminent domain. 
Dated this - day of ~ G V -  , 2004 
RECOMMENDED t IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT 
David S. Ekern, Director, 
On Behalf of The 
Idaho Transportation Board 
APPROVED AS d & l R M :  
TITLE INSURANCE LAW 
title subject to certain encumbrances cannot rescind the conti-act 011 the 
ground that a title insurei- \yill not iinsure lnai-ketable title because uf those 
encumbrances or defects." Fuithei-more, since any title insurance policy 
issued to that purchaser surely woiild except such encumbrances, the puil- 
chaser would not have a claim against its title insurer for loss therefioin, 
including loss caused by a subsequent purcliaser's rejecting the title as 
uninai-I<etable,40 
5.07 Lack of a Right of Access 
Title insurers also assume, in both standard owner's and loan policies, the 
risk of loss from lack of a legally enforceable light of access to and froin the 
insured land.] It is important to understand that the standard titleinsurance 
policy insures only a legal "rigllt of access," and not any particular physical 
route.2 An exception to this rule is that the "Hoineowners Policy of Title 
Insurance for a One-to-four Fanlily Residence," which the American Land 
Title Association (ALTA) adopted in 1908, expressly insures that homeown- 
ers will have actual vehicular and pedestrian access to and froin the land.2.' 
An insui-ed has no clailn against its title insurer because of a road's poor 
pl~ysical condition or because tlie insured inust build a road over a right-of- 
way or irnprove an existing road.8 Indeed, wllel-e public records showed a 
legal right of access, insureds were denied a claim altl~ougl> the only road was 
30 See Kirkwall COT. v. Scssa, 48 N.Y.2d 709,397 N.E.2d 1172, 422 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1979). 
"Oar Pdliser v. Tide Ins. Co., 115 N.Y.S. 545 (Sup. 1908). 
See ALTA owner's and loan policies, at Appendices B, C, D and E infro. 
%See Gates v. Ciiicago Title Ins. Co.. 813 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. App. I9SI); Kraure v. Title & 
T m t  CO.. 3911 SO. 2d 805 (Flil. App. 1980): Title & Trust Co, v. Barrows, 381 So. Zd 1088 (Fla. 
App. 1979). See generally Phwer  v; Lawyers Title Ins. COT., 508 So. 2d 731 (Fla. App. 1987); 
Annot., "Defkd in, or Condition of, Adjacent Land or Way as Within Covelage of Title 
Iilsurance Policy," 8 A.L.R. 4th 1246,1250-54; Annot., "Absence oI'EffecIva1 Subdivision, or of 
Sheet or Easements, as Witliin Title Insuimce Coverage." 40 A.L.R. 2d 1247; Werner, "The 
Basics of Title Insurance,'' in A.B.A. Red Prop. Frob. & Tr. L. Sec., Title h,sumnce: The 
Lmoyer's Etponding Role 36,50 (1985). 
2."his policy is rliscussed in !ill at $5.13[2] i f~ fra  nd ii copy is reproduced at Appendix H 
substantial i.epnii): Title & Trust Co. v.  Barrows, 381 Sb, 2d 1088, 1090 (Fla. App. 1980) (Bct 
that road wm frequently under water due to elevation of insured property was not bi-mch of 
policy, since insuredsweie only guaranteed legal riglit of access); MixBean v. St Paul Title Ins. 
Corp., 169 N.J. Supn. 502,405 A.2d 405 (1979) (insured is only paranteed a legally enforcea- 
ble light to get lo and fro111 property, nut that access dl be most convenient or easily used 
route.): Hocldng v .  Title Ins. & Trust Co., 234 P.2d 625 (=d 1951). 
RISKS TRANSFERRED TO INSURER 
impassnhle due to high tide water duling the spring and fall of each year.* 
The reasoning is that it is the insured's, not the title iilsurer's, responsibility 
to inspect the property or hire a survey to evaluate the efficacy of the access." 
This rule is consisterit with the line of cases discussed in $$ 5.05 and 5.06 
PI-operty or access it by boat or plane over a lake. Yet, a magistrate judge 
actually upheld such a defense by one title insurer.8 On appeal, the First 
Cil-cuit "recoiled" at that idea and relllanded the case for a deterlnination of 
whether lake access was adequate in that case as a matter of fact. Unfortu- 
nately, the First Circuit let pass the better niling-that "a right oiaccess" in 
a title insurance policy means "access over land by vehicle" as a matter of 
law, unless the title insurer expressly indicates that its access coverage is 
See Title & Tns t  CO. v. Bariowr, 381 So. 2d 1088 (Iila. App. 1980). 
See Kiause v. Title & Trust Co.. 390 So. Zd 805 @la. App. 1980): 
[tllir: quality of a pariicular access . . .would Inve been discoverable od? upon n pllysical 
examination of tile proper?, oi- a detailed survey. The policy here specifically excepted 
any facts revealed by ax accurate smvey . . .As the title coinpony insured the quality of 
tlie title as shown by the record and there was access of record, it war not required to aid 
in the suit.  . . to establish a giant of necessity 
Accord Gates v. Cliicngo Title Ins. Co., 813 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. App. 1991). 
See genewily United Bank v. Cliiciigo Title Ins. Co., 168 F.3d 37 (1st Cii. 1999): Mamot 
Pin. Sews. Inc. v. Capitol Funds, 988 N.C. 122, 217 S.E.2d 551 (1975) (thougli title insurer 
ul6rnately prevailed because polivy excluded ordinance that prevented auionmtive access, tlie 
See United BanL v. Chicago Title Ins. Co.. 168 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 1998). 
Cl>icagoTitle tells us tliat there is access by seaplane landingontlie I& and that visitors 
to a recreational piopcrly often travel in this manner. Possibly there are situations in 
(Release #?, ?/2001) 
TITLE INSURANCE LAW 
Since tlus insuring clause does not guarantee a pal-ticular access, an 
insured sliould have the descitptinn of any accessway iinpol-tmt to a project 
included within the policy's description of the land to which title is insured. 
Tile insured alternatively ]nay ask the title insurer for an Access Endorse- 
1nent.l' Where a title policy describes a public street as a boundary of 
insured land, the insured is entitled to evec t  that the insurer determined 
that the street was legally dedicated for public use." 
Where tbe policy does not describe a particular accessway or bounding 
street, the title insurer may still be required to enforce an insured's light to 
use streets bounding the insured n:al property. This result foilows from the 
presuinption in the law of conveyancing that property ownerslup extends to 
the center of any bounding street."z The reasoning is that if fee owners are 
entitled to presume rights to the center of the streets adjoining their land, 
then insurance of their title includes coverage of their rights to tile center of 
the bounding streets.'s That rule has been applied despite policy conditions 
restijcti~lg the pdlicy's coverage to the specific lot described in the policy and 
disclaiming responsibility for defects in the title to adjoining streets.14 Nev- 
which a right of access in fiiis rnlnneiis d l  that is required. But tlieie is no case law cited 
to us shou,ing that this is always so for all property. and common sense recoils from sucll 
a suggestion. Tlius,.we conclude that-ifthere is no "right" oflnnd access, . . the recod 
creates an issue oftiact >IS to w1,ether a "rigl>t.'by any otber means. . .is ndeguatein this 
'O See $ 9 . 1 7 i n 1 .  
"See MacBean v. St. Paul Title Ins. Coip.. 169 N.J. Super. 502,405 A.2d 405, 409 (1979) 
("a ieasuna1,ie purelxuer of insurance would understand tl~at a survey . . . indicating a sheet 
abuttingone oftlie boundary lines.. .had been certified to him by thoinsurer as showing that 
sheet to be a dedicated public sweet'?. Tlie issue in MacBean was the b,ciusion of a survey 
within tile policy's coverage, not the clause insuingaccess: lioweuer, thestateinent of lawwould 
appear applim>ble to an access case. 
IZ See Joyce P ~ O I W S ~ ,  Patton oa Titles 5 143 (2d ed. & 1999 Pocket Part, west Group); 
Trust Co., 250 Cd. App. 2d 248,253,58 Cad. Rptr. 273,276 (1967): 
In a conveyanL.e of p ropav  by reference to a iiiap that slrows a bounding stTeet, n 
grantee c.m correctly claim a presinnption of ownership to the center of tlie street. In 
view of the shength of this presuniption and its long-standing aoucpviinct: in the law of 
red property, we think a titieinsurincepolicy on properly bounded by a sheet necessa- 
Cornpare Sli~vel-v. Title Guar. &Trust Co., 43 S.W.2d 212 (Tenn. 1931) (insurer not lixble for 
iiiisdescription ofboundsty street that the~.caitci would be closed). 
' % M ~ ~ I ~  v. Title Ins. &Trust Co., 250 Cd. App. Ed 248,252.58 Cd. Rptr. 273,276 (1967): 
TITLE INSURANCE LAW 
Since tlus insuring clause does not guailultee a particular access, an 
insured should have tile description of any accessway impo~tant o a PI-oject 
included within the policy's description of tbe land to whicll title is insured. 
The insured alternatively ]nay ask the title insurer for an Access Endol-se- 
ment.1" Where a title policy describes a public street as a bonndaq~ of 
insured land, the insured is entitled to expect tlxlt the i~lsiircr deter~nined 
that the street was legally dedicated for public use." 
Wlrere the policy does not desciibe a particular accessway or bounding 
street, the title insurer may still be required to enforce an insured's light to 
use streets bounding the insul-ed real PI-operty. Tliis result follows froin the 
presuinption in the law of conveyancing tliat property ownership extends to 
the center of any bounding street.'% The reasoning is that if fee omers are 
entitled to presume rights to tlie center of the streets adjoining their land, 
then insurance of their title includes coverage of their rights to the center of 
the bounding streets.13 That rule has been applied despite policy co>lditions 
restiictingthe policy's coverage to the specific lot desc~ibed in the policy aud 
disclaimi~lg responsibility for defects in the title to adjoining streets.14 Nev- 
w1lic.h a iight ofaccessin this ilianner is nU tl~at is required. But thereisno case law cited 
to us showing that this is tdwnys so for nU pioperty, and common sense recoils iiorii sucl, 
a suggestion. n~us, b e  conclude hat--if there is no "rigllt" of land nccers . . . tlie rrc.ol-d 
creates an issue of fbct ar to wlietlier a "right" by any other means . . .is adequate in this 
m e .  
lo See $9.17infiu. 
" See MacBean v. St. Paul Title Ins. Coip., 169 N.J. Super. 502, 405 A.2d 405,409 (1979) 
Pa reasonable purchaser of insurnnce wodd understand that a survey . . . indicating a street 
abuning one ofthe boundary h e s  . . . had been ceitiIied to !rim by the insurer as showing tliat 
s l~eet  o be a dedicated public sheet"). Tlie issue in MucBron war the i~>clusion of o survey 
*thin the policy's covnage,nM ibe ciauseinsuring access; howwer, h e  statement of isw would 
appear applicable to an access case. 
See Joyce R~lomw, Putton on Til1e.v $ 143 (2d ed. & 1999 Pocket Part, west Group): 
In n conveyirnco of property by refeisnce to a map tlist sliows a bounding sheet, a 
grantee can correctly ddin s presumplioil of ownenllip to tlie center of the sheet. In 
view of the strength of this presmription and its lorig-standing acceptance in the lsw of 
red piopefly, we tbink a title insunince policy on property bounded by a sheet nnecessa- 
Compere Shiwer v. Tille Guar. &Trust Co., 43 SW.2d 212 (Tenn. 1931) (insuler not liable for 
~nisdescri~tion of boundary sheet tliat therci~fter would be closed). 
l4 Murray". Title Ins. &TrustCo., 250 C I ~ .  App. 2d 248,252,58 C.4. Rptr. 273,276 (1967): 
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ertheless, if ai.1 insured had notice p~ior  to purchasing that the adjoining 
public street wtis abandoned, then title insurance of a specific lot would not 
insure by i~nplication title to the adjoining stlip of land where the street was 
abandoned. Under these circuinstances a grantee would have no right to 
expect that owr~ership of a lot would presumpiively inolude ownership in the 
abandoned street.'" 
In a case wl1e1-e tile policy did no expressly cover loss from lack or a right 
of access, a title insul-er still was held liable for damages when it was found 
that the iiisured bad no access from the insured land to a public street.15.l 
The court ruled that a title insurance policy covers loss oftitle from any cause 
not expressly excepted, and held the insurer liable for t l~e  loss in value of the 
insured 1and.15" Additionally, even if the policy does not eqressly cover lac]< 
or a right of access, if it insures against nnmarlcetability of the title, the title 
insurer will be hable if no legd access to the land exists. The majority rule is 
that lack of access makes title nilinarketable.'6s 
Often, in wol-king out debt, a defaulting ~nortgagor will deed over to the 
mortgagee enougl~ of the mortgaged propelty lo satisfy part or all of the 
deht. Additionally, o ~ n e  julisdictions pennit the siieriff at forecloure to sell 
only so much of the debtor's properiy as is necessary to satisfy the debt. In 
both situations, the party talang title to the land should ascertain that a right 
of access exists otbkr than through propelty the debtor has retained. Other- 
wise, if the debtor refuses access througl~ its retained property, the 
mortgagee or purcl~aser may find it owns landlocked property of little value. 
In that situatior~ access can solnetiines be acquired via judicial action enforc- 
ing an easemeilt by necessity. However, the insured mortgagee who 
[T]be title colnpany initially relies on certain policy exclusions purporting to restrict its 
coverage to the specific lot described in the policy md to disclaim responsibility for 
defects in the title to adjoining sheets, and the Wie. We are not impressed with this 
defense, and wr liwe no hesitancy in finding the title oo~np&~'s blanket exblusions from 
tire coverage of its policy wholly inconsistent with the protection w1iic.h the face of the 
policy puiports to oiier. 
l5 id. Cornpare Hawstad v. Fidelity Natl Title Ins. Co., 68 Cd. Rptr. 2d 481 (Cd. Ct. App. 
1997) (policy should not be interpreted to indude private road whereit is clearly neither a part 
oinoi ;Ippurten;m* to either of t l ~ e  lots specifically referred to in the policy's Schedule "A" 
descliption, ptlriicu1,uiy given policy deiinitioo oi"1and" whicll cleorly and explicitly insures fee 
title and not any property beyond tlle lines oftbe siea described or refirred to in Schedule A, 
nor any right. title, interest estate or easement in abuttingstieets). 
s5.1 See Clements v. Steiwart Title Guar. Co., 537 S.W. 2d 126 (Tex. App. 1976). 
15.2 1~1. 
'6.sStewilit Title Guar. Co. v. West, 110 Md. App. 114, 138, 676 A.2d 853,964 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1996); Regm v. L.imr, 40 NY.M 415, 387 N.Y.S.2d 79, 354 N.E.2d 818 (1976); 
Joyce Puloiiiar, Potton 071 Titlrs 5 46 (2d ad. & 1QQD Podret Part, West Group). 
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TITLE INSUMNCI? LAW 
acquired title to landlocked propel-17 throug11 foreclosure or a deed in lieu 
would have no claiin under its original loan policy f o ~  the costs of such a 
judicial action, unless the mortgagee Iiad the policy updated, or purchased a 
new owner's policy, to cover title problems through t l~e  date of the foreclo- 
Sure Or W O T ~ O U ~ . "  
As inentioned in the preceding paragraph, when no legal access exjsts to 
insured real property, the title insnrer inay have to bear the cost of a judicial 
action to declare an easeir~ent ofway by necessity.17 However, as always, the 
insurer's liability under this insuiing clause is lnodified by t11e policy's 
exclusions, exceptions, and conditions. The foliowing lnay be particularly 
relating to the use or enjoyment of tbe land and the cliaracter or 
location of iinprovernents on the land, 
(2) The standard exclusii>ns for loss caused by exercises of govemmen- 
tal police power aid eminent domain,'8 and 
(3) The standard Schedule B exception for titleproblelns wllic11 would 
Insureds' claims also are liinited by any special exceptions written into the 
policy, even tl~ough the result is no velucular access to the insured prop- 
erty.20 Additionally, terms of the policy permit iildelnnification only if the 
insured has sustained a 10~s.~ '  
As discussed inore fully in $$6.06[1] and 10.04[1] [aJ[ii], standard own- 
ers' title insurance policies seem to say, and courts have construed them to 
Is Regarding tile need to update the title policy to date alier the worlcout or foreclosure 
s;lie,see $4.04[2] suprn and Ch. 14 injn. 
l7 See Myerberg, S a y e r  & Rue, P.A. v. Agee, 51 bid. App. 711,446 A.2d 69(1%2). 
's'Wl,ere access is lust due to condeliinntion of a stmet abutting the insured parcel, poli~y 
rncludons for eminent dom.Cn actions prevent tile insrirer froin being liable, u>Jess the con- 
demnation proceedings were of record at the time tile policy was issued. L. Srniilock Real9 
Cori). v. Titic Guix Co., 52 N.Y.2d 179,418 N.E.2d 650, (W7 N.YS.2d 57 (1081). sr~hseqrmnt 
appeal, 97App. Div. Zd 205,469 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1983),n1oil$ed 63 N.Y.Zd955,473N.E.2d 234,. 
483 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1984). 
'Q~ee Cbs. 6 and 7 i,fr<c. 
20 Tile poky's spuiijc sception o l  deed rertl-ictions proliibiting die insured's using pnrt of 
tlie property ibi an access easement to tile common boundsiy o f t l~e  hsurcd land imd the street, 
limited the insured's clvili?. Lincoln Sav. &Loan Ass'n v. Title Ins, ti Tmst Co., 46 Cd. App. 3d 
493,120 Cal Xptr. 219 (1875). 
21 See Nawldnsv. OddandTitie ins. & Guiir. Co., 165 Cal.App. 2d IlG, 331 P,Zd742(1958) 
(insureds hiled to show that lack oi'direct access to theii remice station reduced the market 
wriue of the insured luml). S w  also § 5.02 saipm. 
RISKS T b l N S F E I I R E U  TO INSURER 
say, that the loss payable when tl)e insured land lacks a nght of access will 
generally be the cliffel-ence hehueen tlie [air market value of the land with a 
light of access and its value without any light of access.Z2 However, the 
author is aware of several recent unpublished cases'in wllich tit.le insurers 
told insured owners wile 11ad learned that the only access to their insured 
property was via revocable license rather than pennanent legal right of 
access that they had no loss under the policy until the access actually is 
revoked. Essentially, they are contenrling that, so long as the insureds have 
not yet been stopped fro~n using the road or had to pay ~noney out-of-pocket 
to use the roadway or buy another, they have no indelnnifiahle loss. If title 
insurers want "actual loss" to mean tl~at an insured owner must have had to 
pay a third party or sell the land to a third party at a loss, they need to revise 
the policy to expressly say so. Until such policy revision, if the insurer does 
not acquire a right of access, an insured owner's loss shouldhe the amount 
that the lack of a rigl~t of access reduces the fair market value of the land. 
Lender's title insurimce typically covers all the risks discussed in pS5.04 
to 5.07 above, plus certain ad&.tional risks which c o d r o ~ ~ t  Ienders who talie 
In 1970 ALTA loan policies, this insuring clause also contains language 
excepting from its coverage any clailn of invalidity or unenforceahility of the 
insured mortgage based upon (a) usury, or (b) any consumer credit protec- 
- 
22 See, e.g, llnited Bankv. CM~igoTitle Ins. Co., 168F.3d37 (1st Cir. ISSO). S E E ~ ~ S O  cases 
cited in $$ 6.0GllJ and lU.O4[1][a][iiJ inJn, construing the meaning of ''actual loss" in a title 
., 
insurance policy. 
' See ALTA Loan Policy 1970, ALTA Loan Policy (Apr. 6, 1990) and Compuison of 1970 
ALTA Loan Policy With 1987 Lorin Policy, tit Appendices C, E and F infra. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 'DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
NU. 
FILED 
) 4.u. I I ..I5 P.M. 
STATE OF IDAHO ex rel. IDAHO ) 
TRANSPORTATION BOARD, ) NOV 0 1 1996 
Plaintiff, 
) Case No. 98518 
VS . ) 
JAMES A. FUHRMAN and IIIANE E. ) 
FUHRMAN husband and wife, ) 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Defendants. 
This matter was tried to the court without a jury on September 
3 and 4, 1996. George Parham, deputy attorney general, appeared 
for the state. E. Don Copple appeared for the defendants. 
Whereupon, the court proceeded to hear and consider the testimony 
and exhibits of the parties and witnesses, and the arguments of 
counsel. Now, being duly advised, the court makes and enters the 
following findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Pindings of Pact 
1. This is a condemnation action in which the sole issue 
litigated was the amount of just compensation to be paid by the 
plaintiff to the defendant. 
2 .  The state has procedurally complied with all requirements 
for the condemnation of a portion of defendant's property as part 
5 .>I' 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - - -  Page 1 2. :. .J 
be permitted from the property onto new Highway 55. 
9. The limitations on access will have a significant impact 
on the market value of the remainder of the property. The single 
access to State Street which will be allowed after the take and 
construction of the state's highway project would not be a 
reasonable access to allow full commercial development on the full 
fifteen acres. 
10. Based upon all of the evidence, I find that the value of 
the property before the take was $650,000. I find the value of the 
property after the take to be $425,000. I find the value of the 
take and easements to be $35,000. The temporary easement is of 
insignificant value, and is included within the values stated for 
the.property taken. I therefore find the just compensation total 
11. The calculation required by statute is as follows: 
Value before t:he take : $ 650,000 
Value of property taken 35,000 
Subtotal $ 615,000 
Value of remainder 425.000 
Severance damage $ 190,000 
Recapitulation: 
Value of property taken $ 35,000 
Severance damage 190.000 
Just compensat.ion $ 225,000 
C!onclusions of Law 
12. 1 conclude that the limitation of access onto State 
Street, restricting the potential access points from three to one, 
does not leave the entire parcel with reasonable access for full 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - - -  Page 3 
commercial development and constitutes a taking which significantly 
impacts the value of the remainder. The decrease in value must, 
therefore, be included in the determination of just compensation. 
13. I conclude that the just compensation due from the state 
to the defendants to be the sum of $225,000 as set forth in the 
findings of fact above. 
14. A judgment of appropriation and condemnation in the form 
provided by law may be made and entered accordingly. 
Dated this T2day of November, 1996 
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IN TKF DISTRICT COURT OF TXE? FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WIN PALLS 
THE STATE ~F,rO:AHO,. ex mi., ) 
DARRELL V.&f.hNNING, RR. JAMBS 1 
, COLEMAN, BRUCE: SWEENY, MONTE C. ) 
McCLURE, C3+RY.BLICK, NEIL MILLER ) Case No. CV-04-6336 
and JOHN X. COMBO, IDAHO 
T R A N S P O R ~ ~ T I O ~ ; ~  BOARD, 
1 
1 
\ 
I 
, Plaintif?, ) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
) BIFURCATE 
1 -vs- 
1 
CANYON VISTA F M L Y  LIMITED 1 
PARTNERS* AND &MY J. WCH, ) 
mc.; -.~ 1 
\ 
I 
, Defandants. 1 
Comes now the Plaintiff, Sate of Idaho, by and thou&. i t s  cowsel of record, Joseph D. 
Mallet, Deputy Attorney General for the State of Idaho, and hesby moves t b i s  Court for an order 
bifurcating the trial in this ,matter so hat the scope of the takiug issues can be tried and xesolved 
.- 
by the Court priox to the presentation of the issue of jmt compensation to the jury. 
PLAINTIFF'S:MOT~ON'TO BIFURCATE - I 
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This motion is based upon Idaho Rules of Evidence 42@), and other authorities, as 
further set fonh in the Brief in Suppo*t of Plaintiff's Motion to Bifurcate, filed concurrently 
herewith, as well as the other pleadings and papers on file in this case. 
a- 
DATET) this a day of May, 2007. 
~ & t y  Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
CERTlPICATE OF SERVICE 
%it 
I RERj3BY CBRTIFY that on the (O day of May, 2007, I caused a fme and correot 
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Davison Copple Copple & Cox Dovemight Mail 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
AITORNEY GENERAX, 
JOSEPH D. W L E T  
KARL D VOGT 
Deputy Attomay Crene~al 
Idaho Transportation DepEutment 
331 1 West State Street 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho &3707-1129 
Telephone: (208) 334-88 15 
Facsimile: (208) 334-4498 
TSB #5817 
ISB #5015 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DlSTTUC'I COURT OF THE FDTH JUDICIAX, DISTRICT 
'iXE STATE .OF LDAIXO, ex rel., 1 
DARRELL W W G ,  R. JAMES ) 
COLEMAN, BRUCE SWENY, MONTE C. ) 
McCLWRB, GARY BLICK, NEIL MnLER ) Case No. CV-04-6336 
and JOHN x.::COMBO. IDAHO ) 
) 
) BRIEF ]IN SUPPORT OF PLATNTIFB'S 
,, PARTNE~S?%P AND LAZY J RANCH, 
Pic., 
j 
1 
, 
Comes now the Plaintiff, State of Idaho, by and through its counsel of record, Joseph D. 
Mallet, Deputy ~ t t o r n e ~  General for the SZate of Idaho, and hereby submits &is Memorandum in 
support of its motion to bifurcate the txial in this matter so that the scope of the taking issues can 
be tried and resolved by the Court prior to the presentatjon of the issue of  just compensation to 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT'OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO BEURCATE - 1 
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the jury. 
J. 
XIYTRODUCTXON 
This is' acl eminent domain case. The Plaid% State of Idaho (hereinafter, "ITD") has 
essentially taken a "sttip take" kom Defendants, Canyon Vis.ta Family Limi.ted Partnership and 
Lazy J. ~ m c h  (hereinafter, "Defendants") in conjunction with phase one of the US 93 Twin 
Fails Alternate Route Project (hereinaftex, "Project"). This Project will ultimately route US 93 
, west on polk &he Road, bypassing the core of the city of Twin Falls, 
~ o u @  the discovery process and the recent exchange of pretrial motions, it has become 
clear that there is  a dispute between the parties regarding the "latger parcel" issue in this case. In 
other words, the parties disagree as to what consolidated body of land constitutes the remainder 
parcel or the full parcel in tbe before condition. A specific description of the remrrjnder parcel is 
essential for &e jury to analyze the issue of severance damages. For this reason, Plaintiff bas 
moved to bihcate the tcial so that the Court can resolve the larger parcel dispute prior to 
submitting t!w issue ofjust compensation to the jury. 
11, 
LEGAL STANDARD 
~ o t i o b  to, bifurcate are c o m o ~  in eminent domain cases because, in Idaho, the Court. 
and the jury are boq required to decide separate factual issues. In eminent domain cases, 'Yhe 
only issue for. submission to a jury is the question of the value of the property sought to be taken 
or the amoudt of compensation for the taking." State ex rel. Flandro v. Seddon, 94 Idaho 940, 
943, 500 ~ . 2 d  841, 844 (July 28, 1972), AU issues other than just compensation are for 
resolution by tl~e trial court. Rueth v. .Sfare, 100 Idaho 203,223, 596 P.2d 75, 95 (1978) rehr'g 
denied (1979) (hereinafter "Kueth l"). This includes my question as to the scope of the take, 
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which are legal; questions to be decided by the court. Ada County Highway District v. Sharp, 135 
.Idaho 888,892;,26 P13d 1225,1229 (Ct. App 2001)). 
Because of the interrelated fact finding roles of the judge and jury, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has recogdized that ttial courts may find it preferable to bifurcate the issues with the court 
first determining the taking issues, then providing the jury with "an accurate description of the 
property or rigkt therein which has been taken." Rueth I at 223, 95. The policy behind 
bifurcation is @at 'Such a procedure would save the litigants the unnecessary expense of expert 
witness fees &d trial time were all issues submitted in one trial and the taking issue then 
resolved adversely .to the property owner." Id. 
However, the deoisian to bifurcate eminent domain proceedings is left to the sound 
discretion of the tsid court. Rueth v, State, 103 Idaho 74, '80, 644 P.2d 1333, 1339 (1982) 
(hereinafter '5ueth IT). This is consistent with RCP 42@) which allows for a GO&, in its 
discretion, to &der separate trials for any separate issues in a case "in furtherance of conveaience 
or to avoid pkjudice, or when separate kids will be conductive to expedition and economy."' 
IRCP 42@). 
nr. 
ARGUMENT 
In this case, bifurcation is approprjate because the parties have a matexid dispute as to 
what constitutes the "larger parcel." ITD asks the c o d  to b i i ca te  the trial and resolve the 
twger parcel dispute prior to submitting the issue of just compensation to the jwy. 
A. The Lamer Parcel Rile. 
The larger parcel issue arises &om the language of Section 7-71 1, Idaho Code, which sets 
forth the rules fox assessing damages in entinent domain cases. .710is statute provides in part that 
"If the property sought to be condemned consfitUtes only a p M  of a larger parcel.. ." then the 
jury must assess 'tbe damages, if any, "which will accrue to the portion not sought to be 
condemned, by reason of its severance Born the portion sought to be condemned, and the 
construction 05: the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff:? I.C. $ 7-711(2) 
(emphasis added). Incidentally, if severance damages are found, tbey must be offset by the 
extent the larger parcel is "specially and directly benefited" by the taking. I.C. $ 7-71 1(3). 
"Parcel," as used in this section, means a consolidated body of land. State ex rel. Symms v. City 
ofMountain Home, 94 Idaho 528,531,493 P.2d 387,390 (1972)(citing Big Lost River I&ga6don 
Co. v. ~uv id son ,  2i  Idaho 160, 171-17s 121. P. 88 (1912)). 
The larger parcel issae is also ~ t a t e d  to the valuation of the part taken. In the City of 
CaldweIE v. Roark, 92 Idaho 99, 437 P.2d 615 (1968), the Court held that the value of the part 
taken should be detennined "with the whole parcel being sold in its then condition in one sale.)' 
Id. at 101, 617 (emphasis added). In that case, the court invalidated a valuation methdd that 
valued the t&e by comparing it to tlie market pfice of a small portion of the remainder parcel, 
. . 
not the whole .property itself. Similarly, it is error to not consider the correct lwger parcel when 
deciding the appEcable highest and best we of the property. State ex rel. Symms v. City of 
. - Mountain ~ o h e ,  94 Idaho 528,531,493 P.2d 387,390. 
Accordiigly, for the jury to analyze just compe11sation, the j q  must be supplied with a 
specific description of the larger parcel. Only after the jury knows .the bounds of the correct 
larger pweI,can t$e jury decide the highest and best use, value of property Men, and whether 
any damages .accrue to the larger parcel in excess of special benefits conferred. It is the court's 
. .- 
responsibility to decide the lnrger parcel. In State ex rel. Fiandro v. Seddon, 94 Idaho 940, 500 
P.2d 841, (Jply 28, 1972), the court held that the jm can only decide questions of just 
compensation. All other factual issues are to be resolved by the court. ld. at 943, 844. Flandro, 
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while not a larger parcel case, conoerned a f i  issue. The court held that whether or not an 
item was a f i m e  had .to be decided by the trial court. Only if and when the trial court decided 
the item in was a fixture would the jury be allowed to determine the value of the fixture. 
SimitwIy, in %e c w  at bar, it should be the Court that determines the larger parcel. Once the 
larger parcel is settled, the issue can then be given to the jury to determine just compensation. In 
both cases, the court describes the property and the jury values it. 
ITD is obligated to disclose and discuss ~ontrary dicta horn State ex rel. Symms v. City of 
Moanfain Home, 94 Idaho 528, 493 P.2d 387 (Feb 2, 1972). In that case, while reviewing the 
correctness of a larger parcel determination, the c o w  mentioned that ordinarily the larger parcel 
. .,. , 
question was-a practical questio~l for the jury. Id. 532, 391. Since that time, the court has 
specifically addressed'tke boundaries of what a jury may properly decide in an eminent domain 
case. Tt was the Fland~o case, decided later in 1972, that fast made it clear Pbat "in emineht 
domain proc6ediigs the ody issue for submission to a jury is the question of tke value of the 
property sought @ be taken or the amount of compensaljon for the W g . "  Flandro, 94 Idaho at 
943,500 P.2d at 844, Rlteth Jalso clarified that the role of the court was to provide the jury with 
both the "description of the propety or the right thexein which has been taken." Rueth 1; 100 
Idaho at 223, 596 P. 2d at 95. Since the larger parcel, determination anives at an accurate 
description of the property, under Flandro and Rueth I, it is a question for the court to resolve. 
B. T h e  Larger Parcel Dlspuk 
In the,case at bar, there is a dispute as to the larger parcel that needs to be resolved. The 
expert witnesses hired by each side disagree as to the larger parcel determination. For a correct 
resolution ofthis issue, the parties need to have a fair opporttmity to argue the applicable law as 
we31 as +he facts. The larger parcel answers vary froln expert to expert, and those answers will 
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vary dependkg on how the Court interprets the applicable law. Examples of the larger parcel 
dispute follow: 
. . 
I. .Roger Dunlap (Defense valuation witness). Mr. Dunlap analyzed the larger 
parcel and concludes that the larger parcel matched the legal description in the 
..'c,omplaint. (See Deposition Transcript of Roger L. Dunlap, Exhibit "A" to 
,Affidavit of Joseph D. Mallet in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Bifurcate,, at p. 
,, 110, LL. 8-1 1) (hepafter "Dualap Tr."). However, for purposes of valuing the 
taking, he assumed the property was taken from a 1-acre pad site. @ualap Tr. at 
: p. 165, LL. 5-14). This allowed him to use co&mable sales that indicated pad 
, , site values, not the value of the parcel described in the legal descriptiou. 
2. Mark Rickey (Defense valuation witness). h. Richey analyzed the larger parcel 
and concluded that the larger parcel was only the property described in the 
. 
. complaint. (See Deposition Transcript of Mark Richey, Exhibit "B" .to Affidavit 
. of Joseph D. Mallet in Support of Plainties Motion to Bifmoate, at p. 89, L. 24 to 
: p. 90, L. 3) (hereafter 'Richey Tr.")). 
3. _John Dillman (Plaintiff valuation witness). Mr. Dillman concluded the larger 
parcel included not only the subject property, but also at least the adjacent parcel 
to the east. (See Deposition Transcript of John Ditman, Exhibit "C' to Affidavit 
" ofJoseph D.  all& in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Bifurcate, at p. 13, L. 21 to 
p. 14, 1;. 12) @?mafter "Dillman Tr."). Mr. Dillman discussed that the larger 
parcel could be the four adjacent parcels. (Dillman TI. at p. 31, LL. 9-11). 
4. . Paul Hyde (Plaintiff valuation witness). While Mr. Hyae assessed damages to the 
subject property, calling that the larger parcel, he also discussed the fact that he 
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valued the sub.iecf property assuming that the highest and best use was to develop 
. .. 
with all four adjacent parcels 'developing together, which is essentially a larger 
parcel detwmination, (See Deposition Transcript of Paul Hyde, E&ibit to 
- . .  
Affidayit of Joseph D. Mallet in Suppo~t of Plaintiffs Motion to Bifurcate, at p. 7, 
,LL. 13-24) (hereafter "Hyde Tr."). Mr. Hyde analyzed the value of the subject 
p r o p w  assuming .&at it would at least develop in conjunc~on with the 
neighboring parcels. w e  Tr. at p. 103, L. 23 top. 104, L. 7). 
In addit& to the factual issues related to the hearget parcel issue, the Court also needs to 
clarify the applicable law. The parties dispute whether legaUy s a c i e n t  d t y  of ownership 
exists for the,iarger parcel to include .Ute neighboring parcels. In State ex ref. Symrns v. Nelson 
S a d a n d  Gravel, Inc., 93 Idaho 574,468 P.2d 306 (1970), the Idaho Supreme Court held that a 
larger parcel determination does not require a fee interest in each tract. Diering ownerships, 
such as a fee ownership in one parcel and a leasehold interest in another, are sufficient %r larger 
parcel purposes, Nelson Sand and CiPave1,93 Idaho at 581,468 P.2d at 313, 
The difense witnesses mistakeny believe that a larger parcel determination requires a 
paty to own the land in question in fee. Dunlap, for example, says his larger parcel 
determination would have been larger if suEcient unity of omersbip (a fee interest) existed. 
. . 
(Dunlap Tr. at p. 112, L. 23 to p. 115, L. 3). Richey also says the absence of common fee 
ownership caused him to fmd a smaller larger parcel. (Richey Tr. at p. 96, L. 10 to p. 97, I,. 14). 
Wbile finding no. Mty of o&sbiP, Richey admi& that the subject property is leased by the 
neighboring parcel, (Richey Tr, at p. 102, LL. 3-5). Correctly applying the Nelson Sand and 
Gruvel rule, both Dunlap and Richey would have different larger parcels. T h i s  law needs to be 
clarified and .applied by the COW% before the jury can determine just compensation. 
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Confusion on this issue aZs0 exists to the reality of the ownership of &e related pacels. 
J.C. and Margwet .~illims, at oae h e ,  owned a "parent parceY that has been split into four 
parts. (~ee:~%osition Transcript of C i a  Wills, Exhibit "E'to Affidavit of Joseph D. Matlet in 
Support of ~ l ~ n 6 f f s  Motion to Bifkcate, at p. 49, LL. 5-14) (hereafter "Wgls Tr."). b e  of 
theses parts 6 the subject parcel wblch is owned by the Cayon '(rista Family Limited 
PartnersMp. The children of J,C. and Margaret Williams, Linda Wis, Christie Wiiiiams, and 
ffary WiIi&ns, are all equal partners in that entity and recei~e equal disbursements of 
partnership.incpme. (Wills Tr, atg. 67, L. 1 to p. 69, L.6). The ownership of the KLS&M parcel 
to the west is the same. (WiUs Tr. at p. 59, L. 23 top. 60, L.8). Similarly, the puce1 to the east, 
the Lazy J p-arcel, is ,,owned by a corporation and the shareholders of that corporation are the 
same people who o , y ,  t&e adjacent parcels as partners. (Wills Tr. at p. 23, L. 6 to p. 24, L. 11). 
Ina  sitnation like this, where the same four people own four adjacent pieces of property 
.. .-. , 
under different business entities, the hequestion of unity of title for purposes of a larger parcel 
analysis is..a.fhtual determination that needs to be resolved before the jury can value damages. 
The parties dispute whether unity of title exists where the same people o m  adjacent propexties 
through different entities. TrT, argues Nelson Sand and Gravel only Tequtres that the same 
person bas an ownemhip interest in each of the two tracts. The Defendants, through their 
experts, argue that the different entity fee owners preclude a larger parcel determination 
including the.adjacent properties. This facbal and legd dispute must be resolved by the Court 
prior to allowing the jury. to detenni~~e just compensation. Under these circumstances, 
bifurcation is appropriate to resolve the issue prior to presenting the issue of  just compensation to 
the jury. 
For the above-stated reasons, IT73 ~pespectfdly requests that the Court bifwcate the trial in 
this matter to resolve the larger parcel issues prior to the jury's assessment of just compensation, 
"rr\ 
DATED this =by of May, 2007. 
~ e ~ u j $  Attorney General 
Idaho Depatment of Transportation 
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valuation witness, Mark Richey. Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by 
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I identifies the parcels that it is touching. 
2 So the first thing I do is I look at 
3 title to other adjacent properties. And then 1 
4 look at whether these properties have a similar 
5 highest and best use. So if you have a smaller 
6 property with a different zoning, and a different 
7 highest and best use, but it happens to be under 
8 the same ownership, I may call the smaller parce 
9 the larger parcel. 
10 And then the other thing I do is look 
11 at unity of title. Who owns the property is the 
?2 potential larger parcel. And then possibly 
13 narrow it down from there. 
14 Q. So you look at the governmental --you 
15 look at the parcel the government identifies to 
16 start with; correct? 
17 A. Right. 
18 Q. And you look to see if that tmly is 
19 what the market would consider 
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1 was. 
2 Do you believe that that is the same 
3 highest and best use for adjacent parcels on both 
4 sides? 
5 A. It's very similar. I can't recall 
6 exactly what it was on Lazy J or KLS&M right now. 
7 But I think it was really similar. 
8 Q. It is your opinion, then, if not 
9 identical, they are substantially the same? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. So in the highest and best use factor 
12 we actual])/ got a check mark. I mean, that is 
13 present on that one factor in your analysis; 
14 correct? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. You don't see any barriers related to 
17 the highest and best use -- nothing about the 
18 highest and best use of the neighboring parcels 
would cause you to make a larger parcel 
I A. Well, you need to know what you are 
2 appraising. Once you come up with your larger 
3 parcel, that is your subject property. And that 
4 is what you appraise. 
5 Q. Did you perform that analysis in this 
6 case? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. And what was your determination? 
9 A. The determination is the legal 
10 description in the complaint is the larger 
11 parcel. 
12 Q. And what was it that made you decide 
13 use that as your larger parcel in this case? 
14 A. Well, the highest and best use is a 
15 mixed used center as illustrated on this diagram3 
16 And there are no other contiguous parcels that 
17 are owned by the same folks. I guess that's the 
18 end of the analysis. 
19 Q. Okay. So you gave me three factors. 
20 And you applied those three factors. And the 
21 result was the parcel that we've identified is 
22 lhe larger parcel? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Now, highest and best use of the 
25 subject property You have just stated what thaP5 
M & M COURT REPORTING 
20 purposes of development? 20 determination than what you have done? 
21 A. Right. A. No. You're correct. 
22 Q. Did I state that accurately? Q. And the second factor was -- or it may 
23 A. Right. Plus, the ownership. have been the first factor you gave me. The next 
24 Q. Right. And that is relevant to you factor is whether or not the parcels are 
25-co.n.ti.gaaus--lslhatc~~reL- 
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1 A. Right. 
2 Q. You called it contiguity? 
3 A. Right. 
4 Q. Whether that's a word or not, I think I 
5 know what you are mean. They are touching each 
6 other. They are next to each other. ' Right? 
7 A. That is a word. 
8 Q. Okay. So you look at the Lazy J parcel 
9 on the east. And what we call the KLS&M parcel 
10 on the west. In fact, the BCM&W parcel -- let's 
11 go one more further on the west. 
tcV2 The BCM&W is not contiguous; is it? 
13 A. To the subject; no. 
14 Q. But the two adjacent parcels that I 
5 have just identified, they are contiguous, and 
16 share the same highest and best use? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. So far so good. It loolcs like we have 
19 a larger parcel as of these two factors; correct? 
20 A. Correct. 
21 Q. We move down to the unity of title. 
22 A. Right. 
23 Q. And that is the sole reason that you 
24 have determined the lar er parcel to be only the 
subject panel? 
~ X H  I BIT NO, 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. And what was it that made you decide 
3 there wasn't sufficient unity oftitle? 
4 A. There are different companies that own 
5 three different parcels. 
6 Q. And the companies would be? On the 
7 subject we have Canyon Vista -- 
8 A. LLC. 
9 Q. It's a limited family partl~ership, I 
1 0  think. 
1 1 A. I think it's limited liability company. 
1 2  But I could be wrong. 
1 3  Q. Whichever the entity is. We've got 
74 that entity. Aiid Lazy J is owned by the Lazy J 
1 5 Ranch Corporation? 
1 6  A. Something like that. 
17 Q. Because those two are different 
18 entities, that is the basis of your determination 
1 9  that unity of title didn't exist? 
20  A. Yes. 
21  Q. And because unity of title didn't 
2 2  exist, for that sole reason you have taken the 
2 3  larger parcel only as the subject property? 
24  A. I should say I started with the premise 
2~.-that-.th6l6ga;l-d~~~i~~i.OR-i~~O~fe~~R-t$g~~~ 
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1 Q. Now, you said it's possible. Is it 
2 likely that would have occurred? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. What effect, if any, would that have 
5 had on your valuation in this case, in your 
6 opinion? 
7 A. I don't know. I can't do that 
8 appraisal on the fly. 
9 Q. Too big for you to say as you sit here 
1 0  today? 
1 1 A. Yeah. 
1 2  Q. Is it possible it would have had a 
13 difference? Is it possible it would have made a 
14 difference? 
1 5  A. Yes. 
16 Q. It seems like your severance damage 
1 7  determination that the subject parcel is 
18 landlocked, your determination that there is 
1 9  damages because it is legally landlocked, that 
20  aspect would go away if the larger parcel 
21 included all three parcels; would it not? 
22 A. It would be different. Now, if it had 
2 3  access somehow through adjacent parcels -- for 
24 instance, if there was one here (indicating), and 
2Lone-be-1e(i. d-icat-in~)~-w~~1d-'E-hat--bead@~~ty$~ 
1 complaint. You know, if you legally described 
2 this, and this property was also owned by Canyon 
3 Vista, LLC, I would say, "Wait a millute. How 
4 come there is two different lawsuits or two 
5 different complaints?" But I saw no reason to 
6 include other propefiies, because they are not 
7 owned by the same entity. 
8 Q. Now, ifthey were, hypothetically, 
9 owned by the same entity, would your highest and 
10 best -- would your larger parcel determination 
1 1 have been different? 
12 A. Very possible. 
1 3  Q. It seeins like unity of title was the 
74 one aspect that bumped it down to the size that 
1 5  you have determined. If that made any sense to 
16 you. Go ahead and answer. 
17  It seemed like unity of title was the 
18 sole factor for you determining the iarger parcel 
19 that you did. And I gave you a hypothetical. If 
20 we would have had unity of ownership, or, as you20 
21 call it, unity of title on the two adjacent 
22 properties, is it possible that your larger 
23 parcel would have been all three of the parcels? 
24 Being Lazy J, Canyon Vista, and ICLS&M? 
25 A. Yes. 
1 drain the whole property? And would all three of 
2 these properties be worth less? Maybe Lazy J and 
3 KLS&M have value now that would be lower if they 
4 had to share access with this middle parcel. I 
5 don't know. That's a biggy. That would be 
6 another assignment. 
7 Q. Ican appreciate the fact that that is 
8 a complex question. 
9 If you can tell me, would you assume 
10 that a larger parcel of all three, including all 
11 three properties we just discussed, would you 
12 assume that that deter~ni~latioii would give you 
13 less severance damages overall? Or can you even 
14 say? 
15 A. I can't say. 
16 MR. MALLET: Off the record. 
17 (A discussion was held off the record.) 
18 (Noon recess taken.) 
19 Q. (BY MR. MALLET) Before our lunch break 
we were speaking about the large parcel issue. 
21 And your large parcel determination in this case. 
22 I want to switch gears a iittle bit and talk 
23 about a co~icept called assemblage. 
24 Are you familiar with that co~icept? 
125 A. Yes. 
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1 whole parcel. If I were to buy this whole larger 
2 parcel at $5.50 a square foot in the before; 
3 correct? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Your $9.50 a square foot, isn't that 
6 essentially what a purchaser would pay for -- I 
7 want to say a pad site on the front. Is that 
8 fair to say? If I were to buy a pad site on the 
9 front, or if I were to sever off something in 
10 that band on the front, sever off a pad site, 1 
11 would pay $9.50 for that as a purchaser? 
12 A. Yeah. And let me just clarify that. 
13 $9.50 coiltemplates selling off an acre of land 
14 with frontage on Pole Line. There is some 
15 confusion in the market and in our terminology 
16 when we talk about real estate. Sometimes pad4 
17 mean that you sell this area off to a potential 
18 user. And the parking lot has been installed. 
19 And all of the utilities been stubbed to this 
20 building. And the oilly thing that is there is a 
21 little piece of dirt where they can drop in the 
22 building and everything is ready to go. That is 
23 not what I'm thinking of when I say pad sites. 
24 Q. I'm with you. What are you describing 
~ ~ - i . n . . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ w . ~ ~ t ~ y ~ ~ . . h ~ ~ ~ ~ u ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~  
a g e  1 6 6  
1 A. I'm thinking of a pad site with a 
2 one-acre -- approximately one-acre site that is 
3 suitable for a user to develop a building, as 
4 well as a parking lot. 
5 Q. I appreciate you clarifying that. I 
6 was having trouble formulating my question. Antt6 
1 site for the sake of our discussion right now to 
2 avoid confusion? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Okay. Under that definition of a pad 
5 site, if I were to come up with this piece of 
6 property in the before, and want one of those pad 
7 sites, and I were to buy it, you are saying $9.50 
8 a square foot; right? 
9 A. I'tn saying that is the price for the 
10 dirt. 
I 1  Q. Right. 
12 A. The one acre of dirt undeveloped. 
13 Q. The one acre of dirt undeveloped. So 
14 that $9.50 a square foot equates to what you 
15 would sell a piece of -- sever off and sell a 
6 piece of the front dirt to a purchaser? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. You would call that the economy scale? 
19 What do you call that when the individual pait in 
20 the front has a higher price than what a 
21 purchaser would be induced to pay for the whole 
22 parcel? What do you attribute that to? 
23 A. Proximity, access, and size. 
24 Q. Those are all characteristics unique to 
2 ..-Mr~at.-we..a~a .].i.~gaaapad.si.teL Page  168  
1 A. Right. 
2 Q. Now, you could have taken the approach 
3 to where you assessed the value by determining 
4 what would be -- what price would be paid by one 
5 buyer for the whole parcel; correct? You could 
have done that? 
7 that, 1 think, was the part I was having trouble 
8 with. 
9 So if you've got a shopping center that 
10 is almost 90 percent built out. There may be a 
11 little square of dirt up there with a parking 
12 lot. Services stubbed out. Everything of that 
13 nature. And somebody is going to come by and 
14 stick a coffee shop, or a Jack in the Box, or 
15 something on that square of dirt. 
16 That is what some people refer to as a 
17 pad site; correct? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. My question was -- and I think it was 
20 in line of what you are thinking. What do you 
21 call it when you have your band of value up here,21 
22 and you're conte~nplating the whole site that 
23 would be encoinpassed for that use? In other 
24 words, not only that little square of dirt, but 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. But you chose not to? 
9 A. Right. 
10 Q. Now, at the date of the take there was 
11 no platted pad site on this property; was tl~ere? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. It is still your opiiiion that a market 
14 existed for one of those at the date of the take? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. So you basically decide what a 
17 purchaser would pay in the future for land in one 
18 of those smaller pad sites and that is what you 
19 assign to the take? 
20 A. I11 the future? 
Q. At the date of the take. Excuse me. 
22 Would you like me to rephrase that? 
23 A. Yes, please. 
24 Q. You basically decide what a purchaser 
25 the parking lot and -- can we call that a pad I25 would pay at the date of the take for land in one 
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1 control on those roads have to reflect the 
2 inoveinent of traffic through urban areas. So 
3 access has changed and I expect it to continually 
4 change to ease the flow of traffic through most 
5 all the towns in Idaho. 
6 Q. So is it fair to say that as cities or 
7 co~nrnunities grow their access policies become 
8 more restrictive kind of as a general 
9 proposition? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Have you observed this in Twin Falls? 
12 A. I observed it, yes. 
1 3  Q. Certainly Twin Falls is a classic 
14  example of a lural coinmunity that is being 
1 5  affected by a lot of growth; is it not? 
16  A. Yes. 
17 Q. When you appraised this property, my 
18 understanding of your work and what you've don 
19 is that your larger parcel determination 
20 coincides with the way ITD has identified this 
21 parcel; is that correct? 
22 A. Well, that would be partly due to it 
23  and also it's the ownership of record. 
24 Q. Without respect yet to the reasons why, 
ge 90 
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1 analysis; why didn't you just go in and take 
2 ITD's parcel they've identified and use that as 
3 your large parcel; why does it matter to you as 
4 an appraiser? 
5 A. Well, s o ~ n e t i ~ ~ ~ e s  the properties that you 
6 are appraising that's identified in a project 
7 reflect a larger parcel and sometinles they don't. 
8 Q. Why do you even care what the larger 
9 parcel is, is what I'm asking; why does it matter 
?O to you? 
11 A. Because it determines the highest and 
12 best use. 
1 3  Q. Other than the fact that it relates to 
14 the highest and best use, is it useful to you at 
1 5  all? 
16 A. It defines the larger parcel that I'm 
17 appraising. 
:I 8 Q. I understand that is what it does. I'm 
1 9  asking you why that matters. You seem to say it 
20 inatters for highest and best use. Does it matter 
21 for any other reason? 
22 A. It matters for highest and best use 
23 because you measure the effects of the project 
2 4  against the highest and best use. Should this 
2 ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ . ~ . ~ ~ ~ n d e r s t a ~ ~ i . n ~ ~ . t h a t - ~ ~ 5 - - - j u s t - ~ e a ~ . ~ a . ~ - l - p a ~ ~ e 1 ~ - a - s . m a 1 ~ ~ 1 ~ e g a ~ 1 - p a r 6 ~ ~ - a n d -  age 92 
1 parcel is exactly the same as the parcel 
2 identified in ITD's complaint? 
3 A. I believe it is. 
4 Q. When you undertake your larger parcel 
5 determination, do you consider it persuasive the 
6 way ITD has addressed the properties? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. In other words, you really don't care 
9 what ITD says the larger parcel is, you make yo=- 
10  own; is that right? 
11 A. I malte my own; that is correct. 
12 Q. It just happens in this case that your 
13 larger parcel coincides with ITD's parcel in this 
14  case? 
1 5  A. It coincides. 
16 Q. How is the larger parcel determination 
17 relevant to your valuation? 
18 A. It generally determines the contiguity 
19 of use, contiguity of ownership, continuity of 
20 use and ownership. It's part and parcel to the 
21 valuation of the property. 
22  Q. When you say it's part and parcel to 
23 the deterillination of the value of the property, 
24 how does that affect the outcome, a sillaller 
25 versus a larger; why do you even do this 
1 the project affects the use of that property 
2 stand alone, that is the parcel. 
3 Q. What about severance damages, does it 
4 have any relationship to severance damages or 
5 your assessment of severance damages in the case? 
6 A. The larger parcel; is that your 
7 question? 
8 Q. That is my question. 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. How is that related? 
11 A. Severance damages can be reflected by 
12 change in highest and best use. 
13  Q. We've talked about your general 
14  approach to determining the highest and best use 
15  and why you do it. Did you do that analysis in 
16 this case? 
17 A. Did I do the highest and best use 
18 analysis? 
19 Q. Yes. Actually, I'm asking about the 
20 larger parcel ailalysis. I'm sorry. 
21 Did you undertake that in this case? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. You gave me three factors, you said 
24 use, I believe, you looked at, ownership, and 
25 whether the properties a 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. While that is generally the analysis 
3 you apply to your larger parcel determinations, 
4 is that the analysis you applied in this case? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. The result of  that analysis was that 
7 the property we've described in the complaint is 
8 the larger parcel? 
9 A. Yes. 
1 0  Q. When you look at neighboring parcels 
11 the subject property, say, the Lazy J parcel, for 
1 2  example, are there similar uses on the property 
1 3  right now or at the date of the take? 
1 4  A. Yes. 
1 5  Q. Are the highest and best uses similar, 
16 in your opinion? 
1 7  A. I haven't done one on the Lazy 3, so I 
18 can't answer that. 
1 9  Q. As  you sit here today, do you have an 
20 opinion on whether the highest and best use is 
21  likely the same? 
22 A.  I don't know. 1 don't really know how 
23 the Lazy J fits with all the adjacent properties 
24 and what the access scenarios are. I can't 
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1 Q. You've done the KLS&M property. Let's 
2 look to that side. Is the highest and best use 
3 similar between these two properties, KLS&M and 
4 the subject? 
5 A. In what condition? 
6 Q. In the before condition. 
7 A. Similar. 
8 Q. So it looks like on your use leg of 
9 your analysis you've got the use at the time of 
10  the take is similar to at least one of the 
11 adjacent properties; correct? 
1 2  A. Similar highest and best use, that's 
1 3  correct. 
14  Q. Well, not only the highest and best 
1 5  use, but you've got the mobile home park use that 
1 6  spills over on to the KLS&M property, occupies 
17 the Canyon Vista property and the Lazy J as well; 
1 8  right? 
1 9  A. Well, I believe the manufactured units 
20 that slop over from the Lazy J park that is 
21 located on Canyon View, some of those units, just21 
22 due to the line of the legal description, flop 
23 over o11to KLS&M property. I don't think there is 
24 a technically improved mobiie home park, an 
25 economic entity mobile home park constructed on 
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1 KLS&M. I think there is just some survey 
2 discrepancy where they fall over. So highest and 
3 best uses are similar, but the existing uses 
4 would be different. 
5 Q. So we are talking about your larger 
6 parcel determination in this case. When you are 
7 looking at that use factor, just as to that 
8 factor, it looks like you've got some uses that 
9 are common between the adjoining properties on 
tc11O both sides; is that correct? 
11 A. Well, that happens with ahnost any 
12 property you would ever appraise has some common 
1 3  uses. 
14 Q. We are just talking about the use leg. 
15 I understand you gave me three legs of analysis. 
16 But just as to the use leg, it seems like what 
17 you are telling me is you've got this prong 
18  satisfied as to the neighboring parcels, at least 
19 this prong; is that your opinion? 
20 A. On the highest and best use they have 
21 similar highest and best uses. 
22 Q. But that is not the end of your 
23 analysis; is it? If it was, you'd have a larger 
24 parcel of possibly three or four other parcels; 
2! i -wouldyounoL-  
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1 A. Right. They don't have common 
2 ownership. 
3 Q. One of the other factors was contiguity 
4 1 think you said, whether they are contiguous or 
5 whether they are next to each other. Certainly 
6 the parcels we are talking about, the IUS&M and 
7 Lazy J, are contiguous to the subject property; 
8 are they not? 
9 A. They are contiguous. 
10 Q. We've bumped through two of the factors 
11 and so far it looks like we've got those 
12 satisfied. I take it you get hung up on the 
13 third one, that is ownership? 
14 A. Yes. 
15  Q. If there were common ownership between . ' . 
16 all three ofthe parcels, would you have made a 
17 larger parcel determination that was greater than 
18  the one you made in this case? 
19 A. There is common ownerships between the 
20 two parcels or I should say common interests 
between the two parcels. It's my understanding 
22 the ownership of the subject property is sole and 
23 separate from the ownership of the KLS&M property 
24 even though they are related entities. The owner 
25 of the subject property doesn't have 100 percent 
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I interest in the subject property because those 
2 shares or whatever are being transferred out 
3 through estate planning through a family 
4 partnership. 
5 I believe the KL,S&M parcel, the owner 
6 there doesn't own 100 percent interest, but has a 
7 majority interest lilce the subject property, 
8 awaiting additional shares to be gifled through 
9 estate plaiming and via a family partnership. 
10 But it's also my understanding that those parcels 
1 1 were all created -- they were created prior to 
12 the project and the project caused the change of 
13 access to each of those parcels that were 
1 4  created. 
15 Q. You have read Christy Williams' 
16 deposition; is that correct? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Is that where you base your opinion of 
19 the ownership or information you received from 
20 her, is that the basis for your opinion that the 
21 larger parcel determination as far as the 
22 neighboring parcels fails on the ownership prong't22 
2 3  A. I think you asked two or three 
24 questions in there. Could you repeat that for 
2S-.lae,-p1eas&,- P a g e  98 
1 Q. I'd be happy to reask it. 
2 It loolcs like you've considered the 
3 ownership prong in your larger parcel 
4 determination and you think that the adjoining 
5 properties fail that common ownership 
6 requirement; is that correct? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. You get that information from where 
9 that leads you to that determination? 
10 A. Well, it's contained in that 
11 deposition, but also at a meeting years ago they 
12 described the ownership in those three parcels 
13 when we had the meeting at the ciubi~ouse. 
1 4  Q. Now, tile Lazy J Ranch Mobile I-Iome Par134 
15 or manufactured home park has a use that Lazy J 
16 parcel and Canyon Vista parcel share; does it 
17 not? 
18 A. Is a use that they share, that's 
19 correct. 
20 Q. In other words, this operating mobile 
21 home park, which is apparently named Lazy J 
22 Ranch, it is cited on both of these, the Lazy J 
23 and the Canyon Vista parcels? 
24 A. It covers both of tliose parcels, that's 
25 correct. 
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1 Q. Now, when you are looking at the 
2 current use of the property, do you believe or is 
3 it your understanding that the Lazy J Ranch 
4 Corporation that OWITS the Lazy J property, that 
5 they have some sort of a lease or right of use 
6 over the Canyon Vista property? 
7 A. They have a lease over at least a 
8 portion of the property. 
9 Q. "This property" being the subject 
10 property? 
1 1 A. Over the subject property, that's 
12 correct. 
1 3  Q. I lulow my question may have been a 
14 little confusing, so I want to clarify. 
15 You believe that the Lazy J parcel 
16 owners have a lease on the subject property? 
17 A. Well, let me review the lease to be 
18 accurate on that. There is a lease in there and 
19 I have a copy of the lease in my file and I would 
20 like to review that before I answer that 
21 question. 
Q. That would be  fine. 
23 A. Can we take a break? 
24 MR. MALLET: Actually, that's a good 
~ 5 . i d e a 7 - ~ @ t ~ a ~ ~ ~ a - b ~ e a I ~  .I.------ Page  1 0 0  
1 (Recess taken.) 
2 Q. (BY MR. MALLET) We are back on the 
3 record after a short break. 
4 Before we left we were talking about 
5 your opinion that there was some sort of a lease 
6 by the owners of the Lazy J parcel over the 
7 subject property and you qualified that by 
8 saying: I've got a document I need to look at to 
9 give you the real answer. Have you had that 
1 0 document in front of you? 
I 1  A. Yes. 
1 2  Q. What, if anything, does that tell you 
13 about the possibility or the certainty that the 
Lazy J owners have a lease over the subject 
1 5  property? 
16 A. It just sl~ows the parties to the lease 
17 and when it was made. So what I wanted to 
7 8 confinn is that the Lazy J did have the lease on 
19 it. When you asked me the question, I knew there 
20 was a related entity that had the lease, the 
21 mobile home park, but I didn't know, at the time 
22 1 wasn't prepared to answer I k ~ e w  hat entity 
23 that was. But it does look like the Lazy J 
24 Mobile Home Ranch does have a lease on the 
25 subject property for the mobile home portion of 
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1 the property. 
2 Q. I apologize, we took a break and I 
3 can't remember what I have or haven't asked yo1,3 
4 so I may reask a couple questions. But just to 
5 make sure we are on the same page, it's your 
6 understanding that the Lazy J Mobile Ranch, Inc 
7 is the owner of the Lazy J parcel? 
8 A. No, that's not my understanding. I 
9 don't know who owns the Lazy J parcel. All I'm 
10 commenting on is the lease between the Lazy J 
11 Mobile Home Ranch and the part of the subject 
1 2  property it affects. I believe a previous family 
.. . 
1 3  partnership created this lease prior to the -- 
1 4  prior to the creation of the current ownership. 
1 5  I think the current owners are successors in 
1 6  title to this property. 
1 7  Q. Where you see a use that occupies the 
1.8 .Lazy J parcel and the subject parcel, do you 
1 9  assume that there are leases in favor of cross- 
20  leases or leases in favor of one property owner 
21- over the other; how do you account for that in 
2 2  your opinion when you are appraising this 
23 property; what do you think the facts are; what 
24 did you assume for purposes of your opinion? 
. 2~~~~-hat-t.h~~eis-a-l.ea.sef~rthe-mab~~~2~-2Qappr0xi~matdy-eq~a1si~p8-r-~~1s-an$~~~ 
1 determination, would it matter if separate 
2 parcels were created but not through the legal 
subdivision process? 
4 A. I don't really know what you are asking 
5 me. You can create whatever parcel you want in 
.6  the state of Idaho. S o  I don't know what you are 
7 asking me regarding to subdivision. 
8 Q. I'll give you a hypothetical. The day 
9 before the date of the take if the owners of the 
10 subject property were to have created 20 leases 
11 and sold this parcel in 20 different 
12 approximately 1-acre parcels to other people, 
13 would you consider each of those parcels as the 
14 larger parcel or how would that affect, if it 
1 5  would, your larger parcel determination? I may 
16 need to reask that, let me know if I do. 
1 7  A. You said they created 20. It's a 
18  hypothetical question, but you said they created 
1 9  20 leases? 
20 Q. Twenty lots. 
21 A. Twenty lots? 
22 Q. Yes. 
23 In other words, if the owner of the 
24 property gets deeds and divides their parcel into 
1 home occupation on the subject property for that 
2 use. 
3 Q. Whatever the lease may be, there is 
4 some sort of lease; is that your opinion? 
5 . A. Yes. 
6 Q. Now, we've been talking about the 
7 larger parcel determination before our break. I 
8 would like to continue on, at least for a time, 
9 on that issue. 
1 0  . . When you are looking at the way these 
11 parcels were created and the timing and how it 
12 was done, do you have any opinions as to whether 
1 3 t h e  KLS&M property and the subject property w e d 3  
14 legally subdivided from each other? 
1 5  , A. Do I have an opinion if they were 
16 legally subdivided from each other? 
17' Q: Yes. 
18  A. No. 
19 Q. Did you make any assumptions of that 
20 nature when you formulated your opinion in this 
21 case? 
22 A. They are each legal parcels of record 
23 and as far as the legality of a subdivision, I 
24 don't have an opinion to that. 
25 Q. As far as your larger parcel 
1 them away to other people; would that affect your 
2 larger parcel determination on the next day, the 
3 date of the take? 
4 A. It may. 
5 Q. Now, if they didn't go through a 
6 subdivision process, in other words, those splits 
7 were not created through a subdivision or they 
8 didn't avail themselves of the subdivision 
9 requirements to maice those smaller divisions of 
10 their properiy, would that matter to you? 
11 A. It may not in the hypothetical you are 
12 describing because I believe you can survey and 
divide any parcel pretty much any way you want to 
14 in the state of Idaho. If you break, if you 
15 create what they call maybe an illegal 
16 subdivision parcel, it depends on what the county 
17 records are, the ones that are illegal you 
18 couldn't build a house on them. And since you 
19 are not putting houses on that parcel, it 
20 probably wouldn't have a big effect on it because 
21 you are going to go through the entitlement 
22 process to put the property to its highest and 
23 best use anyway and cure those issues. 
24 Q. So in other words, if that were screwed 
25 up, if the creating of the lots was done outside 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Okay. Is this updating a specific page 
3 of the report? 
4 A. I'd have to look at the report, but 
5 there was a math error on --here's the sulnmary of 
6 it. It had to do with the summary of the 
7 remainder value, and explained the error. It was 
8 a thousand-dollar error, so the compensation would 
9 have been 326 instead of 327. 
1 0  Q. Okay. And when did you discover that? 
11 A. Saturday. 
1 2  Q. This past Saturday? 
13 A. Yes. 
1 4  Q. So you have refreshed yourself on your 
15 2003 report? 
1 6  A. Yes. 
1 7  Q. Do you believe that report was an 
1 8  accurate assessment of fair compensation as of 
1 9  July 30th, 2003? 
20 A. With the correction to the 326, yes. 
2 1 Q.  Okay. Why did you in your 2003 report 
22 appraise the Canyon Vista as a stand-alone 
2 3  property, and in your update combine it with 
24 parcel 191 
2 5 A. The more I was involved in the project, 
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1 and particularly the four parcels owned by the 
2 Williams extended family unit, it was clear to me 
3 that the larger parcel was not an individual 
4 property, that the mobile home park, the Lazy J 
5 Mobile Home Ranch, was operated as a single entity 
6 across three properties. And 95 percent of them 
7 were on parcels 19 and 41, and I concluded that 
8 was a larger parcel. And I concluded that parcels 
9 16 and 40 were a separate larger parcel. And at 
1 0  the advice of counsel, I use those two different 
11 units as larger parcels, but the compensation was 
1 2  allocated out to each different parcel separately. 
13 Q. As an appraiser how do you properly 
1 4  determine the larger parcel? 
1 5  A. It has to do with ownership, use, and 
1 6  particularly the proximity to each other. 
17  Q. Is there a definition of larger parcel 
1 8  that you use? 
1 9  A. Basically, the three components that 1 
20 just gave you define a larger parcel. But it has 
2 1  to be somewhat flexible; il might not have ali 
2 2  three -- ownership, unity of use, and contiguity 
23 -- ail, in eveiy case. 
2 4  Q. And how do you use the three factors to 
25 determine what the iarger parcel consists of! 
John Dillman 
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1 A. You look at the property you are 
2 appraising. You look at the ownership, you look 
3 at the use. 
4 Q. Do you look at the current use or the 
5 highest and best use? 
6 A. You have to look at both. Current use 
7 could be the highest and best use. 
8 Q. I,etis deal with the ownership issue 
9 first. How did you analyze that and determine the 
1 0  larger parcel in doing your Canyon Vista 
11 appraisal? 
1 2  A. The original tract owned by the 
1 3  Wiliianis family was about 82 acres. Originally, 
1 4  it was subdivided -- not subdivided. It was split 
1 5  into two properties: Lazy J, and J and M 
1 6  Investments. And in November of 2001, J and M 
1 7  Investments split their area into three.tracts of 
1 8  land which are now known as parcels 41, 16, and 
1 9  40; for the project, not the joint legal 
2 0 descriptions. 
2 1  Q. When was the property originally split 
22 Into Lazy J and J and M? 
2 3  A. I don't have a date on the Lazy J, 
24  which occurred heforeNovember of 2001. But the 
25 other split occurred on November 2nd, I believe, 
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1 2001. 
2 Q.  How do you know Lazy J was split off 
3 before 20017 
4 A. There was a reference in my 2002 
5 appraisals where -- no, that's not quite right. 
6 Tlie original set of plans showed parcel 19 as 
7 Lazy J and the other three as parcel 16. So based 
8 on that, I assumed that Lazy J had been separated 
9 before the other three properties. They conid 
1 0  have all occurred at once in November of 2001. 
11 But there is no record that I have, there is 
1 2  nothing in the title report that shows that. 
1 3  . Q. That shows what? 
1 4  A. I'm sorry? 
1 5  Q. There's nothing in the title report 
1 6  that shows what? 
1 7  A. That it was split off earlier than 
1 8  that. 
1 9  Q. And is that why, throughout your 2007 
20 appraisal report, you reference all four as being 
2 1  split at the same time? 
22 A. Yes. 
2 3 Q. When you read that report, you were 
24 under the impression that all four were split at 
25  the same time. 
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1 hasn't changed. 
2 Q. What did you conciude about the highest 
3 and best use before the taking of the Lazy J piece 
4 standing aione? 
5 A. Same conclusion. 
6 Q. What did you conciude about the KLSMN, 
7 or parcel 16 piece, standing alone? 
8 A. Same conciusion. 
9 Q.  How about BCM&W on the corner -- 
1 0  A. Same conclusion. 
11 Q. You need to let me finish my question 
1 2  for the record. 
1 3  What was your conclusion of the highesl 
1 4  and best use BCM&W standing alone? 
1 5  A. Same conclusion. 
1 6  Q.  So all four pieces in your view have 
1 7  the same highest and best use; correct? 
1 8  MR. MALLET: Object to the question. The 
1 9  form of the question is not ciear whether you are 
20 asking him in the before or the after. 
2 1 MS. CUNNINGHAM: In the before. 
22  THE WITNESS: In the before, the highest and 
2 3  best use is to deveiop ail four of them in one 
24 master plan, one C-l PUD. 
2 5  Ill 
- 
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1 BY MS. CUNNINGHAM: 
2 Q. So for highest and best use purposes, 
3 why wouldn't that poinl to the larger parcels 
4 being all four pieces then? 
5 A. Well, like 1 said, reanalyzing the 
6 property over the years that I have spent on this 
7 project, 1 reconsidered my original conclusions in 
8 that the property would have to be developed 
9 together to maximize the benefits to the 
1 0  ownership. And it was clear that the ownership 
11 stretched across three, at least three of the 
1 2  properties that were operated as the Lazy J. 
13 So I changed my opinion about the 
1 4  larger parcei. The highest and best use never 
1 5  changed. The broad highest and best use for 
1 6  redeveiopment sometime in the future is commeicial 
1 7  and residential. 
18 Q. You said that the three prongs of 
1 9  determining the larger parcel were ownership, use, 
2 0  and contiguity, ~neaning whether or not the 
2 1  propenies are contiguous to one another; correcl? 
2 2  A. Yes, correct. 
2 3 Q So if we look at ail Four pieces, under 
24 your analysis they wouid have common ownership 
2 5  because they are all somehow tied into the family, 
John Dillman 
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1 and that is aii that's required; correct? In your 
2 view? 
3 A. In my opinion, yes. 
4 Q. And all four of them have the same 
5 highest and hest use; correct? In the before? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. And ail four are contiguous; correct? 
8 A. Correct. 
9 Q. So why isn't the larger parcel all 
1 0  four? 
11 A. The larger parcel could be ali four. 
1 2  Q. Yes, it could. Why isn't it? 
13 A. Well, 1 think it had to do with the 
1 4  fact that the parcei numbers were developed by the 
1 5  Highway Department, that the ownership required 
1 6  compensation to each of the four iildividuals and 
1 7  not as one lump sum, and that the value 
1 8  conclusions were the same for each iarger parcel. 
1 9  So in effect, it was appraised as one larger 
20 parcel. The beforevalue of each parcel is the 
2 1  same as the -- same as the after value. 
22 But you're right. In retrospect, it 
23 couid have been appraised as one parcel. 
24 Q. Are you saying, in effect it was -- one 
25 larger parcei as all four because your values were 
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1 the same in the before, or similar; and your 
2 values were the same in the after in each separate 
3 appraisal? 
4 MR. MALLET: Object to the form. 
5 THE WITNESS: Well, I'll retract that. 
6 There's two larger parcels: One is improved, with 
7 95 percent of the mobile home park. The other 
8 larger parcel is mostly cropland. 
9 BY MS. CUNNINGHAM: 
1 0  Q. Would you agree that the current use is 
11 not as important as the highest and best use when 
1 2  you are appraising property for condemnation? 
1 3  A. Yes. 
1 4  Q. Would you agree that when you're 
1 5  determining the larger parcel, the highest and 
1 6  best use is what you need to look at as far as 
1 7  unity of use? 
1 8  A. Yes. 
1 9  Q. And that is more imponant than the 
20 current use in  that context; correct? 
2 1 A. If it's in the changing market, yes. 
2 2 Q. And this is a changing market; correct? 
23 A. Yes, it is. 
24 Q. And it was in 2004? 
2 5  A. 11 was ii12004, yes. 
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that time for business valuations. 
Q. What projects have you worked for ITD 
doing condemnation work? 
A. Let's see. As best 1 recall there was 
a mobile home park in Idaho Falls. There's 
been -- it was the Fearless Farris property there 
in Nampa. And there's been, let's see, three on 
this Twin Falls project. It seemed like there was 
another one someruhere, too, hut Lhose are the one 
I can remember offthe top of my head. 
Q. What other properties did you appraise 
in Twin Falls? 
A. Two of the parcels that were next to 
this one, the Lazy J. aiid then the KLS&M. 
Q. Did you ever do any work on the comer 
parcel BCM&W? 
A .  NO. 
Q. Before we begin today, are there any 
changes that you'd like to make to your March 7, 
2007 report in this matter? 
A. I just wanted to clarify perhaps the 
discussion in the cover letter dealing with the 
larger parcel. As 1 read through it last night, I 
realized that 1 didn't clarify what is mentioned 
later on in the report. 
A. Six or seven. 
Q. How recently? 
A. I just finished one last week. 
Q. What would be the first condemnation 
report that you did, what point in your career? 
A. Probably three or four years ago. 
Q. So you've only been doing condemnation 
work for the last three or four years? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you ever done any condemnation 
work for property owners? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What percentage ofyour condemnation 
work's been for owners? 
A. I guess probably one out of six, so 
that would be, what, whatever pcrcentage that 
works out to, a little less than 20 percent. 
Q. Out of the five that you've done for 
condemnors, would those all be for ITD? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And how did you come to start 
appraising for ITD in condemnation? 
A. I received a phone call, oh, it's been 
a couple, a number of years ago from a Scott 
Campbell. They were interested particularly at 
- 
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Q. Okay. I would agree. Why don't you 
tell me what you'd like to change in that regard. 
A. Just that I considered the larger 
parcel issue in this case, the main concern is the 
unity of ownership as to whether or not that 
exists and view that as a legal matter. And so I 
really collsidered the legal -- from the position 
just the one parcel, the Canyon Vista parcel, this 
parcel 41 is probably, as I mentioned later, is my 
larger parcel. However, as you gathered through 
the report, I still considered all four parcels in 
highest and best use considerations. 
Q. Okay. If I understand you correctly, 
you're saying that the larger parcel that you've 
appraised and valued is specifically only parcel 
4 1 ; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. However, in your view, the property 
would he developed together all four for highest 
and best use purposes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. And that's true in your 
view both before and after the taking; correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When you say unity of ownership is a 
Page 8 
legal issue, what do you mean by that from an 
appraisal standpoii~t? 
A. Well, in my investigation of the four 
named entities, there's clearly some common 
ownerships. And looking at the appraisal text, it 
talks about there are some cases that say that 
common ownership is sufficient and some that would 
argue that point. I'm not an attorney, so I'm not 
going to specify how that would work out. 
Q. Okay. Did you ask for any 
clarification on that issue from ITD's legal 
department? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you learn? 
A. They really wanted me to just conclude 
on a value for this specific parcel. So it wasn't 
as big an issue. 
Q. So your value of $3 a foot before and 
after assumes that this propeity is sold as a 
stand-alone piece in the market? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Arc you fmiliar with the process that 
ITD has for having a list of approved appraisers? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And have you made application to be on 
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s initial other than larger parcel because of the 
legal connotation. I wasn't meaning that, just 
3 meaning because of the bigger piece. And I 
4 realize I should have come up with different 
5 verbiage. 
6 MR. MALLET: Bigger parcel. 
7 THE WITNESS: Bigger parcel, would that 
8 work? The bigger combined parcel. I should have 
9 said like the combined fours parcels or soinething 
l a  like that would have been more clear. 
11 Q. BY MS. CUNNINGHAM: Right, to refer to 
1 2  your highest and best use concept. 
1 3  A. Exactly. 
1 4  Q. Rut when wc get to our valuation 
1 5  concept, we're just dealing with this as a stand- 
1 6  alone? 
1 7  A. Yes. That's what I should have said. 
1 8  I wasn't thinking the Iwger parcel word as a 
1 9  legal connotation. 
20 Q. Let's take a little break. 
2 1  (Recess.) 
7.2 Q.  BY MS. CUNNINGHAM: Ail right. Page 64 
2 3  is where we're going next. 
24 A. Okay. 
z.5 Q. Okay. 'The second paragraph down you've 
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1 mentioned that you've talked to both Mr. Mallet 
2 and JoAnn Butler about this issue of the trailer 
3 parks -- I mean the mobile home evictions or I 
4 don't know if you want to call them evictions hut 
5 redevelopment of the site. 
6 A. Yes. It sounds better; huh? 
7 Q. Yes. I f  I understand you correctly, 
8 you had a concern about whether or not you could 
9 redevelop the site given its current use; is that 
1 0  fair to say? 
11 A. Well, not whether you could but at 
1 2  least considering timing and costs and would that 
13 impact the property and how much. 
1 4  Q. And do you think that a six-month 
15 timeframe to transition the use would have any 
1 6  impact on value? 
1 7  A, I consider that in the value basically. 
1 8  In other words, I think I concluded I  roba ably 
19 would have concluded at a litlie bit higher value 
20 had it not been for the mobile home park hut not a 
21 significant amount. Now i n  other states where 
2 2  there's other issues, then it would have made a 
2 3  major difference. But Idaho, this is -- as far as 
2 4  w e  could determine this is it. 
2 5 Q. Okay. 011 page 65 you deal with the tax 
Paul Hyde 
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1 assessment. I'm wondering if you know whether or 
2 not the tax assessed vaiue of the properiy is 
3 going up or down? 
4 A. 1 don't h o w .  But  generally it goes 
5 up, but I don't know for sure. 
6 Q ,  If it were going dowil, would that 
7 impact your view at ail? 
8 A. No. If it were an income-producing 
9 propetly, it would, but in this case it wouldn't. 
1 0  Q. On page 67 and a couple other places in 
11 the report under physical possible use you 
1 2  reference the relatively large size of the 
1 3  property, and given your other statements I was 
1 4  confused as to whether that meant the 20-acre or 
1 5  the 82-acre size. 
1 6  A. This is particularly now we're talking 
1 7  just about this wouid he the 20-acre piece. 
18 Q. So you consider that to he a relatively 
1 9  large size? 
20 A. Yeah. But as I've mentioned, you know, 
21 you'd make more money if you'd develop it as an 
22  80-acre site. 
2 3 Q. Along similar lines on page 68 when 
2 4  we're talking about the conclusion of highest and 
2 5  best use if lefi vacant, again are we talking 
Page 1 0 4  
1 about a subject development as a mixed use 20-acre 
2 or as an 82-acre? 
. 3 A. It's really both. Talking speciFically 
4 at this point I'm valuing this specific piece, so 
5 it's the 20-acre piece. But I'm looking at that 
6 highest and best use for the entire parcel so the 
7 larger -- not larger parcel, the bigger piece. 
8 Q. Did you do an economic feasibility 
9 study? 
1 0  A. No. 
11 Q. Did you do a developmental approach as 
1 2  a check on highest and best use? 
1 3  A. No. 
1 4  Q. Okay. Now on page 74,1 need some help 
1 5  understanding what you're saying here about the 
1 6  before and aRer comps. 
17 A. Okay. 
1 8  Q. You seem to be saying that it's okay to 
1 9  use comps for both the before and the after, tile 
2 0  same comps, and I'm curious how that relates to 
2 s  disregarding project influence in condemnation. 
22 A. Well, in this case as I mentioned you 
2 3  ordinarily try and do others, but because of the 
24  long history of this project, I thought that that 
2 5  was basically so well known that it was basically 
26 (Pages 1 0 1  t o  1 0 9 )  
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1 A. 19 spaces were added at a later date. 
2 Q. Do you know roughly where those were, 
3 or where those are? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Where is that? 
6 A. That would be -- well, take 157 spaces 
7 and subtract 19, and they're between those two 
8 numbers. 
9 Q. I just mean, where are they located? 
1 0  Are those the ones on the property line in 
11 between? 
12 A. No. No. They would be on the norlh 
1 3  side of Canyon Vista. They would runalong Polo13 
1 4  Line Road. 
1 5  Q. It's my understanding that in between 
16 Canyon Vista and the KLS & M parcel, there are 
1 7  row of trailers that are split by the property 
18  i n  Is that your understanding? 
1 9  A. Yes. 
20 Q. And there may even be a couple that are 
21 over the property line; is that correct? 
22 A. That's correct. 
2 3  Q. And those were in existence or in place 
24 before the property line was created? 
25 ,2. Tkather~+st. P a g e  2 2  
1 Q. Okay. I was led to believe that you 
2 are the manager of the mobile home park; is that 
3 fair to say? 
4 A. That's what they call me. 
5 Q. Can you explain what your duties are. 
6 Why don't you explain'to me what your position 
7 is, or what your duties are generally, basically. 
8 A. Basically, I am the manager. I oversee 
9 the employees we've got; the outside person, 
1 0  people who do our lawn mowing; my office help,lO 
11 which right now is my granddaughter. I collect 
1 2  rent. I pay the bills. I pay the employees and 
13 do the withholdings. 
1 4  Q. Now, is this your primary occupation? 
1 5  A. Yes. 
1 6  Q. Do you receive a wage? 
1 7  A. Yes. 
1 8  Q. Would you consider yourself an employe~l8 
19 of Lazy J Ranch Corporation? 
20  A. Yes. 
21 Q. Is that who your W-2 would show as your21 
22 employer? 
2 3  A. Absolutely. 
24  Q. And one thing I'm curious about is the 
25  split between your responsibilities as a 
M & M COURT REPORTING 
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1 corporate shareholder for the Lazy J Corporation 
2 and as an employee ofthe corporation. First of 
3 all, you are a currently a shareholder in the 
4 Lazy J Corporation; are you not? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. When I say Lazy J Ranch, the full name 
7 is Lazy J Ranch, Inc.? 
8 A.Yes .  
9 Q. And you are a shareholder in that 
10 entity? 
11 A. Yes, I am. 
1 2  Q. And you were at the time of the taking 
in this case, which was December 28th, 2004? 
1 4  A. Yes. 
15 Q. What are your responsibilities in the 
16 corporation as a corporate shareholder, if any? 
17 I think you were listed as secreta~y? 
18 A. I'm secretaryltreasurer now. My 
1 9  parents were always the officers, and the three 
20 ofus were directors up until -- oh, I don't 
21 know -- four, or five, six years ago. I can't 
22 remember exactly what year. We thought it best 
2 3  that somebody be an officer. 
24 Q. Now, just for the record, you have a 
- 2 5 - b r - e & e m - l l i w ?  Page 24 
1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. And a sister, Christie Wills? 
3 A. Williams. 
4 Q. Excuse me, my apologies. 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. They are both shareholders in this 
7 corporation? . . .  
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. And currently, your inother is the 
fourth shareholder in the Lazy J Corporation? 
11 A. She is the president. 
12 Q. So it looks like you said, until four 
1 3  or five years ago, it was you and your parents 
14 that were the directors; is that correct? 
1 5  A. No. My mother and my father were the 
16 officers. And my brother and sister and I were 
17 directors. 
Q. Directors; okay. What type of 
19 decisions as the secretary and treasurer can you 
20 make for the corporation, or do you make? 
A. Boy, what kind of decisions? 
22 Q. I have to ask. Can you give employees 
23 raises? You are the employee. 
24 A. I would like to. 
25 MR. COPPLE: R 
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1 were split, and the ownership interest of all 1 A. It's the corporation, and it's owned by 
2 these different entities. So I'm going to try to 2 my brother, my sister, and I, and my parents. 
3 wade through that. 3 Q. Now, i t  seemed like in 1970, there was 
4 A. Okay. 4 a name change. It looked like it was Lazy J 
5 Q. We've gone through the easy stuff, and 5 Mobile Home Park? 
6 it took a long time. I'm hoping that's not a 6 A. That's correct. 
7 hard venture of things to come. But let's go 7 Q. But that's the same corporation? 
8 ahead and start by talking about how these 8 A. Absolutely. 
9 properties were split-up originally. 9 Q. Except the name change, the Lazy J 
10 Originally, your mom and dad owned a 10 Ranch, Inc, today is the same corporation? 
I 1  vely large piece of property that now consists of 11 A. Yes. 
12 what we call the BCM & W, the K . In 1970, as far as I can see, the 
13 Vista, and the Lazy J parcel? 3 corporate records show that there were three 
14 A. Yes. 14 shareholders in the corporation. And I showed it 
15 Q. So at one point, your mom Pike was one share, your mother was one, and 
16 that piece of property? d was one. Are you familiar with that at 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. And the first split, it looks to me was 18 A. Kind of. I vaguely remember that when 
19 in 1970, where they split off what we call the 19 it was first set up as the corporation, he was 
20 L,azy J parcel -- 0 their attorney, and he had to have a share or 
21 A. That's correct. ing. I don't remember any inore than that. 
22 Q. -- which is the coulee andeast; So the lawyer drafted the documents and 
23 correct? d himself in the deal, it looks like? 
24 A. Correct. MR. COPPLE: That was not uncustomary, 
25.-Q-bya-havc-anyid~&@ ~ ~ ~ - @ = - i = W f = @ p a ~  
1 canals coulees in Twin Falls? 
2 A. No, I don't. Because supposedly, it's 
3 an incorrect name for them. 
4 Q. Is that a French word or -- 
5 A. It beats me. 
6 MR. MALLET: Do you mind if we take a 
7 recess, since I spilled water? 
8 MR. COPPLE: No. 
9 (A recess was had.) 
10 Q. (BY MR. MALLET) Now, this original 
1 I division was in 1970, as far as you know? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 . Q. And it left what we now call the Lazy J 
14 parcel. And then its adjacent eastern parcel had 
15 about 60 acres in it? 
16 A. That was my mom and dad's parcel that 
17 was left. 
18 MR. COPPLE: But. that's not what he 
19 asked you. Was there about 60 acres in ihe 
20 parcel that was left? 
21 TI-IE WITNESS: Yes. 
22 MR. MALLET: Thanks. 
23 Q. (BY MR. MALLET) At the time it was 
24 split, who owned the Lazy J property, if you 
25 know? 
1 That was the days before one-man companies. 
2 MR. MALLET: I didn't know that. I was 
3 wondering why it was that way. 
4 Q. (BY MR. MALLET) But basically, as far 
5 as you know, it was your mom and dad that ran the 
6 corporation. And your lawyer was only nominally 
7 included? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. So in 1970, we have a corporation with 
10 your mom and dad owning what we call the Lazy J 
11 parcel. It's been split off from the 60-acre 
12 parcel. At the time it was split off, it was 
13 owned by whom, if you know?' 
14 A. J C and Margaret Williams. 
15 Q. Was that the J&M, Limited Partnership 
16 that owned that, by chance? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. That came to be actually later; didn't 
19 it? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. So your mom and dad owned the 60 
22 individually, and then they owned the smaller 
23 parcel through the corporate entity in '70. 
24 A. The land is actually in the 
25 corporation. 
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1 Q. (BY MR. MALLET) So the property was 
2 transferred out of the J & M Family Investments, 
3 Limited Partnership -- it was transferred out, 
4 that would be the transfer in November of 2001, 
5 which split the 60-acre parcel? 
6 A. The 60 acres was transferred out. 
7 Q. That's correct. So we've gone from 
8 1970, where the 60 acres was held by your lnoln anc 
9 dad? 
10 A. Right. 
11 Q. .And then we move to 1983, where it was 
12 transferred from your lnoln and dad to the J & M 
13 Family Limited Partnership? 
14 A. That's right. 
15 Q. And now I'm moving ahead to 2001, 
16 specifically, November, and now it looks Like the 
17 limited partnership transferred title of that 60 
18 acres to -- 
19 A. Right. That's correct, to the three 
20 other entities. 
21 Q. Right. Okay. 1 have a copy of a 
22 quitclaim deed froin the limited partnership to 
23 the Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership, and 
24 that appears to have been dated November 2nd, 
25-2..oo7- 
Page 58  
- 04/24/2007 
Page 59  
1 THE WITNESS: I don't know why you had 
2 me bring anytl~ing. You've got everything. 
3 Q. (BY MR. MALLET) Actually, I don't have 
4 everything that you've brought. I have quite a 
5 few items from your sister. .She claimed not to 
6 have access to Lazy J. She punted to you, I 
7 guess, so.. . 
8 A. That's probably true, though. 
9 Q. I figured it was. Since you were not 
10 only the manager, but the secretary of the 
11 corporation as well. So here we are. 
12 These partnerships, the limited 
1 3  partnerships that received titie in 2001, your 
14 entity was the KLS & M partnership, the limited 
15  partnership? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. And the general partner at that time 
1 8  was or is the KLS & M, LLC? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. And that has one member, which is you; 
21 correct? 
22 A. Correct. 
23  Q. At the time it. received title, who were 
24 the limited partners, if you know, of that 
~KbS&-~-pa&~e~ship?----- Page 60 
1 A. I imagine that's when it was gifted 
2 over to her entities. 
3 Q. Okay. And you would have a similar 
4 quitclaim deed -- 
5 A. Right. 
6 Q. -- to your entity, which would be the 
7 ICLS & M? 
8 A. Yes. Right. I know I'm talking over 
9 him. I'm sorry. 
10  Q. Again, tliat's productive to do that in 
11 everyday conversation. It's just going to muddle 
1 2  our record up a little. 
1 3  A. okay. 
14  Q. So my question was: You received a 
1 5  siiililar quitclaiin deed that deeded the ICLS & M 
1 6  property into your entity? 
17 A. Yes. 
1 8  Q. And as far as you know, the 60 acres 
1 9  has stayed titled the same way, since this 
20 transfer in 2001; as far as you know, have all 
21 three of the parcels stayed in the same ovvllership21 
22 since that time? 
2 3  A. Yes. 
24  MR. MALLET: She's going to wait. 
25  She's giving me a hard time, Don. 
1 A. In other words, the date of the change? 
2 Q. Correct, 2001? 
3 A. Myself, my sister, and my brother. 
4 Q. How about your mother? 
5 A. You know, they did have a little 
6 percentage, and they -- I believe, that was 
7 signed over right at the time of the change of 
8 the entity. 
9 Q. The reason I ask is, because it looks 
10  to nie like on tlie Canyon Vista, instead of having 
1 I an LLC, you have a colyoration, which is the 
1 2  general partner, wliich is your sister, Christie? 
1 3  A. Mnl-luiiiii. 
1 4  Q. But tlie limited partners are -- as far 
15  as the documents I've seen, were originally your 
1 6  mom and dad, and the11 you, your sister, your 
1 7  brother. And that seemed like it was probably 
18  the case on the ICLS & M as well; is that correct? 
1 9  A. I guess I lost you when you were 
20 talking about her corporation. What does that 
have to do wit11 it? Okay. Start again. 
22 Q. Yes. If you don't understand, ail you 
2 3  have to do is ask me to repeat the question. 
24 A. Okay. Repeat it. 
25  Q. Instead of having an LLC as the general 
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1 Q. And your mom and dad, possibly? 
2 A. They had .3 something in the beginning, 
3 and then they gifted it out immediately. 
4 Q. Now, how was it that your 
5 grandchildren -- 
6 A. Mm-hmm. 
7 Q. -- and your daughter, how do they come 
8 to supplant your sister and your brother and your 
9 mom and dad as owners of the KLS & M, the li~nitec 
10 partners? 
11 A. Okay. You are going to have to repeat 
12 that. I don't understand that. 
13 Q. You said originally, your brother, 
14 sister and your mom and dad, and possibly you 
15 were limited partners in the KLS & M, Limited 
16 Partnership? 
17 A. That's correct. 
18 Q. It looks like that's changed; hasn't 
19 it? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Now did that come to pass? Did 
22 somebody gift to your kids? 
23 A. No, sir. 
24 Q. Did they gift to you and. gift to your 
2 5 4 1 d r 4  - Page 
1 A. I also gifted to my children, and I 
2 also gifted to my brother's ohildren. In return, 
3 he gifted to his children and gifted to my 
4 children. He gifted from his part in my entity 
5 to my children. 
6 Q. And you gifted from your part in his 
7 entity to his children? 
8 A. Yes, I did. 
9 Q. When did that happen? 
10 A. Right off the bat, I startedgifting to 
1 I my children and my grandchildren. I think inaybrn 
12 it was the next year I started gifting to his 
13 children. Then when he got grandchildren, I 
1 4  gifted to all of them. 
1 5  MR. COPPLE: We've been going an 
16 hour-and-a-half. Do you \want take a break? 
1 7  MR. MALLET: Yes, let's do it. Let's 
18 take a real break. 
19 (A recess was had.) 
20 MR. MALLET: Back on the record. 
21 Q. (BY MR. MALLET) I think we've gone 
22 over the profits of the mobile home park, how 
23 they are split. I wanted to talk more about the 
24 rents. 
25 A. Okay. 
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I Q. I had a bunch of questions related to 
2 some documents that your sister gave me. I have 
3 tabbed what she calls "Tax Report 2003." Have 
4 you ever seen that document? 
5 A. Yes, this is something she's made up. 
6 It's on her -- 
7 Q. That was my first question: If you've 
8 seen it, where did it come from? And it looks 
9 like you didn't generate that as your manager or 
1 0  secretarial duties? 
1 I A. No, I didn't. 
1 2  Q. Now, this is the Canyon Vista Family, 
1 3  Limited Partnership record, at least it was 
14 represented to me, to be a record of that limited 
15 partnership? 
1 6  A. That's exactly what that is. 
17 Q. Are you currently a limited partner of 
1 8  that limited partnership? 
1 9  A. Yes, I am. 
20 Q. It shows that you received a 
21 disbursement, at least in 2003, of 18,000, almost 
22 $19,000? 
23 A. That very well could be. I don't know 
24 that that's accurate, but it sounds good. 
7c. 
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1 MR. COPPLE: That's four years ago: 
2 Q. (BY MR. MALLET) In other words, you 
3 received a disbursement that year. You are just 
4 not sure if that's right to the dollar amount? 
5 A. Yes, exactly. 
6 Q. Okay. Now, this disbursement, this 
7 money would be -- it's not income from the Lazy J 
8 Mobile Home Park; is it? 
9 A. No, it's rent. 
1 0  Q. So the Canyon Vista Family, Limited 
1 Partnership receives a rent check, and that's 
1 2  supposedly how it got disbursed this year? 
1 3  A: Yes. 
1 4  Q. And is that how it's still done today? 
1 5  A. Yes, I believe so. 
16 Q. And I can assume it was done that way 
17 in 2Q04 as well? 
18 A. Yeah. Right now, she's getting more 
1 9  rent. 
20 Q, I'm talking about how the rent is 
21 split-up now. We all talk about that as being 
22 your sister's parcel, the Canyon Vista parcel? 
23 A. Correct. 
24 Q. But the partnership that owns it, you 
25 actually are a limited partner in that 
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1 partnership; correct? 
2 A. Right. 
3 Q. And as part of your rights as a limited 
4 partner, you receive what it looks like, an equal 
5 share of rents to your brother and sister? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. A lot of these old tax returns, I've 
8 got 2001 here tabbed, for example, it shows the 
9 profit sharing as just under 33 percent. Now, do 
1 0  you see that in this 2001 return? 
11 A. The profit sharing -- what am I looking 
1 2  at? This is Lazy J's? 
1 3  Q. No, this is the Canyon Vista Family, 
1 4  Limited Partnership's tax return. 
1 5  A. Okay. 
1 6  Q. And it's a 2001 return. And this is 
17 one for the limited partner named Linda Wills, 
1 8  which is you; right? 
1 9  A. Right. 
2 0  Q. And it shows that you have an equal 
21 share, 32.3 percent share in the limited 
2 2  partnership? 
2 3  A. Yes. 
24 Q. While that was true in 2001, was it 
2&-tweirr2QorCa~11? Page 70-  
1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Is it true as we sit here today? 
3 A. I believe so. 
4 Q. You had talked about your parents 
5 having what you believe is a small share. It 
6 looks like in 2001, J. C. Williams had a 1.55 
7 percent share. Do you see where it says that? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. And does that sound right? 
10  A. Yes. 
11  Q. And I see one to your mother. 
1 2  A. She would have been the same, uh-huh. 
13 Q. And at some point, as far as you know, 
14 has your mother divested herself fiom -- 
1 5  A. She gifted it off. 
1 6  Q. And we see some documents, tax 
17 documents for that Canyon Vista Family, Limited 
18  Partnership in 2003. This one relates to you? 
1 9  A. Okay. 
20 Q. And it shows you have a higher 
21 ownership now, it's 33.08 percent? 
22 A. Yes. 
2 3  Q. And I assume that that higher 
24 percentage would have been obtained through soma24 
25  sort of gifting or inheritance? 
- 04/24/2007 
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1 A. It could have come from Mom and Dad's 
2 share. 
3 Q. This is just something I wanted to ask 
4 you about. In 2004, it looks like -- and these 
5 are still the Canyon Vista Family, Limited 
6 Partnership returns. It looks like the 
7 partnership showed some income from the rental of 
8 the house. Do you see that? 
9 A. I don't see it, but I know they did, 
10 yes. 
11 Q. The house rental, it would be under B, 
12 line B. 
13  A. Yes, right up here (indicating). 
14 Q. Yes. 
15  A. Uh-huh. 
16 Q. Now, the house is not part of the Lazy 
17 J Mobile Home Park, then? 
18 A. No. 
19 Q. It's separate? 
20 A. It's gone. 
21 Q. We're talking back before it was gone? 
22 A. Yes. Yes. Okay. 
23 Q. You, as the manager of the mobile home 
24 park, did you manage that house -- . 
35 '4. 41- - Page 7 2  
1 Q. -- or how did that work? 
2 A. Christie owned that house. 
3 Q. While Christie had prepared those 
4 documents before, it looks like there is a 2004 
5 tax form for the Canyon Vista Family, Limited 
6 Partnership, and it looks like your distribution 
7 that year would have been 18,868. Does that 
8 sound accurate? 
9 A. That could be. I don't think they've 
10 changed anything, because I believe my own 
11 accountant. 
12 Q. Okay. I was going to say, unless 
1 3  somebody lied to the IRS, that probably is 
14 correct; isn't it? 
15 A .  Yes. 
16 Q. On the KLS & M parcel, does the KLS & M 
17 Family, Limited Partnership receive any rental 
18 income? 
19 A. No. 
20 Q. So although some of the mobile homes 
21 are wholly or partly on that property, the rent 
22 distribution doesn't go at all to that entity? 
23 A. Un-huh. 
MR. COPPLE: Say no. 
125 THE WITNESS: No. 
M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. - (208) 345-961 1 
, ? K c 7  - 
E DON COPPLE - ISB # 1085 
HEATHER A. CUNNINGHAM - ISB # 5480 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX 
Attorneys at Law 
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza 
199 North Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 600 
Post Office Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-3658 
Facsimile: (208) 386-9428 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership 
and Lazy J. Ranch, Inc. 
W THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, W AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWTN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., 1 CASE NO. CV 04-6336 
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN MCHUGH ) 
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C. 1 BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL 1 PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION 
MILLER and JOHN X COMBO IN LIMINE- ORDER OF 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, ) CONDEMNATION 
Plaintiff, 
VS. ) 
1 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED ) 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J. RANCH, ) 
INC. 
1 
Defendants. 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLANTIFF'S SECOND MOTION n\T LIMINE-ORDER OF CONDEMNATION - 1 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. The Order of Condemnation is Admissible and Relevant 
and Can Be Applied Retroactively in this Case. 
The State contends that the Order of Condemnation is not relevant to the issue of just 
compensation despite the fact that the Order sets forth the rights that are being sought and 
acquired by the State for its project. This is interesting since in this case the Complaint and the 
Order of Condemnation are consistent with one another. The State is apparently seeking to 
minimize the fact it is condeiming access rights. This Order of Condemnation issue is addressed 
at length, as well as its impacts, in the Trial Brief, Part 11, lodged in this case on April 11, 2007. 
Defendant asks that the court refer to that brief in dealing with this argument, as it is extensive 
and on point 
The State neglects to advise this Court that pursuant to Idaho Code 5 7-707, the statutory 
provision reads in pertinent part: 
Complaint. -The complaint must contain: 
6. An order of condemnation, or resolution, or other official and binding 
document entered by the plaintiff which sets forth and clearly identifies all 
property rights to be acquired including rights to and from the public way, and 
permanent and temporary easements known or reasonably identifiable to the 
condemning authority. 
The State relies on the case of Ada County Highway Dist. v. Sharp, 135 Idaho 888,26 
P.3d 1225 (2001) for the propositioli that the complaint supercedes an administrative order for 
purposes of defining the rights that are being condemned. The State, in essence, argues that since 
the colnplaint in this matter was filed (December of 2004) prior to the statutory amendment 
requiring the inclusion of the order of condemnation, that the statutory amendment cannot be 
applied retroactively. Also, in -there was conflict between the Order of Condemnation and 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION IN LIMINE-ORDER OF CONDEMNATION - 2 
the Complaints, in this case the two are consistent. 
Idaho Code 5 40-310 sets forth the powers and duties of the Idaho Transportation Board 
and specifically states that "[Tlhe order of the board that the land sought is necessary for such use 
shall be prima facie evidence o f  that fact." (Emphasis added). Idaho Code 5 40-3 1 O(1). The 
Idaho Transportation Board has been entering Orders of Condemnation in every case in which it 
constructs a public project requiring land from property owners for decades. 
Although Idaho Code § 7-707 was amended in 2006 requiring a complaint to include the 
order of condemnation or a similar binding document, the State's reliance on the Sharp decision 
is no longer the law in Idaho and the statutory provision can be applied retroactively in this case 
because it is a procedural in nature rather than substantive. Idaho courts have addressed the 
application of legislation being applied retroactively. 
Typically, retroactive application deals with legislation amendments of the law. The 
general rule on retroactive application of legislative amendments is that "[s]tatutes will not be 
applied retroactively absent express legislative intent to do so." Floyd v. Board of Comm 'rs, 131 
Idaho 234,238, 953 P.2d 984, 988 (1988). In addition, legislation that is remedial or procedural 
may be applied retroactively, whereas legislation that is substantive or that affects vested rights 
may not. Id.; Tuttle v. Wayment Farms, Inc., 131 Idaho 105, 108,952 P.2d 1241, 1244 (1998). 
The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Currington, set forth the distinction between 
procedural and substantive law, as follows: 
Substantive law prescribes norms for societal conduct and punishments for 
violations thereof. It thus creates, defines and regulates primary rights. In 
contrast, practice and procedure pertain to the essentially mechanical operations of 
the courts by which substantive law, rights and remedies are effectuated. 
108 Idaho 539, 541, 700 P.2d 942,944 (1985) (quoting State v. Smith, 527 P.2d 674,676-77 
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(1974)). 
The question for the court in determining whether a statute may operate retroactively, 
absent express legislative intent, is "whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences 
to events completed before its enactment." Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 51 1 U.S. 244,269- 
70 (1994). This reasoning was applied by the Idaho Supreme Court inFloyd v. Board of 
Co~nm 'rs, 131 ldaho 234, 238, 953 P.2d 984, 988 (1988). There, the Court considered whether 
statutory changes in the standard of review to be applied in a case were substantive or 
procedurallremedial. Id. at 237, 953 P.2d at 987. The district court held that the amendments 
would adversely affect the substantive rights of the plaintiffs if applied retroactively because the 
scope of review would be limited under the new provisions and thereby the rights of appellants 
would be affected. Id. at 236, 953 P.2d at 986. Thus, the district court declined to apply the 
statute retroactively. Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed and considered the statutory amendments to be 
procedural. Id. at 238,953 P.2d at 988. In reaching its conclusion, the Court reasoned that the 
statute did not "give the parties a right to pursue some cause of action or to present a defense." 
Id. Rather, the statute merely prescribed the operations or processes of the court, but did not 
change the right of the parties to have a decision reviewed. Id. Because the statutory 
amendments did not affect the parties' rights of review, the Court held that the new provisions 
would apply retroactively. Id. 
I-Iowever, in Grant v. City ofTwin Falls, 120 Idaho 69 (1991), the Idaho Supreme Court 
reviewed whether the United States Supreme Court's decision in Graham v. Connor, regarding 
the standard to be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment could be applied retroactively. The 
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Idaho Supreme Court held that standard pronounced in the Gvaham case could be applied 
retroactively. 
The Court elaborated as follows: 
"The general rule . . . is that an appellate court must apply the law in effect at the 
time it renders its decision." (Citations omitted). Thus, "ordinarily a decision 
reformulating federal civil law will be applied retroactively." (Citations omitted). 
However, there are some cases in which "application of this retroactivity precept 
produces inequitable results, penalizing parties who ordered their affairs in 
reasonable reliance on a rule of law that was later invalidated." Citation omitted). 
In such cases, a decision reformulating federal civil law will be applied 
prospectively only if the decision satisfies the three factors set forth in 
Chevron Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97,92 S.Ct. 349,30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). 
Those factors are: (1) Whether "the decision to be applied nonretroactively . . 
establish[es] a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent 
on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression 
whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed", (2) whether, in light of "the 
prior history of the rule in question, [and] its purpose and effect, . . . 
retroactive operation will further or retard its operation"; and (3) whether 
the decision "could produce substantial inequitable results if applied 
retroactively." (Citation omitted). 
Id. at 72 (emphasis added). 
"We find this application of Chevvon to the issue of Graham's retroactivity to be well- 
reasoned and sound. We therefore hold that the standard enunciated in Graham should be 
retroactively applied to cases such as this one which were pending at the time Graham 
announced." Id. at 73. 
Applying the Chevron factors adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court, the Court must 
evaluate the circumstances to detennine the retroactive application of Idaho Code $ 7-707. 
As noted, Idaho Code $ 7-707 is merely a procedural provision which sets forth what 
information must be included with the complaint. Similarly, Idaho Code $40-3 10 recognizes 
that the order of condemnation is prima facie evidence of what the Board is acquiring from the 
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landowner. 
The Idaho Transportation Board's Order of Condemnation in this matter reads in 
pertinent part as follows: 
The Board, having considered the report and recommendations of the State 
Highway Administrator and having duly considered the matter, finds: 
4. That all rights of access to, from and between the right of way of the public 
way and all of the contiguous remaining real property of the record owner(s) shall 
be extinguished and prohibited except for access, if any, as provided and shown 
on the said project plans referred to in Paragraph 2 above. 
In its Amended Complaint, the State asserts that access shall be limited to that as shown 
on the plans attached as an exhibit to the complaint. The attached exhibit provides no access on 
Pole Line Road on the Canyon Vista property. Thus, the State's own amended complaint is 
consistent with the Board's Order of Condemnatioil of the subject property and therefore 
discussing the Order of Condemnation is not confusing nor would it mislead the jury. 
The State provides no rational reason that the Order should be excluded from mention, 
and there are many reasons it needs to be mentioned. The State has continualIy advocated that it 
is not condemning the access rights to Canyon Vista's property which the Order of 
Condemnation states otherwise. Idaho Code 5 40-310 specifically expresses that the Board's 
order is prirna facie evidence. If the State now wants to conceded and stipulate that it is in fact 
taking the access rights of Canyon Vista, then Defendants will stipulate to excluded the order of 
condemnation. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing argument and case law, Defendants respectfully request that it 
enter its Order denying the State's Motion in Limine to exclude the Order of Condemnation. 
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ORIGINAL 
The State has filed its Motion in Limine to Exclude the Testimony of Roger Dunlap on 
the grounds that Mr. Dunlap appraised the property utilizing the development approach method 
which was prohibited in the case of City of Caldwell v. Roark, 92 Idaho 99,437 P2d 615 (1968). 
That simply is not the case, Mr Dunlap did appraise the whole property and did consider what a 
prospective purchaser would pay for the whole property. The State's misunderstanding how Mr. 
Dunlap arrived at his opinion of just compensation. The bands or zones of value approach is 
simply not identical to the development approach addressed in Roark. The development 
approach assumes a hypothetical future subdivision of lots and hypothetical sales prices of lots, 
skipping the development costs and development process itself. The bands or zones of value 
approach, in contrast, values raw mound as one aiece, but also recognizes that due to the physical 
characteristics, some parties of the whole may be worth more than others. No specific lots or 
subdivisions are assumed and no hypothetical developed lots prices are used. The latter approach 
is widely accepted in condemnation while the development approach is not. 
Prior to the taking, the Canyon Vista property consisted of 19.71 49 acres and all of the 
witnesses, boththe State's and the property owners, have agreed that the highest and best use of 
the property was for commercial purposes before the taking. It was Mr Dunlap's conclusion that 
while the entire property was commercial, the front 4.186 acres was more valuable than the rear 
15.5289 because it had the potential for commercial pad sites. This is best illustrated by the pad 
development along Blue Lakes in Twin Falls. 
There is nothing unique about the application of this zones of value method of appraisal, 
other jurisdictions throughout the country which have addressed this methodology have done so 
approvingly. Mr. Dunlap has assumed a hypothetical subdivision of the parcel; he is saying 
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even if a large pays a blended rate for the whole piece, some portions of the property are worth 
more than others. 
The Plaintiff, State of Idaho, has requested the Court to enter its Order excluding any 
evidence of valuation that is based upon placing separate values on different portions of the 
Defendant's property on the grounds that Defendant's valuation witnesses did not appraise the 
entire property as one unit, but simply added up amounts from different areas. That simply is a 
misrepresentation by the State, as each valuation witness did appraise the whole property and 
evaluated merely what a prospective purchaser would consider in determining how much he 
would pay for the property as a whole unit. 
Almost every case that has considered this issue has recognized the validity of the use of 
a "band of valuation" appraisal in finding that there may be different values on the property as a 
whole. In Los Angekes County Flood Control Dist. v. McNulty, 379 P.2d 493, the Court stated: 
The court instructed the jury that in determining the market 
value of the parcel condemned it is not proper to attribute a per- 
square-foot value to defendants' entire property and then apply the 
value to the parcel condemned unless each square foot of 
defendants' land has the same value and that, if the parcel 
condemned is different in quality from the rest of the land, it 
should be assigned a different value. There was a conflict in the 
evidence as to whether 2.55 acres of the 2.62 acres taken were 
worth as much per acre as the remainder of defendants' land, and 
the instruction correctly states the applicable principles of law. 
(People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. Neider, 195 Ca.App.2d 
582, 590, 16 Cal.Rptr. 58; Hayward Union High School Dist. of 
Alameda County v. Lemos, 187 Cal.App.2d 348,353, 9 Cal.Rptr. 
750; People v. Loop, 127 Cal.App.2d 786,796-800,274 P.2d 885; 
4 Nichols on Eminent Domain (3d rev, ed. 1962) 6 14,231, p. 545.) 
Los Angeles Couniy Flood Control Dist. v. McNulty, 379 P.2d 493. 
In People v. Loop, 274 P.2d 885 (1954), the State objected to valuation evidence on the 
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grounds the value was not an average value of the whole parcel. The Court heId that a uniform 
value across every foot of a parcel of property is only a proper method of valuation when it can 
be said that each and every square foot of a parcel has the same value as each and every other 
square foot. 
The square foot method of valuation is based on the 
assumption that each and every square foot of a parcel of property 
has the same value as each and every other square foot. It is not a 
mandatory method of valuation. The square foot method is a 
proper method of valuation only when it can be said that each and 
every square foot of a parcel has the same value as each and every 
other square foot. 
Nichols, a leading authority on the law of eminent domain, 
says: "In assessing the value of the land taken as part of the entire 
tract it is not proper merely to compute the percentage value on the 
basis of an artificial average unit value for the entire tract unless 
the actualities of the case accord with such coverage value. It may 
be that the part taken is the most valuable part of the tract 
considered from a qualitative point of view. To attribute an 
average unit value thereto which is based in part on the lower value 
of the balance of the tract is inequitable to the owner in a doubIe 
aspect of the situation. It attributes a value to the part taken which 
is lower than its actual value and it attributes a higher ultimate 
value to the remainder area than its actual value, thereby reducing 
his recovery as to both factors below his actual damages." (4 
Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3d ed., 330, § 14.231.) 
People v. Loop, 274 P.2d 885, 892-895, 
A band of value approach was also approved in llnited States v. I ,  629.6 Acres of Land, 
etc., State ofDel., 360 F.Supp. 147 (1973). It stated: 
The Government's second objection that the Commission 
improperIy determined two highest and best uses for separate parts 
of the condmned acreage, and then valued the portions separately 
under an improper summation approach is also without foundation. 
An examination of the Commission's report evidences that the 
Commission was continually aware of its obligation to value the 
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property as a whole. The Commission's conclusion that the 
highest and best use of the property was 1,266.2 acres of farm and 
recreation land utilized in the manner the landowner was using it 
and 366 acres utilized for a sand and gravel pit was permissible 
under the evidence, the Court's instructions and the applicable law 
See Cade v. United States supra, 213 F. 2d at 140; TIingit & Haida 
Indians v, United States, 389 F.2d 778, 182 Ct.Cl. 130 (1968); 
Cunningham v. United States, 270 F.2d 545 (4" Cir. 1959); United 
States v. 2,208.88 Acres of Land, 330 F.Supp. 1045 
(E.D.Mo.1971); Wilson v. United States, 350 F.2d 901 (loLh Cir. 
1965). Moreover, the Commission specifically avoided any 
duplication of valuation by not attributing two highest and best 
uses to the same acreage and by not accepting conflicting and 
incompatible uses. see e. g., United states v. Cumingham, 246 
F.2d 330, 333 (4" Cir. 1957); and United States v. Carroll, 304 
F.2d 300 (4Ih Cir. 1962). 
Whenever various portions of a condemned parcel are susceptible 
to different highest and best uses and no comparables are available 
for valuation of one or both portions, a form of summation will 
necessarily be employed. However, when, as the Commission did 
here, the determination of just compensation is reached by viewing 
the property as a single whole parcel with compatible component 
highest and best uses, the ascertainment of different per acreage 
values for the various different parcels and the ensuing calculation 
of overall damages does not involve an impermissible valuation 
technique. See Cade v. United States, supra. 213 F.2d at 140; 
United States v. 1,955.00 Acres of Land, 447 F.2d 673,674-676 
(loth Cir. 1971); United States v. 2,208.88 Acres of Land, supra; 
and Cunningham v. United States, 270 F.2d 545, supra. 
In Brady-Stannard Motor Co., Inc. v. State, 352 N.Y.S.2d 68, the State condemned 1.6 
acres of the property owned and located at the rear of the property. One-third (113) of the taltiilg 
was level, filled land and the remaining consisted of low, wet, wooded land considerably below 
grade. On appeal, the only issue was the validity of the use of the "band of valuation" approach. 
The New York Supreme Court held that the use of the approach was proper: 
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The only issue before this court is the validity of the use of 
the "bands of valuation" approach to value and the finding of a 
different value for the 1.135 acres of land at the rear of claimant's 
property which necessitated fill to make it usable. 
In the instant case the "bands of valuation" approach was 
employed on the basis of a difference in quality of land with the 
same highest and best use and, absent any involvement with 
improvements, is proper. (Acme Theatres v. State of New York, 
supra at 388-389,310 N.Y.S.2d at 498-500,258 N.E.2d at 913- 
914). Furthermore, such a method valuation has been used to 
establish value for land taken along a highway or a city street, and 
the result herein is consistent with the principles set forth in prior 
case law. 
The Brady-Stannard case was cited in the subsequent New York cases of 124 Fervy St. 
Realty Corp. v. State, 369 N.Y.S.2d 224 and Oneonta Center Associates v. State, 388 N.Y.S.2d 
57 (1976). In the 124 Ferry decision, the Court said: 
The primary issue presented on this appeal is whether the 
trial court was justified in evaluating the front and rear portions of 
the parcel separately although the entire parcel's highest and best 
use was determined to be a single joint commercial use. We 
believe that it was. 
Claimant's appraiser employed a single unit of valuation 
for the entire tract, based on a combination single highest and best 
use. By means of the interpolation of comparable sales the State's 
appraisers determined that the rear land used for the ear wash 
operation had a lesser value than the front portion used for gas 
station purposes. The court, noting that the evidence indicated the 
two uses were separate, both as a personnel and operation, and that 
the zoiling patters and cornparables indicated a higher unit value 
for the frontage land than the rear land, amved at a value for the 
gas station area of $5 per square foot and $3 per square foot for the 
car wash area. The assignment of different values to separate 
segments of a single tract with a single highest and best use, when 
based on a difference in quality and location of land, is a proper 
method of valuation. (See Brady-Stannard Motor Co, v. State of 
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New York, 43 A.D.2d 994,352 N.Y.S.2d 68). The court's 
determination to divide the parcel taken into two segments for 
valuation purposes was a factual finding, well supported by the 
record and should not be disturbed. 
I24 Ferry St. Realty Corporation v. State ofNew York, 48 A.D.2d 959,369 N.Y.S.2d 224,226. 
In Oneonta, the Court said: 
The appraisers for both parties agreed that the highest. and 
best use of the property was as a shopping center. However, while 
claimant's exDert arrived at a unit value of $12,865 per acre for the 
entire parcel, ;he appraiser for the State found that the rear 
undeveloped area had only a limited commercial development use 
because of problems of access and topography. Accordingly, he 
valued the front acreage at $10,700 per acre and the rear acreage at 
- - 
$800 per acre. 
In its decision, the court found the highest and best use of 
the property to be as a shopping center with excess acreage. 
Rejecting the claimant's appraisal as based upon improper 
valuation methods, it adopted the State's differing valuations for 
the front and rear acreage and granted claimant a total award of 
$3 1,200 in direct damages for the land and improvements 
appropriated. This appeal ensued. 
We find that the judgment of the Court of Claims must be 
affirmed. The bands of valuation approach advocated by the State 
and adopted by the court is justified in this instance because of the 
differences in quality and location of the front and rear segments of 
claimant's parcel (124 Feny St. Realty Corp. v. State of New York, 
48 A.D.2d 959, 369 N.Y.S.2d 224, mot. for lv. to app, den. 38 
N.Y.2d 705,381 N.Y.S.2d 1025,343 N.E.2d 774; Brady-Stannard 
Motor Co. v. State of New York, 43 A.D.2d 994,352 N.Y.S.2d 
68). 
Oneonta Center Associates v. State ofNew York, 54 A.D.2d 993,388 N.Y.S.2d 57, 58, 
In E-470 Public ITighway Authority v. 455 Company, 983 P.2d 149, a 1999 Colorado 
Court of Appeals decision was reversed on the grounds the court said the following about 
valuations based upon different highest and best use: 
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In determining the value of property in condemnation 
proceedings, the commissioners are to consider evidence of the 
most advantageous use to which the property may reasonably be 
applied. Goldstein v. Denver Urban Renewal Authority, 192 Colo. 
422,560 P.2d 80 (1977). Opinion evidence as to value requires 
that the unique and different characteristics of individual pieces of 
property be analyzed. Denver Urban Renewal Authority v. 
Berglund-Cherne Co., 193 Colo. 562, 568 P.2d 478 (1977). 
When the highest and best use of property is not uniform 
throughout a tract in question, courts in other jurisdictio~ls have 
permitted appraisers to testify to the highest and best use for the 
different portions of the full tract involved for purposes of 
determining just compensation. See Departinent of Transportation 
v. H.P./Meachum Land Ltd. Partnership, 245 111.App.3d 252, 184 
II1,Dec. 351,614 N.E.2d 485 (1993); Oughton v. Gaddis, 683 
So.2d 390 (Miss.1996); City of Dallas v. Rash, 375 S.W.2d 502, 
(Tex.Civ.Appll964); see also United States v. 1,629.6 Acres of 
Land, 360 F.Supp. 147 (D.De1.1973) (upholding valuation based 
on testimony attributing different highest and best uses to two 
separate portions of condemned parcel), aff d in part, rev'd in part 
on other grounds, 503 F.2d 764 (3d Cir.1974); 124 Ferry St. Realty 
Corp, v. State, 48 A.D.2d 959,369 N.Y.S.2d 224 (1975) 
(assignment of different values to separate segments of parcel was 
a property method of valuation.) 
E-470 Public fIighway Authority v. 455 Company, 983 P.2d 149, 155. 
In Oughton v. Gaddis, 683 So.2d 390 (1996), the Mississippi appellate court held that 
"when the highest and best use of property taken is not uniform throughout, the appraiser may 
testify to highest and best use for different portions of the tract." The court further held that: 
In order to make the fair market value assessment, "all the facts as 
to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its 
improvements and capabilities, may be shown and considered in 
estimating its value." Hillman, 189 Miss. At 850, 870, 198 So. at 
571. The lower court is not limited to just the property's highest 
and best use for the moment, but may consider the value of the 
property with reference to any use for which the property is 
reasonably adaptable. Potters 11,608 So.2d at 1227 (within 
commercial properties, there are many uses of differing values); 
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Daniels v. Board of Supervisors of Clarke County, 323 So. 2d 748, 
749 (Miss.1975); Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Hancock, 
309 So.2d 867 (Miss.1975) (part of condemned land had 
residential purposes as highest and best purpose); State Highway 
Comm'n v. Brown, 176 Miss. 23, 33, 168 So. 277,279 (1936) 
(property may have several available uses and purposes, and 
consideration must be given to the fair market value of each use 
and purpose.) 
When the highest and best use of the property is not uniform 
throughout the tract in question, an appraiser may testify to the 
highest and best use for the different portions of the full tract 
involved. This rule makes sense in light of the purpose of the "just 
compensation" provision in the constitutions . . . 
Here, the State seeks to take a portion of the full tract that iilcludes 
a larger percentage of buildable, nonwetland property than does the 
tract as a whole. Consequently, the application here of the State's 
proposed rule, that an appraiser must offer only one valuation 
considering the total value of the entire parcel, would misrepresent 
the value of the specific land portion to the taken. Dep't of Transp. 
V. HPIMeachum Land Ltd. Partnership, 245 111.App.3d 252, 185 
I11.Dec. 351,614 N.E.2d 485,488 (1993) (citations omitted). 
"[~]enerall$, the market value of the p&icular part of a tract 
expropriated is determined by the actual market value of the 
- - 
portion taken, and not by its average per-acre or square-foot value 
as a pro rata portion of the parent tract." State Through Dept. of 
Highways v. LeDoux, 184 So.2d 604,610 (La.Ct.App.1966). 
This Court holds that the lower court was in error for 
excluding Cook's testimony that the Oughton land where the 
easement was being laid, was in a more valuable region than the 
- - 
agricultural land which was the dominant part of the property. 
Oughton v. Caddis, 683 So.2d 390,393-395 
In The Department of Transportation v. HP/Meachum Land Limited Partnership, 614 
N.E.2d 485 (1993), the Illinois court held that "when highest and best use of property is not 
uniform throughout tract in question, an appraiser may testify to highest and best use for different 
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portions of full tract involved, for purposes of determining just compensation." The court said: 
When the highest and best use of the property is not 
uniform throughout the tract in question, an appraiser may testify 
to the highest and best use for the different portions of the full tract 
involved. (Department of Public Works & Buildings v. First 
National Bank (1973), 9 IIl.App.3d 633,636,272 N.E.2d 487; see 
also Department of Transportation v. Mullen (1983), 120 
IIl.App.3d 268,281,75 I11.Dec. 803,457 N.E.2d 1362; Department 
of Public Works & Buildings v. Hufeld (1966), 68 IlI.App.2d 120, 
128, 215 N.E.2d 312.) This rule makes sense in light of the 
purpose of the "just compensation" provision in the constitution 
that "'[tlhe owner is to be put in the same position monetarily as he 
would have occupied if his property had not been taken."' (Almota 
Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States (1973), 409 
U.S. 470,473-74,93 S.Ct. 791,794,35 L.Ed.2d 1,7, quoting 
United States v. Reynolds (1970), 397 U.S. 14, 16, 90 S.Ct. 803, 
805,24 L.Ed.2d 12, 15; City of Chicago v. Farwell (1918), 286 Ill. 
415,421, 121 N.E. 795.) In addition, this rule does not conflict 
with the principle of valuing the portion taken as part of the whole 
and not as a separate parcel. The valuation of the part taken as part 
of the whole is designed to provide just compensation to the 
landowner where the land sought to be taken is of greater value 
when considered as part of the whole than if considered as a parcel 
by itself. Tri State Park District v. First National Bank (1975), 33 
Ill.App.3d 348,351,337 N.E.2d 204; see also Forest Preserve 
District v. Draper (1944), 387 111. 149, 157-58, 56 N.E.2d 410 (and 
cases cited therein). 
Here, the State seeks to take a portion of the full tract that 
includes a larger percentage of buildable, nonwetla~d property than 
does the tract as a whole. Consequently, the application here of the 
State's proposed rule, that an appraiser must offer only one 
valuation considering the total value of the entire parcel, would 
misreprese~~t that value of the specific land portion to be taken. 
We find that that rule does not follow the law of this State and, 
thus, that the court's denial of the owner's first motion was in 
error. The Department of Transportation v. HP/Meachum Land 
Limited Partnershdp, 614 N.E.2d 485,488. 
Clearly, the methodology utilized by Mr. Dunlap to arrive at his opinion ofjust 
compensatio~l is an accepted methodology which has passed judicial scrutiny. The State 
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incorrectly argues that Mr. Dunlap applied a development approach method which was 
prohibited by the Idaho Supreme Court in Roark. 
In City of Caldwell v Roark, 92 Idaho 99,437 P2d 61 5, the property consisted of 9.48 
acres of land within the City of Caldwell. The portion of the land sought to be taken was platted 
by the property owner and was designated as the Third Parkside Addition. As platted, the 
property consisted of 80 lots of which the city was condemning 49 lots. Streets and alleys had 
been laid out but the comers of the lots were not staked and the property had utilities available, 
On appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, the property owner argued that the jury should 
have been required to find the value of the lots in the portion of the platted area condemned 
separately, as separate parcels of property rather than the aggregate value of the lots as one 
parcel. The Court said: 
"However, where the entire parcel of land, as a unit, is taken at one time 
by condemnation, the jury is required to fix the value of the entire parcel as a 
unit as of the time the summons is issued. LC. 5 7-712. This value cannot 
properly be determined by aggregating the individual sales value which 
separate lots may bring when sold to individual prospective home builders 
over a period of time in the future, for the reason that such a basis of valuation 
would pennit the jury to speculate upon future developments. The jury was 
properly permitted to consider the prospective value of he property for that 
purpose in determining its value as a single parcel at the date of the summons. 
"* * * The test is not what the lots will bring when and if 62 willing 
buyers come along, but what the tract, as a unit, and as is, platted or not, and 
in whatever state of completion, will bring from a willing buyer of the whole 
tract."(authority omitted). 
"* * * The valuation must be on the basis of what a willing purchaser 
would pay now and not what a number of purchasers might be induced to pay 
in the future for the land in smaller parcels." (authority omitted). 
" * * * They are not to determine how it could best be divided into 
building lots, nor to conjecture how fast they could be sold, nor at what price 
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per lot. A Speculator or investor, in deciding what price he could afford to 
pay, would consider the chances and probabilities of the situation as they 
actually existing. A jury should do the same thing. They are not to inquire 
what a speculator might be able to realize court of resale in the future, but 
what a present purchaser would be willing to pay for it in the condition it 
is no in." (authority omitted). 
The State also complains on page 7 that this method generates higher damages. Article 1 
Section 14 of the Idaho Constitution states that "private property may be taken for public use, but 
until a just compensation to be ascertained in the manner prescribed by law, shall be paid 
therefore." I.C. 7-71 1 reads in part as follows: 
"The coui-t, jury or referee must hear such legal testimony as may be offered by any of the 
parties to the proceeding, and must thereupon ascertain and assess: 
1 .The value of the property sought to be condemned ........ 
In this case, the value of the part condemned consists of the area where the commercial 
pads would have been located together with all of the access from Pole Line Road. Because the 
frontage area of the property is more valuable than the rear 15 acres the State should be required 
to pay the value of what they sought to condemn - not an average spread across the entire 
property. 
Mr. Dunlap repeatedly said in his deposition that the average price per foot in the before 
condition was $5.50 per foot and even if the State were correct in its interpretation and view of 
the Roark case, Mr Dunlap disclosed that in his opinion at $5.50 a foot, the fair market value of 
the property in the before condition was $4,723,296. He further disclosed that the size of the 
remainder in the after condition was 17.836 acres with a value of $1,659,011. The difference 
between the before and after, utilizing the blended rate is exactly the same, ie $3,064,285 - the 
identical amount the State is trying to exclude by misunderstanding the methodology utilized as 
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the development approach. 
Further, exclusion of Mr. Dunlap's entire testimony is improper. Mr. Dunlap valued the 
entire property on a blended rate. We believe his methodology is well supported by the cases 
cited herein and appraisal methodology. The bands of value approach has been used and accepted 
in other condemnation cases in Idaho Courts we have tried (not appealed). Should the court 
disagree, Mr. Dunlap should still be able to present at a minimum his blended rate analysis 
DATED this the 11"' day of May, 2007. 
n 
E Don Copple, of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1 lth day of May, 2007, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served upon the following: 
Joseph Mallet U.S. MAIL 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
33 11 West State Street 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129 
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HEATHER A. CUNNINGHAM - ISB # 5480 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX 
Attorneys at Law 
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza 
199 North Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 600 
Post Office Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-3658 
Facsimile: (208) 386-9428 
edcoi~~~ic~davisonconvle .coi~~ 
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Attorneys for Defendants 
Canyon Vista Family Linlited Part~~ership 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TI-IE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
TI-IE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., ) CASE NO. CV 04-6336 
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOE-IN MCHUGH ) 
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C. ) AFFIDAVIT OF ROGER DUNLAP 
MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL 1 IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MILLER and JOIW X COMBO, MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, ) THE TESTIMONY OF ROGER 
DUNLAP 
) 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED ) 
PARTNERSHIP INC. 1 
Defendants. 1 
1 
ROGER DUNLAP, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
AI'FIDAVIT OF ROGER DUNLAP IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE 
TO EXCLUDE THE TESTIMONY OF ROGER DUNLAP - 1 
ORIGINAL 
I submit this Affidavit ill opposition of the Plaintiff's Motion in Limine to exclude all 
testinlony of Roger Dunlap, 
I am a certified general real estate appraiser. I have over 20 years of experience in real estate 
val~~ation a d eminent domain work, both as an appraiser and as a real estate analysist for a law fim. 
1 have worlted on hundreds of eminent domain cases cases in Arizona, Maryland and Idaho. I have 
testified as a real estate valuation expert in trials in Superior Court in Yavapai County and Maricopa 
County, Arizona and Nampa, Idaho. A copy of my curriculuin vitae is attached hereto as Exhibit A 
and incorporated herein by this reference. 
I have been hired by the defendants to give expert testimony in the condemnation trial with 
the following caption: ITD v. Ca~zyon Vista, etc. 
The plaintiff has con~plained that the nlethod I employed to measure the estimated 
con~pensation due to the defendant inflates the conlpensation estimate. This is not tile case. 
I have employed a "zone of value" techniq~le, because I believe it most accrtrately mirrors 
what a potential buyer of the subject property would consider if be were to consider buying the 
subject property, taking into account the involu~ltaiy taking of a portion of the land and all of the 
access to Pole Line Road. In illy opinion, the land fronting on Pole Line Road has a higher value 
than the land in the rear of the property and should be valued separately in conlputing the value of 
the taking. I therefore valued the entire property at $5.50/SF as a blended overall rate and then 
estimated the value for the fi-ontage by using sales of similar land in the conlpeting area including 
sales imr~~ediately across the street fro111 the subject. 
FIowever, even if I had considered the subject as having one overall value of $5.50/SF, the 
coinputatioll ofestinlated compensation would be nearly the saine, and the rounded estimate would 
be exactly the same. A summary of co~llpeilsation is presented as follows. My opinion of just 
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Surnmarv 
Total value before $5.50 X 858,781 (19.715 net acres) $4,723,295 
Value of take $5.50/SF X 81,266 SF (1.8784 acres) 
Permanent Easement $5.50/SF X 13,970 (.3207 acres) X 50% 
TCE $5.50/SF X 9,344 SF (.2145 acres) X 10% 
Total Value of Taking 
Value of reinainder before 
Value of remainder after 
Severance damage 
Total Estimated Compensation 
Rounded 
3," DATED this - day of May, 2007. 
Roger rinlap n 
4 SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me his& day of May, 2007. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the & day of May, 2007, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served upon the foliowiilg by the method indicated below: 
Joseph D. Mallet - U.S. MAIL 
Deputy Attor~iey General Hand Delivery 
Idaho Transportation Department ~ a c s i ~ i m  
33 11 West State Street 
Post Office Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129 
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HEATHER A. CUNNINGHAM - ISB # 5480 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX 
Attorneys at Law 
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza 
199 North Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 600 
Post Office Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-3658 
Facsimile: (208) 386-9428 
Attorneys for Ddendants 
Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership 
and Lazy J. Ranch, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., 1 CASE NO. CV 04-6336 
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN MCHUGH ) 
BRUCE S WEENEY, MONTE C. 1 
MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL 
MILLER and JOHN X COMBO, 1 DEFENDANTS' MlEMORANDUM IN 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, ) OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
1 MOTION TO BIFURCATE 
Plaintiff, 
j 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED ' ) 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J. RANCH, ) 
INC. ) 
Defendants. 
COME. NOW the Defendants, Canyon Vista Family Limited Pafinership and Lazy J. 
Ranch, Inc., by and tlxough its attorneys of record ofthe firin Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox, 
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and hereby submit this Memorandum in Opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion to Bifurcate the trial 
to resolve the issue of the larger parcel in this matter prior to the presentation of the issue of just 
compensation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
After nearly two and a half years since the filing of this condemnation action, the State 
now contends that through the discovery process and recent exchange of pretrial motions that "it 
has become clear that there is a dispute between the parties regarding the 'larger parcel' issue in 
this case." Plaintifs Briefin Support of Motion, p. 2. 
Not only is this representatioil to the Court misleading and false in reflecting the State's 
understanding of this case and the other three cases in which it now contends it desires to 
consolidate into one larger parcel, but the State's own actions further indicate that it made a 
deliberate decision in separating the cases into four distinct parcels. 
Since at least October of 2001, the State has been hlly aware that the fainily members 
intended to divide a 60 acre parcel into three distinct parcels for estate planning purposes. 
Despite having this knowledge and three years afterwards, the State filed four separate 
condemnation lawsuits against the properties, appraised each individual parcel as a separate 
parcel of property and ultimately resolved thee  of the four parcels short of trial. Not once did 
the State file with the Court that the three cases of State v. KLS&M(Case No. CV 04-6334, Fifth 
Judicial District, Twin Falls County, Idaho), State v. BCM&W (Case No. CV 04-6335, Fifth 
Judicial District, Twin Falls County, Idaho) and State v. Lazy J. Ranch (Case No. CV 04-6337, 
Fifth Judicial District, Twill Falls County, Idaho) constitute one larger parcel for purposes of 
determining just compensation, In each case, just compensation was settled for $380,000, 
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$817,500 and $150,000, respectively. In each of those cases, the property owners were required 
to disclose their opinions first and they always advocated each parcel was a separate and distinct 
piece of property. The State, too, in assessing just compensation appraised and valued the 
properties separately. 
It is only now, after the State recognizes that this case is going to trial, that the State 
attempts to utilize the settled three cases to mitigate the damages arising from the Pole Line Road 
project to the subject property, the fourth and final parcel. 
It is difficult to see how the State's efforts to inject this issue after taking inconsistent 
positions previously in the three other cases can be anything other than bad faith and one must 
question whether the intent of this motion is anylhing more than an attempt to delay the jury trial 
which has been set for nearly two years. 
Based upoil the authority set forth herein, Defendants' respectfully request that this Court 
enter its Order denying the State's Motion to Bifurcate. 
11. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. The Other Three Parcels Were Condemned SeparateIy 
and Adiudicated and Should Not be Included in the Subiect Case. 
Previously, Defendants provided the Court with authority in Defendants' Motion in 
Limine to Exclude Evidence, Testimony and Argument regarding the Development of the subject 
Property with Adjacent Properties that held that res judicata and collateral estoppel applied when 
the goveriunent attempted to introduce valuation evidence of other parcels, which had been 
adjudicated previously, with the subject parcel of the suit. The Illinois court affirmed the trial 
court's decision to exclude the proposed valuation evidence. 
In Department of Transportation v Chicago Title and Trust Co , 707 N.E.2d 637 (1999), 
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the Appellate Court of Illinois was faced with the issue of whether valuation evidence of other 
parcels, which were condemned separately and adjudicated, should have be included with the 
property at issue under the larger parcel concept. The Court rejected the Transportation 
Department's arguments and explained its holding as follows: 
A prior judgment may preclude a subsequent action under both res judicata and 
collateral estoppel. (Citation omitted). The doctrine of resjz~dicata provides that 
a final judgment on the merits is conclusive as to the rights ofthe parties in that 
case and constitutes an absolute bar to a later action involvillg the same claim. 
(Citation omitted). The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when a party 
participates in two separate cases arising on different causes of actions, as here, 
a id  some controlling fact or question material to the determination of both cases 
has already been adjudicated against that party in a prior case. (Citation omitted). 
Housing Authority, (citation omitted), involved a dispute over the ownership of a 
parcel of land. However, the courl in that case found that the ownership of the 
parcel had already been determined long ago in a 1932 federal condemnation case. 
The court in Housing Aulhority thus determined that the two cases were 
substantially the same. (Citation omitted). 
Here, the ownership and valuation of the other parcels has already been 
adjudicated. As to the East Parcel, the circuit court in that case entered an order 
on February 28,2989, that Marco Muscarello was the owner. The final judgment 
order was entered in that case on June 19, 1997. The liotice of appeal for the 
instant case was filed on September 30, 1997, but no appeal was taken from the 
final judgment in the East Parcel case. A just compensation award was paid to 
Marco Muscarello, as trustee. (Citation omitted). 
As to West Parcel I, the circuit court in that case entered final judgment order on 
May 22, 1990, for a just compensation award to Gershon Hammer as the owner of 
the property. . . . 
The remainder damages as to these parcels have already been determilled and 
awarded to the appropriate parties. IDOT cannot now argue that the remainder 
damages of any of the parcels have decreased due to a subsequent acquisition to 
these properties. The issue of who held title to the other parcels, as well as the 
valuation of those parcels, was properly determined by the circuit courts as of the 
date of filing of the complaints to condemn. 
Id. at 647-48. 
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Although there is no Idaho appellate case directly on point, Idaho courts have adopted and 
applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel which is clearly applicable to situations and 
circumstances now raised by the State. The Chicago Title court's application of collateral 
estoppel is consistent with the elements of judicial estoppel adopted by the Idaho appellate 
courts. 
In Robertson S7lpply, Inc. v. Nicholls, 131 Idaho 99,952 P.2d 914 (1998), the Idaho Court 
of Appeals explained the judicial estoppel doctrine as follows: 
The Idaho Supreme Court considered and adopted the doctrine of judicial estoppel 
in Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 87, 277 P.2d 561 (1954). In Looinis, the Couit 
stated: 
It is quite generally held that where a litigant, by means of such 
sworn statements, obtains a judgment, advantage or consideration 
from one party, he will not thereafter, by repudiating such 
allegations and by means of inconsistent and contrary allegations 
or testimony, be permitted to obtain a recovery or a right against 
another party, arising out of the same transaction or subject matter. 
Id., 76 Idaho at 93-94,277 P.2d at 565. Essentially, this doctrine prevents a party 
ikom assuming a position in one proceeding and then taking an inconsistent 
position in a subsequent proceeding. (Citation omitted). There are very important 
policies underlying the judicial estoppel doctrine. One purpose of the doctrine is 
to protect the integrity of the judicial system, by protecting the orderly 
administration of justice and having regard for the dignity ofjudicial proceedings. 
(Citation omitted). The doctrine is also intended to prevent parties from playing 
fast and loose with the couits. (Citation omitted). 
Id., 131 Idaho at 101. 
In Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242,92 P.3d 492 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the application of judicial estoppel 
'The application ofjudicial estoppel is one of discretion. Ill McKay v. Owens, 130 
Idaho 148, 152, 937 P.2d 1222, 1226 (1997), the Court referred to the Risselfo t ~ .  
Plumbers and Steamjtters Local, which applied the doctrine oljudicial estoppel 
and stated the doctrine and the policies behind it: 
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Judicial estoppel, sometimes also lmown as the doctrine of 
preclusion of inconsistent positions, precludes a party from gaining 
an advantage by tatting one position, and then seeking a second 
advantage by taking a n  incompatible position. 
(Citation omitted). There are also important policies behind judicial estoppel. In 
Risetto, the Ninth Circuit stated that: 
The policies underlying preclusion of inconsiste~lt positions are 
general considerations of the orderly adniinistration of justice and 
- 
regard for the dignity of judicial prdceedings. . . ~udiciai estoppel is 
intended to protect against a litigant playing fast and losses with 
the courts. . . Because it is intended to protect the dignity of the 
judicialprocess, it is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at 
its discretion. (Citations omitted). 
Id., 140 Idaho at 252. 
Other Idaho cases which considered the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel, include Smith 1) 
US.R. Y Properties, LLC, 141 Idaho 795, 118 P.3d 127 (2005) and A&J Construction Co., Inc. 
v. Wood, 14 1 Idaho 682, 116 P.3d 12 (2005). 
The State attempts to disguise its motion to bifurcate as an issue of law on its face by 
neglecting to advise this Court of its own voluntary actions in the other cases which now become 
part of the issue raised before this Court. The State postures as if it has treated each individual 
case on its own merits and that what transpired in the other cases is irrelevant in the instant case, 
despite now attempting to raise the issue ofthe larger parcel in this case. The State is now trying 
to back door Canyon Vista, by incorporating other parcels which may have constituted the larger 
parcel, but the State elected to proceed in a different manner with them. 
The State cites Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203 (1978) and State ex re1 Flandro v. Seddon, 
94 Idaho 940 (1 972) for the proposition that tlie larger parcel is a question of law to be resolved 
by the court. In neither Rzieth nor Flandro was tlie court faced with the issue of whether other 
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properties which had been previously adjudicated could be incorporated into a larger parcel issue 
on a pending case that had yet to be adjudicated. Even if the State's proposition that the larger 
parcel is an issue of law is correct, which we do not disagree, it is remarkable that the issue can 
now be heard after judgments have been entered on the other cases and the time for appeal in 
those cases has expired and three weelcs prior to the trial in this matter. This radical shift in 
positions comes after significant time and expense has been spent preparing for trial and if 
granted would substantially prejudice the Defendants. 
B. If The Court Finds The Larger Parcel to Inelude Adiacent Prooerties 
Are the Judgments Previously Entered Void. 
Assuming the Court decides that the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel and/or 
judicial estoppel do not apply and that the larger parcel in this case consists of one or more 
adjacent parcels for purposes of just compensation in this case, the issue then becomes are the 
judgmellts entered against the other properties void. The entire premise for seeking a larger 
parcel ruling is the State's attempt to mitigate the damages incurred to Canyon Vista's property 
as a result of the Pole Line Road project. The State's theory is that if the adjacent properties 
which have direct access to Pole Line are included, then Canyon Vista would then have 
reasonable access to Pole Line Road, albeit not directly from its physical boundaries but way of 
the larger parcel concept. 
Defendants disagree and dispute that the State's proposed theory would render Canyon 
Vista's property with reasonable access to Pole Line Road. However, what has not been 
contemplated by the State is that if this were the case, do the damages tile other adjacent 
properties may incur to provide Canyon Vista's property with access which were nevei 
contemplated in the judgments entered by the Court in those cases, open the door for Lazy I. 
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Ranch, KLS&M and/or BCM&W to seek new damages. 
The State cannot use the judgments previously entered against the adjacent properties as a 
shield and then subsequently utilize those properties to cure the subject property under the cloak 
of the judgmeilts without any further recourse by those owners. The State's proposed theory in 
this case goes directly against the doctrines referenced herein that have been established since the 
inception of the law. Finality would not exist in the condenlnatio~l world if government agencies 
were permitted to use adjudicated cases to its advantage to cure other properties whose case is 
pending. 
Should the Court be inclined to allow for evidence which includes the adjacent properties 
that have beell adjudicated as part of the larger parcel, then Defendants request a ruling on the 
new issue raised of whether the judgments previously entered by this Court no longer have the 
effect of res judicata. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the case law and arguments provided herein, Defendants' respectfully request 
the Coui-t entered its Order denying the State's Motion to Bifurcate arid find that the State is 
estopped from asserting an inconsistent position. 
In the alternative, sliould the State's Motion to Bifurcate be granted, then Defendants' 
respectfully request a ruling from this C o w  that the judgments previously entered in the three 
other cases be set aside and the cases be set for trial. 
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DATED this g d a y  of May, 2007. 
. A  , 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
- 
d a y  of May, 2007, a true and correct  cop^ of the I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the - 
foregoing was served upon the following: 
Joseph Mallet - U.S. MAIL 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
33 1 1 West State Street 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129 
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E DON COPPLE - ISB # 1085 
HEATHER A. CUNNWGHAM - ISB # 5480 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX 
Attorneys at Law 
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza 
199 North Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 600 
Post Office Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-3658 
Facsimile: 1208) 386-9428 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership 
and Lazy J. Ranch, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., 
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN MCHUGH 
BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE C. 
MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL 
MILLER and JOHN X COMBO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 1 
) 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED ) 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J. RANCH, ) 
INC. ) 
1 
Defendants. 1 
CASE NO. CV 04-6336 
DEEErnANTS' OBJECTION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
BIFURCATE 
COME NOW the Defendants, Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership and Lazy J 
Rancli, Inc., by and through its attorneys of record of tlie firm Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox, 
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and hereby submit its objection to Plaintiffs Motion to Bifurcate the trial on the grounds and for 
the reasons that: 
1) Plaintiff is judicially estopped from asserting the larger parcel issue in this case; 
2) The doctrine of res judicata applies to Stute v. KLS&M (Case No. CV 04-6334, 
Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County, Idaho), State v. BCM&W (Case No. CV 
04-6335, Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County, Idaho) and State v. Lazy J. 
Ranch (Case No. CV 04-6337, Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County, Idaho) 
on the larger parcel issue; and 
3) Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from asserting the larger parcel issue in this case. 
This Objection is made and based on the records and files herein, and the authorities cited 
in Defendants' Brief in Opposition to the Plailltiff's Motion to Bifurcate. : 
I S  DATED this day of May, 2007. 
. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of May, 2007, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served upon the following: 
Joseph Mallet ____ U.S. MAIL 
Deputy Attorney General Hand Delivery 
Idaho Transportation Department J Facsinlile Transnxission 
33 11 West State Street -- O v e r n i y  
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129 
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E DON COPPLE - ISB # 1085 
HEATHER A. CUNNINGHAM - 1SB # 5480 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX 
Attorneys at Law 
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza 
199 North Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 600 
Post Office Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-3658 
Facsimile: (208) 386-9428 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF TI-IE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, ) Case No. CV-04-6336 
PlaintiffiAppellant, 
) 
) SECOND STIPULATION AND 
) REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL 
-VS- \ CLERK'S RECORD 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED 
j 
1 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH, 
INC. 1 
DefendantsIRespondents. 1 
The Appellant, by and through its attorney, Joseph D. Mallet, Deputy Attorney General 
and Respondents, by and through its attorney, Heather A. Cunninghatn, of the firm Davison, 
Copple, Copple, and Cox, in the above entitled proceeding hereby requests pursuant to Rule 19, 
SECOND STIPULATION AND REQUEST FOR 
ADDITIONAL CLERK'S RECORD -Page 1 
I.A.R., the inclusio~l of the following material in the clerk's record in addition to that required to 
be included by the I.A.R. and the notice of appeal. 
IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED between the parties that the following 
iteins shall be included in the clerk's record: 
Clerk's Record 
a. Defendant's Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion in Liinine to Exclude the 
Testilnony of Roger Dunlap (lodged May 14,2007); 
b. Affidavit of Roger Dunlap in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motioil in Linline to 
Exclude the Testimony of Roger Dunlap (filed May 14,2007); 
c. Defendant's Trial Brief - Part I (lodged April 9, 2007); 
d. Defendant's Trial Brief - Part I1 (lodged April 11, 2007); 
e. Defendant's Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs Second Motion in Limine (lodged 
May 14,2007); and 
f. Plaintiffs Trial Brief (filed on or about May 25,2007). 
i 4 ~ 6 ~ W  
DATED t h i s ~ % y  of*, 2008. 
For the Appellants: 
Dep'uty Attorney General 
DATED this & day of July, 2008. 
For the Respondents: 
ofthe firm, Davison, Cop e opple & Cox P 
SECOND STIPULATION AND REQUEST FOR 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of July, 2008, 1 caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
John Lezamiz 
133 Shoshone St N 
PO Box 389 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0389 
Joseph D. Mallet 
Deputy Attorney General 
33 11 W. State Street 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129 
mU.S. Mail 
n ~ a n d  Delivered 
movernight Mail 
NTelecopy (Fax) 208-734-41 15 
~ u . s .  Mail 
01-Iand Delivered 
movernight Mail 
@Telecopy (Fax) 334-4498 
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E DON COPPLE - ISB # 1085 
HEATHER A. CUNNINGHAM - ISB # 5480 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX 
Attorneys at Law 
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza 
199 North Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 600 
Post Office Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-3658 
Facsimile: (208) 386-9428 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Canyon Vista Family Limited Partnership 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
PlaintiffIAppellant, 
-VS- 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH, 
INC. 
DefendantsIRespondents. 
1 ) Case No. CV-04-6336 
) ORDER ON SECOND REQUEST FOR 
) ADDITIONAL CLERK'S RECORD 
1 
1 
1 
1 
THIS MATTER, having come regularly before the Court upon PlaintiffIAppellant's and 
DefendantIRespondent Stipulation, with Joseph D. Mallet, Deputy Attorney General for the 
Idaho Transporlation Department appearing for PlaintifflAppellant and Heather A. Cunningham 
of the firm Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox, appearing for DefendantIRespondent; the Court 
ORDER ON SECOND REQUEST FOR 
ADDITIONAL CLERK'S RECORD - Page 1 
having reviewed the Second Stipulation and Request for Additional Clerk's Record, and in 
furtherance thereof and good cause appearing therefore: 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS I-IEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER that the 
following items shall be included in the clerk's record: 
a. Defendant's Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion in Limine to Exclude the 
Testimony of Roger Dunlap (lodged May 14,2007); 
b. Affidavit of Roger Dunlap in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion in Liinine to 
Exclude the Testimony of Roger Dunlap (filed May 14,2007); 
c. Defendant's Trial Brief - Part I (lodged April 9,2007); 
d. Defendant's Trial Brief - Part 11 (lodged April 11,2007); 
e. Defendant's Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs Second Motion in Limine (lodged 
May 14,2007); and 
f. Plaintiffs Trial Brief (filed on or about May 25,2007). 
DATED t h i s 1  day of August, 2008. 
District Judge 
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ADDITIONAL CLERK'S RECORD - Page 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h e d  day of August, 2008, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
E Don Copple m . ~ .  Mail 
Heather Cunningham U ~ l a n d  Delivered 
Davison Copple Copple & Cox novernight Mail 
P.O. Box 1583 U~elecopy  (Fax) 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Joseph D. Mallei ~ u . s .  Mail 
Deputy Attorney General UHand Delivered 
Idaho Transportation Department a ~ v e r n i g h t  Mail 
Legal Section a ~ e l e c o p y  (Fax) 
P.O. Box. 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1 129 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., ) 
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN 1 SUPREME COURT NO. 34485 
MCHUGH, BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE ) 
C. MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL ) 
MILLER, AND JOHN X COMBO, j 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, ) 
1 
Plaintiff1 Appellant, 1 
1 
VS. 1 CLERK'S SUPPLEMENTAL, 
) CERTIFICATE 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED ) 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH ) 
INC., j 
I, KRISTINA GLASCOCK, Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls, do hereby certify that the 
foregoing CLERK'S RECORD on Appeal in this cause was compiled and bound under my 
direction and is a true, correct and complete Record of the pleadings and documents requested by 
Appellate Rule 28. 
I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above-entitled 
cause, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. 
WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court 
this 25"' day of August, 2008. 
KRISTINA GLASCOCK 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ex rel., 1 
CHARLES L. WINDER, JOHN SUPREME COURT NO. 34485 
MCHUGH, BRUCE SWEENEY, MONTE ) 
C. MCCLURE, GARY BLICK, NEIL ) 
MILLER, AND JOHN X COMBO, 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION BOARD, ) 
PlaintiffIAppellant, 
1 SUPPLEMENTAL 
VS. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
) 
CANYON VISTA FAMILY LIMITED ) 
PARTNERSHIP AND LAZY J RANCH ) 
INC., 
DefendantIRespondent, 1 
I, KRISTINA GLASCOCK, Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Twin Falls, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the CLERK'S RECORD and 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
Joseph Mallet Don Copple 
Deputy Attorney General Heather Cunninghain 
P. 0 .  Box 7129 Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox 
Boise, ID 83707-1 129 P. 0 .  Box 1583 
Boise, ID 83701 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said this 25Ih 
day of August, 2008. 
KRISTINA GLASCOCK 
Clerk of the District Court 
Certificate of Service 1 
